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<\/a><\/p>\n\u00a0Foto:\u00a0https:\/\/www.freedomsphoenix.com<\/em><\/p>\n Philip Marfleet<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n 9 Kas\u0131m 2014\u2019te Kud\u00fcs\u2019\u00fcn yak\u0131n\u0131ndaki k\u00f6ylerden aktivistler \u0130srail\u2019in apartheid duvar\u0131nda sembolik bir gedik a\u00e7t\u0131lar; Berlin Duvar\u0131\u2019n\u0131n y\u0131k\u0131l\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n 25. Y\u0131ld\u00f6n\u00fcm\u00fc an\u0131s\u0131na.[1]<\/a> Filistin Halk Direni\u015f Komitesi \u015funu s\u00f6yledi: \u201cDuvarlar ne kadar y\u00fcksek olursa olsun, y\u0131k\u0131l\u0131r. T\u0131pk\u0131 Berlin Duvar\u0131 gibi Filistin\u2019deki duvar da yan\u0131nda i\u015fgalle birlikte ala\u015fa\u011f\u0131 olacak.\u201d [2]<\/a> \u0130srailliler\u2019in t\u00fcm sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131na ra\u011fmen Filistinliler direnmeye devam ediyor. \u00d6yle yapmak zorundalar: Aktivistlerin duvarda delik a\u00e7t\u0131klar\u0131 s\u0131rada M\u0131s\u0131r h\u00fck\u00fcmeti Filistin b\u00f6lgesinin etraf\u0131na yeni bir set \u00f6rmeye ba\u015flad\u0131; bu sefer 13 km\u2019lik tampon b\u00f6lge yap\u0131lan Refah\u2019a yak\u0131n M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n Gazze s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131na. Bu duvar Gazze\u2019nin g\u00fcneyini kapat\u0131yor.[3]<\/a> Bu iki olay Filistinliler\u2019in i\u00e7inde bulunduklar\u0131 belal\u0131 duruma i\u015faret ediyor: \u0130srail\u2019in yerinden yurdundan etti\u011fi, m\u00fclks\u00fczle\u015ftirdi\u011fi ve \u00f6tekile\u015ftirdi\u011fi Filistinliler ayn\u0131 zamanda uzunca bir s\u00fcredir Arap rejimleri taraf\u0131ndan reddedilip izole ediliyorlar. Bu ku\u015fatma nas\u0131l k\u0131r\u0131l\u0131r?<\/p>\n Ocak 2011\u2019de Arap devrimleri ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131nda \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcn eli kula\u011f\u0131nda gibiydi. Diktat\u00f6rler d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcyor ve kitle hareketi b\u00fct\u00fcn b\u00f6lgeyi sar\u0131yordu: Filistinliler art\u0131k son derece g\u00fc\u00e7 ko\u015fullarla cebelle\u015fmek zorunda kalan bir halk de\u011fil, milyonlar\u0131n kurulu d\u00fczene kafa tuttu\u011fu ba\u015fkald\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olacaklard\u0131. Kahire\u2019nin Tahrir Meydan\u0131\u2019ndaki insanlar Kud\u00fcs\u2019\u00fcn \u00f6zg\u00fcrle\u015ftirilmesi \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131 yap\u0131p devrimin Filistinliler ile M\u0131s\u0131rl\u0131lar\u2019\u0131n birli\u011fini sa\u011flamas\u0131 konusunda taviz vermeyeceklerini g\u00f6stermek i\u00e7in Gazze\u2019ye delegeler yollad\u0131lar. \u0130srail liderleri en k\u00f6t\u00fc ihtimalin ba\u015flar\u0131na gelece\u011finden korktular. \u0130srail savunma bakan\u0131 Ehud Barak\u2019a g\u00f6re Ortado\u011fu \u201ctarihi bir deprem\u201d ya\u015fad\u0131 ve \u0130srail politik bir \u201ctsunami\u201dyle y\u00fcz y\u00fcze geldi.[4]<\/a> [Bu konu\u015fmadan] Bir y\u0131l evvel \u0130srailli gazeteci Aluf Benn hem \u0130srail hem de Birle\u015fik Devletler\u2019in liderlerinin \u201creis<\/i>in[*]<\/a> – ba\u015fkan M\u00fcbarek \u2013 sa\u011fl\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in dua\u201d ettiklerini yazm\u0131\u015ft\u0131.[5]<\/a> Yaz\u0131ya \u015f\u00f6yle devam ediyor: \u201cB\u00fct\u00fcn d\u00fcnya liderleri i\u00e7inde [\u0130srailli] ba\u015fbakan Benjamin Netanyahu\u2019ya en yak\u0131n isim M\u0131s\u0131r Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 H\u00fcsn\u00fc M\u00fcbarek\u2019tir\u201d.[6]<\/a> M\u0131s\u0131r diktat\u00f6r\u00fc ABD\u2019ye sad\u0131k bir arkada\u015f, \u0130srail\u2019e yak\u0131n bir m\u00fcttefik oldu. Kahire ve Tel Aviv h\u00fck\u00fcmetleri aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkileri \u201cnormalle\u015ftirme\u201dye ve yak\u0131n ekonomik ba\u011flar kurmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n En \u00f6nemlisi ise M\u00fcbarek’in M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da kitlesel m\u00fccadeleyle dolu bir gelene\u011fe sahip, ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z politik faaliyeti 30 y\u0131l boyunca engellemesiydi. M\u00fcbarek\u2019i ala\u015fa\u011f\u0131 eden g\u00fc\u00e7ler bu gelene\u011fi tazeledi ve sonu gelmeyen sokak protestolar\u0131 ve kitlesel grevlerle e\u015fi g\u00f6r\u00fclmemi\u015f \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde ileriye ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131. Gazze ve Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019da Filistinliler dayan\u0131\u015fma eylemleri d\u00fczenlediler ve Tahrir ruhuyla \u201c\u0130ntifada\u201d \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131 yapt\u0131lar. Tecritle ge\u00e7en y\u0131llardan sonra b\u00f6ylesi eylemlerin \u0130srail\u2019e payanda olan Arap egemenlerine ve emperyalist m\u00fcttefiklere kafa tutma konusunda ortakla\u015ft\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6rd\u00fcler. Kahire\u2019deki devrimci de\u011fi\u015fimin Kud\u00fcs\u2019\u00fc \u00f6zg\u00fcrle\u015ftirmesi bir m\u00fcddet m\u00fcmk\u00fcn g\u00f6r\u00fcnd\u00fc. Fakat bu g\u00fczel hayal geri \u00e7ekildi. Bunun sebebi sadece Arap ba\u015fkentlerinde imal edilen kar\u015f\u0131-devrimler de\u011fildi; ayn\u0131 zamanda Filistin ulusal hareketinin i\u00e7indeki keskin kriz de nedenlerden birisiydi. Neler ya\u015fand\u0131? Bu ya\u015fananlar\u0131n Filistin\u2019e ve Arap d\u00fcnyas\u0131 \u00e7ap\u0131nda devrimci g\u00fcndeme etkileri neler olacak?<\/p>\n Bu makale Ortado\u011fu\u2019da ayaklanmalar\u0131n ya\u015fand\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir d\u00f6nemde Filistin\u2019in i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu k\u00f6t\u00fc vaziyete de\u011finiyor. \u015eu anda her zamankinden daha zay\u0131f halde bulunan bir hareketin; Filistin ulusalc\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n 1950\u2019lerden bug\u00fcne y\u00fckseli\u015fi ve geriye \u00e7ekili\u015fini de\u011ferlendiriyor. Filistin liderlerinin ideolojik duru\u015flar\u0131, \u0130srail\u2019le uyum sa\u011flama \u00e7abalar\u0131 ve neo-liberalizmi heyecanla kucaklamalar\u0131 inceleniyor. En \u00f6nemlisi M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019daki ayaklanma olmak \u00fczere son devrimci m\u00fccadelelerin Filistin meselesi i\u00e7in \u00f6nemi ortaya seriliyor ve Filistin\u2019in Ortado\u011fu \u00e7ap\u0131nda sosyal adalet m\u00fccadelelerinin bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olmas\u0131na d\u00f6n\u00fck yeni senaryolar de\u011ferlendiriliyor.<\/p>\n Filistin milliyet\u00e7iliginin krizi o kadar derin ki Filistinli aktivistler ve akademisyenler taraf\u0131ndan uzun s\u00fcredir g\u00f6z ard\u0131 edilen sorular art\u0131k a\u00e7\u0131k tart\u0131\u015fmalarda \u00f6nemli hale geldi. Omar Barghouti \u201ct\u00fcmden karmakar\u0131\u015f\u0131k\u201d ve \u201cdo\u011fas\u0131 gere\u011fi herhangi etkili bir direni\u015f stratejisi geli\u015ftirmekte yetersiz\u201d bir ulusal liderlik hakk\u0131nda yaz\u0131yor.[7]<\/a> Raja Khalidi kaybolmu\u015f bir \u201cdevrimci ruh\u201du, hareketin \u201cmilliyet\u00e7ili\u011fin gizli tuzaklar\u0131\u201dndan ka\u00e7\u0131nmaktaki ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve \u201cs\u00f6m\u00fcrgecili\u011fin bir \u00e7e\u015fidinden di\u011ferine ge\u00e7i\u015fi\u201dni sorguluyor.[8]<\/a> Khalidi\u2019ye g\u00f6re en temel mesele Filistin Kurutulu\u015f \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc\u2019n\u00fcn (FK\u00d6) \u0130srail ve onun m\u00fcttefiklerinin eline d\u00fc\u015fmesi: \u201cOslo \u00f6ncesi militan duru\u015ftan \u0130srail\u2019le, k\u00fcresel g\u00fc\u00e7lerle ve neo-liberalizmin zokalar\u0131na uyumlu pozisyona do\u011fru\u2026 neredeyse eksiksiz bir d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm\u201d.[9]<\/a> Yak\u0131n d\u00f6nem Filistin tarihi ba\u011flam\u0131nda ele ald\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131zda b\u00f6ylesi geli\u015fmeler hi\u00e7 de \u015fa\u015f\u0131rt\u0131c\u0131 de\u011fil.<\/p>\n 1948 Nakbas\u0131\u2019ndan[10]<\/a> sonra Filistinliler b\u00f6lgenin her yerine da\u011f\u0131ld\u0131. S\u00fcrg\u00fcnden \u00f6nce \u00e7ift\u00e7i, i\u015f\u00e7i veya kent yoksulu olan bu insanlar; Beyrut, \u015eam ve Amman gibi \u015fehirlerde kurulan m\u00fclteci kamplar\u0131na veya yerle\u015fim b\u00f6lgelerine yerle\u015ftirildikleri L\u00fcbnan, Suriye, M\u0131s\u0131r ve \u00dcrd\u00fcn\u2019e s\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fcler. Zengin veya e\u011fitim avantaj\u0131na sahip olan k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck bir kesim ise y\u00fckselen petrol ekonomisi temeline yaslanan K\u00f6rfez devletlerinin alt yap\u0131 faaliyetlerine yard\u0131mc\u0131 olmak \u00fczere buralara ta\u015f\u0131nd\u0131. Bu diaspora co\u011frafyas\u0131 1950\u2019lerde y\u00fckselen milliyet\u00e7i harekete \u00e7ok sa\u011flam bir temel etki olu\u015fturdu. Bu m\u00fcltecilerin \u00e7o\u011fu yoksul kalmaya devam ettiler ve gittikleri yerlerde de politik olarak d\u0131\u015fland\u0131lar; kayg\u0131 duyduklar\u0131 en \u00f6nemli konular\u00a0 i\u015f, konut, e\u011fitim, bask\u0131 ortam\u0131 ve m\u00fcltecilerin geri d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fc meseleydi. Filistinliler\u2019in \u00f6fkesinden ve bu \u00f6fkenin geni\u015f halk kesimlerini etkilemesinden endi\u015fe duyan [o \u00fclkelerin] rejimleri Filistinliler\u2019i kamplarda ve yerle\u015fim yerlerinde s\u0131k\u0131 bir denetime tabi tutuyorlard\u0131.<\/p>\n K\u00f6rfez \u00fclkelerinde farkl\u0131 bir durum s\u00f6z konusuydu. Buralarda Filistinli i\u015fadamlar\u0131 in\u015faat ve ticaret sekt\u00f6rlerinden servetler elde etti. Profesyonel meslek sahipleri (\u00f6\u011fretmenler, doktorlar, avukatlar, in\u015faat m\u00fchendisleri ve y\u00f6neticiler) yeni devletlerin g\u00fc\u00e7lenmesinde kilit bir rol oynad\u0131lar. Saad \u0130brahim Filistinliler\u2019in \u201cpetrol zengini \u00fclkelerde en etkili g\u00f6\u00e7men cemaati\u201dne d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fc yorumunu yap\u0131yor.[11]<\/a> Kuveyt\u2019te i\u015f yapan baz\u0131 gen\u00e7 giri\u015fimciler de dahil baz\u0131lar\u0131 zenginledi. Bunlar\u0131n en \u00fcnl\u00fcs\u00fc Yasser Arafat\u2019t\u0131. S\u00fcrg\u00fcndeki di\u011fer Filistinliler gibi bu insanlar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011fu, Arap \u00fclkelerinin vatanda\u015fl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 elde edemedi ve ekonomik stat\u00fclerine ra\u011fmen yerel politikada etkili bir rol oynamaktan al\u0131kondular. Bunlar devleti olmayan, embriyon a\u015famas\u0131ndaki burjuvazi idi ve Arafat grubunun esas hedefi ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z bir Filistin\u2019de kendi stat\u00fclerini sa\u011flamla\u015ft\u0131rmakt\u0131.<\/p>\n 1950\u2019lerin ba\u015flar\u0131ndan itibaren Arafat ve i\u015f arkada\u015flar\u0131 \u0130srail\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 askeri harek\u00e2ta giri\u015fmeleri i\u00e7in ba\u015fta M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n Cemal Abd\u00fcl Nasr\u2019\u0131 olmak \u00fczere Arap liderleri aras\u0131nda lobi faaliyeti yapt\u0131lar. B\u00f6lgedeki imtiyazl\u0131lar \u015febekesinin bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olarak devlet ba\u015fkanlar\u0131na, krallara ve emirlere Filistin i\u00e7in harekete ge\u00e7meleri ad\u0131na bask\u0131 yapt\u0131lar ve bu egemenlerle ayn\u0131 stat\u00fcye sahip olman\u0131n tad\u0131na varacaklar\u0131 zamanlar\u0131 iple \u00e7ektiler. Beklentileri bo\u015fa \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131; Arap rejimleri lafa gelince g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fcyd\u00fcler, ama ordu marifetiyle Filistin\u2019i \u00f6zg\u00fcrle\u015ftirmeye hi\u00e7 niyetleri yoktu. S\u00f6m\u00fcrgecilik kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 m\u00fccadelenin t\u00fcm \u201cK\u00fcresel G\u00fcney\u201di sard\u0131\u011f\u0131 1950\u2019lerin radikal politik ortam\u0131nda pek \u00e7ok Filistinli, Filistin\u2019in kurtulu\u015funun ancak t\u00fcm Arap b\u00f6lgesinin s\u00f6m\u00fcrgecilerden temizlenmesiyle sa\u011flanabilece\u011fini savunan Milliyet\u00e7i Arap Hareketi’ne (MAH) dahil oldu. Arafat ve di\u011ferleri 1959\u2019da Kuveyt\u2019te El-Fetih\u2019i (Al Fatah) kurduklar\u0131nda MAH\u2019\u0131n stratejisini tersine \u00e7evirdi: Onlara g\u00f6re Arap birli\u011fini sa\u011flaman\u0131n yolu \u00f6ncelikle Filistin\u2019in kurtar\u0131lmas\u0131ndan ge\u00e7iyordu.[12]<\/a> Bu hem \u0130srail i\u015fgali alt\u0131ndakiler hem de s\u00fcrg\u00fcndekiler dahil b\u00fct\u00fcn Filistinliler i\u00e7in g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir \u00e7ekim yaratt\u0131. Bu, temel bir soruyu g\u00fcndeme getirdi: S\u00fcrg\u00fcndekilerin (Arap \u00fclkelerinde ya\u015fayanlar, yani Filistinliler\u2019in \u00e7o\u011funlu\u011funun) rol\u00fc ne olacak? El-Fetih \u00e7ok netti: Filistin m\u00fccadelesi sert hatlarla \u00e7izilmi\u015f ulusal bir temelde y\u00fcr\u00fcyecekti. Herkes \u201ckar\u0131\u015fmama\u201d denilen prensibe ba\u011fl\u0131 kalacakt\u0131; Filistinliler hi\u00e7bir zaman Arap devletlerinin i\u015flerine m\u00fcdahil olmayacakt\u0131.[13]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00d6nerme tuhaf, hatta sapk\u0131ncayd\u0131: Filistinliler b\u00f6lge \u00fclkelerine da\u011f\u0131lm\u0131\u015flard\u0131 ve ya\u015fam ko\u015fullar\u0131 b\u00f6lgedeki b\u00fct\u00fcn ekonomik ve politik m\u00fccadeleler taraf\u0131ndan belirleniyordu. \u00c7o\u011funluk i\u00e7in iktidarlarla kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya gelmek ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmazd\u0131. Buna kar\u015f\u0131n El-Fetih, \u00fcyelerinin kendi avantalar\u0131n\u0131 garantileyece\u011fi, yeni bir b\u00f6lgesel kapitalist sistemin par\u00e7as\u0131 olarak ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Arap egemen s\u0131n\u0131flar\u0131 hem patron hem de nihayetinde partnerdi; bu y\u00fczden \u201ckar\u0131\u015fmama\u201d El-Fetih\u2019in yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131nda temel bir unsurdu. Bu onun stratejisindeki basit bir \u00e7eli\u015fki de\u011fildi. Arafat ve di\u011ferleri \u00f6z\u00fcnde burjuva ulusalc\u0131lar\u0131 olsalar da s\u00f6m\u00fcrgecilik kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 m\u00fccadelelerin radikal milliyet\u00e7iliinin ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131ndan feyz al\u0131yorlard\u0131. 1965\u2019te en sonunda Filistin\u2019i kurtarmak i\u00e7in silahl\u0131 m\u00fccadele \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131 yapt\u0131klar\u0131nda Cezayir, \u00c7in, Vietnam ve K\u00fcba\u2019daki gerilla stratejisinin ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 yakalama umudundayd\u0131lar. Arafat\u2019\u0131n kendisi 1964\u2019te bir El-Fetih delegasyonunun \u00c7in\u2019e yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ziyarette \u00c7inliler\u2019in Fetih\u00e7iler\u2019in yakla\u015f\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n ak\u0131l d\u0131\u015f\u0131 oldu\u011funu s\u00f6ylediklerini aktar\u0131yor: \u201cBize \u015f\u00f6yle dediler: \u2018Tasarlad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131z \u015fey inan\u0131lmaz. Bunu beceremezsiniz. \u00d6zg\u00fcrle\u015ftirmek istedi\u011finiz b\u00f6lgede hi\u00e7bir temeliniz yok ve bunu sa\u011flama ihtimaliniz de yok. Nereden ba\u015flayacaks\u0131n\u0131z? Silahl\u0131 m\u00fccadele i\u00e7in gerekli ko\u015fullar yok’.\u201d [14]<\/a> Buna ra\u011fmen 1967\u2019de \u0130srail ordusunun Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019y\u0131 i\u015fgalini takiben El-Fetih bu stratejiyi hayata ge\u00e7irmek i\u00e7in b\u00f6lgeye birka\u00e7 y\u00fcz silahl\u0131 adam g\u00f6nderdi. \u00c7o\u011fu h\u0131zla \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc veya yakaland\u0131 ve bu deney bir daha tekrarlanmad\u0131. Yine de \u00f6rg\u00fct milislerinden ve Filistin\u2019i \u00f6zg\u00fcrle\u015ftirmekte kilit unsurun silahl\u0131 m\u00fccadele olaca\u011f\u0131 fikrinden vazge\u00e7medi.<\/p>\n Nasr hem Filistin davas\u0131na bir jest olarak hem de gittik\u00e7e \u00f6fkelenen Filistinli aktivistleri frenleyebilmek i\u00e7in 1964\u2019te FK\u00d6\u2019y\u00fc kurdu. \u00d6rg\u00fct, h\u0131zl\u0131ca El-Fetih\u2019in eline d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Bu s\u0131rada m\u00fclteci kamplar\u0131ndan binlerce gen\u00e7 sava\u015f\u00e7\u0131 ile birlikte Filistinliler\u2019in isyan\u0131ndan etkilenen Arap \u00fclkelerinin vatanda\u015flar\u0131 \u201cfedailer\u201d olarak \u00f6rg\u00fcte kat\u0131l\u0131yordu. MAH da silahl\u0131 bir kanat olu\u015fturdu: Filistin Halk Kurtulu\u015f Cephesi (FHKC). Silahl\u0131 hareket b\u00fcy\u00fcd\u00fck\u00e7e yeni yeni fraksiyonlar ve k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck gruplar ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Bunlar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011fu radikal politik g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fleri savunuyor, ama m\u00fccadele i\u00e7inde Arap devletlerinin temsilcileri gibi hareket ediyorlard\u0131.[15]<\/a> Bu arada El-Fetih K\u00f6rfez rejimleriyle ba\u011flar\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamla\u015ft\u0131rd\u0131; \u00f6zellikle 1969\u2019da Faustvari bir anla\u015fma[\u2020]<\/a> imzalad\u0131\u011f\u0131 Suudi Arabistan egemenleriyle. \u00d6rg\u00fct, El-Fetih\u2019i kom\u00fcnistlerin y\u00f6netti\u011fi iddias\u0131n\u0131n \u201ckirli bir yalan\u201d oldu\u011funa Kral Faysal\u2019\u0131 ikna ederek Suudiler\u2019in krall\u0131kta \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan Filisitinliler\u2019in gelirlerinin y\u00fczde 5\u2019i oran\u0131nda vergi toplamas\u0131n\u0131 ve bu verginin de do\u011frudan FK\u00d6\u2019ye ula\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flad\u0131lar.[16]<\/a> Ayr\u0131ca do\u011frudan Suudi devletinden \u00f6nemli miktarda hibe ve silah yard\u0131m\u0131 elde ettiler. Alan Hart bunu \u015f\u00f6yle yorumluyor: \u201cEl-Fetih i\u00e7in Suudi Arabistan\u2019\u0131n deste\u011finin \u00f6nemi abart\u0131lmamal\u0131. Zaman net bir \u015fekilde g\u00f6sterdi ki Suudi Arabistan yan\u0131ndayken Fetih y\u0131k\u0131lmazd\u0131; elbette [Fetih bu deste\u011fi] Suudiler\u2019in tahamm\u00fcl edebilece\u011fi politikalar\u0131 g\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc s\u00fcrece [elde etti].\u201d [17]<\/a><\/p>\n El-Fetih\u2019in olu\u015fturdu\u011fu silahl\u0131 hareket \u0130srail\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 gerilla stratejisini uygulayamad\u0131. Fakat strateji, Arap rejimleriyle kafa kafaya gelmesine neden oldu. L\u00fcbnan\u2019da ve \u00dcrd\u00fcn\u2019de FK\u00d6 k\u0131sa s\u00fcrede m\u00fclteci kamplar\u0131n\u0131n kontrol\u00fcn\u00fc ele ge\u00e7irdi. Kamplar, Filistinliler\u2019in merkezi devlet otoritesine meydan okudu\u011fu, ele ge\u00e7irilmi\u015f alanlar haline geldi.[18]<\/a> Radikalli\u011fin artt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir atmosferde kafa kafaya gelmek ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmazd\u0131 ve 1970\u2019de \u00dcrd\u00fcn\u2019de \u015fiddetli bir \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Filistinli gruplar burada benzersiz bir deste\u011fe sahipti ve rejimin harekete hasmane yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 y\u00fcz\u00fcnden zay\u0131f monar\u015fiye kar\u015f\u0131 harekete ge\u00e7mek ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmaz gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyordu. El-Fetih\u2019in kurucu \u00fcyelerinden Muhammed Davud Udeh (Ebu Davud),[19]<\/a> gen\u00e7 subaylar\u0131n ve aktivistlerin \u00dcrd\u00fcn rejimine kar\u015f\u0131 vakitsiz bir sald\u0131r\u0131 \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131 yapt\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 ve Arafat\u2019\u0131n bu teklifi derhal reddetti\u011fini s\u00f6yl\u00fcyordu: \u201cS\u0131kl\u0131kla [zaman\u0131n \u00dcrd\u00fcn Kral\u0131] H\u00fcseyin\u2019i devirme meselesini ciddi ciddi tart\u0131\u015f\u0131rd\u0131k\u2026 Arafat her daim \u2018hay\u0131r\u2019 dedi. H\u00fcseyin\u2019e veya herhangi bir Arap rejimine kar\u015f\u0131 sava\u015f ba\u015flatman\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011fa giden yol olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6ylerdi\u201d.[20]<\/a> Fakat sonunda Kral H\u00fcseyin sald\u0131rd\u0131; \u201cKara Eyl\u00fcl\u201d 1970 s\u0131ras\u0131nda ve sonras\u0131ndaki ac\u0131mas\u0131z m\u00fccadelede binlerce \u201cfedai\u201d \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc ve nihayetinde gerilla \u00f6rg\u00fctleri \u00dcrd\u00fcn\u2019den L\u00fcbnan\u2019a do\u011fru s\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc.<\/p>\n Herhangi bir rejime kafa tutma fikri (ayakta kalma stratejisi bile olsa) Arafat ve arkada\u015flar\u0131 i\u00e7in aforoz sebebiydi. El-Fetih, Arap rejimlerinin ve petrol kodamanlar\u0131nda v\u00fccut bulan \u015firket \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n esas oyuncular\u0131 oldu\u011fu karma\u015f\u0131k ili\u015fkiler a\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7inde s\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131p kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bu arada \u00f6rg\u00fct, militanlar\u0131n\u0131 (fedailer) b\u00f6lgenin en \u00e7ok d\u0131\u015flanm\u0131\u015f ve yoksul toplulu\u011fu i\u00e7inden dev\u015firiyordu. Bunlar i\u00e7in de\u011fi\u015fim acil bir ihtiya\u00e7t\u0131. El-Fetih liderli\u011finin buldu\u011fu \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlerden birisi otoriterli\u011fi art\u0131rmak oldu ki bu daha ciddi problemlerin \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n yak\u0131n oldu\u011funun bir g\u00f6stergesiydi.<\/p>\n Hareketin \u00dcrd\u00fcn felaketinin yaralar\u0131 hi\u00e7 kapanmad\u0131. Sonraki on sene L\u00fcbnan\u2019da s\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131p kald\u0131. Burada da neo-fa\u015fist L\u00fcbnan Falanj\u0131, Suriye ordusu ve L\u00fcbnan\u2019\u0131n g\u00fcneyini i\u015fgal eden \u0130srail\u2019le s\u00fcrekli \u00e7at\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bu d\u00f6nem ayr\u0131ca \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fcn \u201cL\u00fcbnanla\u015fma\u201dya maruz kald\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir s\u00fcre\u00e7tir: B\u00f6l\u00fcc\u00fc mezhep\u00e7ilik temelinde y\u00fckselen L\u00fcbnan devletinin hizip\u00e7ili\u011finin, cemaat\u00e7ili\u011finin ve entrikalar\u0131n\u0131n sert tokad\u0131 ve Filistin hareketini kendi rekabet\u00e7i m\u00fccadelelerinde meze olarak kullanan Arap devletlerinin habis etkisi. 1982\u2019de \u0130srail b\u00fcy\u00fck bir istila hareketine giri\u015fti ve sonu\u00e7ta FK\u00d6\u2019y\u00fc L\u00fcbnan\u2019dan \u00e7\u0131kmaya zorlad\u0131. \u00d6rg\u00fct Tunus, Yemen ve Sudan\u2019a da\u011f\u0131ld\u0131. Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k i\u00e7in silahl\u0131 m\u00fccadele stratejisi bitmi\u015f oldu.<\/p>\n M\u00fccadelenin bir sonraki evresi enerjisini tabandan ald\u0131. 1967 sava\u015f\u0131 s\u0131ras\u0131nda \u0130srail, M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n elinden Gazze\u2019yi ve \u00dcrd\u00fcn\u2019den de Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019y\u0131 ald\u0131. Bu \u201c\u0130\u015fgal Alt\u0131ndaki Topraklar\u201dda \u0130srail h\u0131zla kolonizasyon s\u00fcreci ba\u015flatt\u0131; topraklara ve su kaynaklar\u0131na el koydu ve b\u00f6lgenin ekonomisini kendine \u201cuygun\u201d hale getirdi. Yeni yerle\u015fim topluluklar\u0131 t\u0131pk\u0131 19. Yy.da Avrupa\u2019dan geri \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131lan kolonicilerin yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi olu\u015fturuldu. Frans\u0131zlar\u2019\u0131n Cezayir\u2019de yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi \u0130srail kolonlar (k\u00f6yl\u00fclerden zorla el konulan topraklar\u0131n etraf\u0131na m\u00fcstahkem mevkiler) in\u015fa etti. Nakba, insafs\u0131z m\u00fclks\u00fczle\u015ftirme bi\u00e7iminde devam etti: 1988\u2019e gelindi\u011finde Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019n\u0131n y\u00fczde 52\u2019si ve Gazze\u2019nin y\u00fczde 34\u2019\u00fc \u0130srail\u2019in elindeydi;[21]<\/a> \u0130srail ekonomi ve maliye bakan\u0131 Gad Ya\u2019cobi\u2019nin bile i\u015faret etti\u011fi gibi \u201cfiili ilhakla sonu\u00e7lanan \u00fcrpertici bir s\u00fcre\u00e7\u201d.[22]<\/a> Bu arada Filistin halk\u0131 ucuz emek g\u00fcc\u00fc olarak \u0130srail ekonomisinde i\u015fe ko\u015fuldu; Bat\u0131 \u015eeria ve Gazze\u2019nin i\u015fg\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fcn \u00fc\u00e7te biri \u0130srail\u2019deki i\u015flere bel ba\u011flar haldeydi. Bu i\u015flerin ko\u015fullar\u0131 G\u00fcney Afrika\u2019daki s\u00f6m\u00fcrgeci\/apartheid rejimine ait \u201crezerv\u201d\/Bantustan sistemini and\u0131r\u0131yordu.[23]<\/a> Durum patlamaya m\u00fcsaitti ve nitekim patlama Aral\u0131k 1987\u2019de ba\u015flayan \u0130ntifada \u015feklinde ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Bu ola\u011fan\u00fcst\u00fc hareket Gazze ve Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019daki t\u00fcm Filistin toplumunu kapsad\u0131. Aylarca s\u00fcren grevleri, boykotlar\u0131, g\u00f6sterileri ve t\u00fcrl\u00fc \u00e7e\u015fit yerel eylemleri organize eden aktivist a\u011f\u0131, FK\u00d6\u2019n\u00fcn kurumsal yap\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7ok \u00f6tesine ta\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Ramallah\u2019tan gelen bir rapor \u015funu s\u00f6yl\u00fcyordu:<\/i><\/p>\n Sloganlar FK\u00d6\u2019n\u00fcn Filistin halk\u0131n\u0131n tek me\u015fru \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fc oldu\u011funu s\u00f6ylese de buradaki aktivistler a\u015fa\u011f\u0131dan kendi inisiyatiflerini ortaya koyuyor. Hareketin liderli\u011finin sesi umumi ve isimsiz\u2026 baz\u0131 geleneksel ulusalc\u0131 liderler, olaylar\u0131n dalgas\u0131n\u0131n alt\u0131nda kald\u0131lar ve ancak k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck roller oynayabiliyorlar.[24]<\/b><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n \u0130srail bir s\u00fcr\u00fc yerel liderli\u011fi kontrol etmek zorunlulu\u011fuyla (askeri bask\u0131 anlam\u0131nda bile) kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya kald\u0131. Bu, sadece \u0130srail\u2019in sorunu de\u011fildi; Arafat ve El-Fetih liderli\u011fi ve Arap rejimleri de ayn\u0131 sorundan mustaripti. \u0130ntifada, Filistin sorununu yeniden g\u00fcndeme getirip Arap y\u00f6netimlerinin harekete ge\u00e7me ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6zler \u00f6n\u00fcne sererken Ortado\u011fu\u2019nun her taraf\u0131nda destek eylemleri d\u00fczenleniyordu. M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019daki geli\u015fmeler \u00f6zellikle \u00f6nemliydi; burada Filistin meselesi yerel politik sorunlarla i\u00e7 i\u00e7e ge\u00e7mi\u015fti. Filistin meselesi sol i\u00e7in s\u00f6m\u00fcrgecilik kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 m\u00fccadeleyi devam ettirmekte anahtar niteli\u011findeydi; mesele, \u0130slami hareketin de oda\u011f\u0131nda yer al\u0131yordu. 1948\u2019den beri \u0130srail\u2019le d\u00f6rt sava\u015f yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015f ve bunlar\u0131n sonucunda \u0130srail, M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n topraklar\u0131n\u0131 i\u015fgal etmi\u015fti. 1978\u2019de M\u0131s\u0131r cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Enver Sedat\u2019\u0131n \u0130srail\u2019le bar\u0131\u015f anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzalamas\u0131 (buna ABD arac\u0131l\u0131k etmi\u015fti) Filistinliler\u2019i y\u00fcz\u00fcst\u00fc b\u0131rakmak anlam\u0131n\u0131 ta\u015f\u0131yordu ve buna M\u0131s\u0131r halk\u0131n\u0131n duydu\u011fu \u00f6fke b\u00fcy\u00fckt\u00fc.<\/p>\n 1987 \u0130ntifadas\u0131 M\u0131s\u0131rl\u0131lar taraf\u0131ndan \u00fcniversitelerde b\u00fcy\u00fck destek eylemleri ve Cuma namaz\u0131 g\u00f6sterileriyle selamland\u0131. \u0130slamc\u0131 bir vaiz \u0131srarl\u0131yd\u0131: \u201c\u0130srail\u2019le olan s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n cihat\u00e7\u0131lara a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 talep ediyoruz\u201d.[25]<\/a> Hareket Mahallet\u00fc’l-K\u00fcbra\u2019ya (M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n sanayi kenti) s\u0131\u00e7rad\u0131. Burada i\u015f\u00e7ilerin \u0130ntifada\u2019yla ger\u00e7ek bir dayan\u0131\u015fman\u0131n ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilmesi, M\u0131s\u0131r h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin ABD ve \u0130MF\u2019yle yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 anla\u015fmalar\u0131n feshedilmesi ve H\u00fcsn\u00fc M\u00fcbarek\u2019in koltu\u011funu terk etmesi talepleriyle d\u00fczenledi\u011fi bir g\u00f6steride polisle \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar ya\u015fand\u0131. M\u0131s\u0131r i\u00e7i\u015fleri bakan\u0131 \u201csabotajlara ve k\u0131\u015fk\u0131rtmaya\u201d kar\u015f\u0131 konu\u015ftu ve sonraki eylemlere \u00e7evik kuvvetle m\u00fcdahale edilece\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131.[26]<\/a> Phil Marshall\u2019\u0131n g\u00f6zlemleri \u015f\u00f6yle:<\/p>\n Dayan\u0131\u015fma hareketi art\u0131k kendi taleplerine ait bir momentum ortaya koyuyordu ve politik genelle\u015ftirme her eylemde h\u0131zlan\u0131yor. M\u0131s\u0131r, her Arap rejiminin korktu\u011fu \u015feyi ortaya \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131yor; Filistin meselesi Ortado\u011fu\u2019da en y\u0131k\u0131c\u0131 mevzudur. Siyonizme direnirken Filistinliler b\u00f6lgenin emperyalist kontrol\u00fcyle; Arap \u00f6\u011frenciler ve i\u015f\u00e7iler kendi toplumlar\u0131ndaki s\u0131n\u0131f ili\u015fkileriyle ve kendi egemenlerinin d\u00fcnya sistemiyle olan ba\u011flar\u0131yla y\u00fczle\u015ftiler.[27]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n Hareket T\u00fcrkiye, Sudan, Kuveyt, Cezayir, Tunus, Fas ve Suriye\u2019ye s\u0131\u00e7rad\u0131\u011f\u0131nda bu \u00fclkelerin y\u00f6neticileri FK\u00d6 liderlerini hareketin y\u0131k\u0131c\u0131 etkisini engellemek i\u00e7in g\u00f6reve \u00e7a\u011f\u0131rd\u0131lar. Arafat\u2019\u0131n kendisi rejimin Filistinliler\u2019i desteklemesini kutlamak (asl\u0131nda yerel aktivistleri k\u0131namak) i\u00e7in Kuveyt\u2019i ziyaret etti. FK\u00d6\u2019n\u00fcn di\u011fer \u00f6nde gelenleri eylemlerde boy g\u00f6sterdi ve TV yay\u0131nlar\u0131nda Filistinliler\u2019in kendi sorunlar\u0131n\u0131 ortaya sermek i\u00e7in gerekli ne varsa zaten yapt\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 bir bir anlatt\u0131; Filistinli olmayanlar\u0131n harekete ge\u00e7mesine gerek yoktu. Aktivistler ve rejimler aras\u0131nda kalan FK\u00d6 liderleri, kararlar\u0131n\u0131 ikincilerden yana kulland\u0131.<\/p>\n \u0130ntifada\u2019n\u0131n sert etkisi b\u00f6lge boyunca hissedilmeye devam etti. Ekim 1988\u2019de kitlesel protestolar Cezayir\u2019de patlak verdi; kemer s\u0131kma tedbirlerine kar\u015f\u0131 ard\u0131 arkas\u0131 gelmeyen eylemlerde ve grevlerde Filistin hareketinin sembolleri seferber edildi. Arap \u00fclkeleri Cezayir rejiminin yan\u0131nda yedeklenirken Suudi medyas\u0131 \u201cbula\u015f\u0131c\u0131 hastal\u0131k\u201d gulyabanisi korkusunu sal\u0131yordu.[28]<\/a> Bir y\u0131l sonra benzer protestolar \u00dcrd\u00fcn\u2019de ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131: FK\u00d6 liderlerinin hareketi durdurmak i\u00e7in yine ellerinden geleni yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir \u201cDo\u011fu \u015eeria\u2019da \u0130ntifada\u201d. Ortado\u011fu\u2019nun 1950\u2019lerden bu yana ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 en istikrars\u0131z d\u00f6nemine girmesiyle birlikte Arap rejimleri aras\u0131nda harekete ge\u00e7menin gereklili\u011fi konusunda bir konsens\u00fcs olu\u015ftu; Filistin meselesi temel konuydu. K\u00f6rfez\u2019deki m\u00fcttefiklerinin bask\u0131s\u0131yla ABD\u2019nin\u00a0\u0130\u015fgal Alt\u0131ndaki Topraklar konusunu \u0130srail ve FK\u00d6\u2019yle birlikte tart\u0131\u015fmaya a\u00e7mas\u0131na neden olan ko\u015fullar i\u015fte bunlard\u0131. Arafat; \u0130srail\u2019i me\u015fru bir devlet olarak tan\u0131y\u0131p \u0130srailli liderlerle Gazze ve Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019da Filistin ad\u0131nda \u201cmini devlet\u201d kurulmas\u0131 mevzusunda \u00e7etrefilli bir tart\u0131\u015fmaya ba\u015flayarak tarihi bir \u00f6d\u00fcn verdi. Arafat 1993\u2019te\u00a0Oslo Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019na imza atarak Filistinliler i\u00e7in yeni ve zarar verici bir geri \u00e7ekili\u015f d\u00f6nemi ba\u015flatm\u0131\u015f oldu.<\/p>\n Oslo \u201cbar\u0131\u015f s\u00fcreci\u201d resmi d\u00fczeyde \u0130srail ve Filistinliler aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkilerin ilerlemesi olarak kutland\u0131. Bu, iki taraf\u0131n da \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131nayd\u0131. Ger\u00e7ekte bu, Filistinliler i\u00e7in bir felaketti; b\u00fct\u00fcn sonu\u00e7lar\u0131 son y\u0131llarda a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kan bir felaket. Arafat\u2019\u0131n kabul etti\u011fi \u201cmini devlet\u201d b\u00f6l\u00fcnm\u00fc\u015f mikro b\u00f6lgeler ortaya \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131. Bu b\u00f6lgeler \u00fczerinde yeni kurulan Filistin Ulusal Y\u00f6netimi\u2019nin (FUY-FK\u00d6) yetkisi \u00e7ok s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131yd\u0131. \u0130srail geni\u015f yetkiler ele ge\u00e7irdi ki bunlar k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck, yerel konular d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda karar verme hakk\u0131n\u0131 kendisine tan\u0131yan bir manda rejimine yol a\u00e7t\u0131.[29]<\/a> Yeni d\u00fczenlemeler uygulamaya kondu\u011funda \u0130srail Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019da yeni ve geni\u015fleyen yerle\u015fim alanlar\u0131 i\u00e7in en verimli tar\u0131msal arazileri ve bu yerle\u015fim alanlar\u0131n\u0131 \u0130srail kentlerine ba\u011flayan yollar\u0131 elde tutmu\u015f oldu. Kolonile\u015fme t\u00fcm h\u0131z\u0131yla devam etti: 1993\u2019te 281.800 olan Filistin b\u00f6lgelerindeki \u0130srailli yerle\u015fimci say\u0131s\u0131 2002\u2019de 427.617\u2019ye \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131.[30]<\/a> M\u00fctevazi topraklar FUY\u2019a b\u0131rak\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda (Oslo takvimine uygun olarak) \u0130srailli politikac\u0131lar yeni toprak i\u015fgallerinin \u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fc a\u00e7t\u0131. 1998\u2019de d\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri bakan\u0131 (sonra ba\u015fbakan) Ariel \u015earon, Yahudi yerle\u015fimcilere hitaben \u015f\u00f6yle konu\u015fuyordu: \u201cHerkes harekete ge\u00e7meli, acele etmeli ve daha \u00e7ok tepe ele ge\u00e7irmeli\u2026 Alan\u0131 geni\u015fletiyoruz. \u00dcst\u00fcne kondu\u011fumuz her \u015fey bizimdir; konamad\u0131klar\u0131m\u0131z onlar\u0131n elinde kalacak.\u201d [31]<\/a><\/p>\n \u0130srail kendisini tam da co\u011frafyac\u0131 Oren Yiftachel\u2019\u0131n \u201c\u0130srail-Filistin aras\u0131ndaki b\u00f6lgeyi Yahudile\u015ftirmeye d\u00f6n\u00fck tavizsiz giri\u015fimlerin [\u00fcr\u00fcn\u00fc olan]\u2026 \u00fcrpertici apartheid\u201d dedi\u011fi \u015feye adam\u0131\u015ft\u0131.[32]<\/a> Yine de bu, hikayenin sadece bir k\u0131sm\u0131. Oslo Anla\u015fmas\u0131, Amerikal\u0131 stratejistlerin geli\u015ftirdi\u011fi daha geni\u015f \u00e7apl\u0131 bir plan\u0131n par\u00e7as\u0131yd\u0131: \u0130srail\u2019in ve \u0130\u015fgal Alt\u0131ndaki Topraklar\u2019\u0131n neo-liberal ilkeler temelinde ABD\u2019nin m\u00fcttefikleriyle ekonomik entegrasyonunu sa\u011flamak. \u0130srail h\u00fck\u00fcmeti tam bir i\u015fbirli\u011fi i\u00e7indeydi. D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri bakan\u0131 \u015eimon Perez \u015funlar\u0131 s\u00f6yledi: \u201cBiz bayraklar\u0131n bar\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n de\u011fil piyasalar\u0131n bar\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n aray\u0131\u015f\u0131nday\u0131z\u201d.[33]<\/a> Oslo anla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131n imzaland\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u0131ralarda biz dizi kom\u015fu \u00fclkede de\u011fi\u015fim ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131 bile; \u00f6zellikle M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da. 1991\u2019de M\u00fcbarek rejimi sert kemer s\u0131kma tedbirleri, ekonomiyi rekabete a\u00e7maya d\u00f6n\u00fck yeni yasalar ve dereg\u00fclasyon i\u00e7eren bir \u201cEkonomik Reform ve Yap\u0131sal Uyum Program\u0131\u201d kabul etmi\u015fti. Oslo kararlar\u0131 do\u011frultusunda \u0130srail\u2019le M\u0131s\u0131r ve di\u011fer kom\u015fu \u00fclkeler aras\u0131ndaki ekonomik ili\u015fkiler tamamen \u201cnormalle\u015ftirildi\u201d; Arap-\u0130srail ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131yla \u00f6zel sanayi b\u00f6lgeleri kuruldu (Nitelikli Sanayi B\u00f6lgeleri \u2013 NSB).[34]<\/a> \u00a0Filistin ekonomisi bu b\u00f6lgesel ili\u015fki a\u011f\u0131n\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olacakt\u0131; resmi neo-liberal ideolojinin gelene\u011fine uygun olarak Filistinliler ve \u0130srailliler art\u0131k \u201c\u00e7at\u0131\u015fma yerine refah\u201d\u0131 tercih edeceklerdi.<\/p>\n Oslo\u2019dan sonraki ekonomik de\u011fi\u015fim asl\u0131nda \u0130srail\u2019in 1967\u2019de Bat\u0131 \u015eeria ve Gazze\u2019yi i\u015fgal etmesinden sonraki politikalar\u0131n\u0131n yo\u011funla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 beraberinde getirdi. Bu b\u00f6lgeler b\u00fcy\u00fck \u0130srail\u2019in par\u00e7as\u0131ym\u0131\u015f gibi de\u011ferlendirildi; \u0130srail ekonomisine ucuz i\u015fg\u00fcc\u00fc ordusu da dahil \u00e7ok \u00f6nemli kaynaklar sa\u011flayan eklentiler. \u0130srailliler\u2019in toprak i\u015fgalleri b\u00f6lgedeki tar\u0131msal arazileri ciddi bi\u00e7imde etkiledi: 1967-74 aras\u0131nda Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019da Filistinliler\u2019in ekip bi\u00e7ti\u011fi alan \u00fc\u00e7te bir azald\u0131; ayn\u0131 anda Filistinliler\u2019in elindeki \u00e7o\u011fu \u00dcrd\u00fcn Vadisi\u2019nde yer alan sulu tar\u0131m arazileri de y\u00fczde 90 azald\u0131.[35]<\/a> Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019da tar\u0131m arazileri bo\u015f kald\u0131 ve bu arazilerden ge\u00e7imini sa\u011flayan pek \u00e7ok ki\u015fi (\u00f6zellikle k\u0131r gen\u00e7leri) \u0130srail\u2019e vas\u0131fs\u0131z i\u015f\u00e7i olarak g\u00f6\u00e7 etti. \u0130srail\u2019in g\u0131da ve end\u00fcstri mallar\u0131 b\u00f6lgeye akt\u0131k\u00e7a b\u00f6lgenin end\u00fcstrisi ve ticareti de ciddi olarak etkilendi. \u0130srail ekonomisi Filistin\u2019in gerileyen ekonomik faaliyetlerine nazaran b\u00fcy\u00fcd\u00fc: Bu, \u0130srailli fabrikat\u00f6rler, arac\u0131lar ve \u0130srail y\u00f6neticilerinin iltimas ge\u00e7ti\u011fi bir avu\u00e7 Filistinli i\u00e7in talih ku\u015funun konmas\u0131 demekti. B\u00fct\u00fcn bunlar i\u015fgal s\u00fcrd\u00fck\u00e7e zenginle\u015fen yeni bir Filistinli kapitalist s\u0131n\u0131f yaratt\u0131. Bunlar ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta \u0130srail askeri g\u00fcc\u00fcyle i\u015fbirli\u011finden, daha sonra ise \u0130srail yetkililerinden temel mallar\u0131n ihracat-ithalat imtiyaz\u0131n\u0131 elde ederek ve \u0130srail in\u015faat ve hizmet sanayilerine emek-g\u00fcc\u00fc sa\u011flayarak zenginle\u015ftiler.<\/p>\n Oslo s\u00fcrecinin bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olarak Arafat ekonominin temel sekt\u00f6rlerinin denetiminden feragat etti; b\u00f6ylece \u0130srail yetkilileri FUY\u2019un neleri ihra\u00e7 ve ithal edece\u011fine karar verir hale geldi. 2005 itibariyle Bat\u0131 \u015eeria ve Gazze ithalatlar\u0131n\u0131n neredeyse y\u00fczde 75\u2019ini \u0130srail\u2019den yaparken m\u00fctevazi ihracatlar\u0131n\u0131n y\u00fczde 88\u2019ini de \u0130srail\u2019e ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdiler.[36]<\/a> \u0130srailli yetkililer ve i\u015fadamlar\u0131 k\u00f6\u015feyi d\u00f6nd\u00fc: Sadece Filistin\u2019in ticaretinden yarar sa\u011flam\u0131yor, ayn\u0131 zamanda FUY\u2019un veya yerel STKlar\u0131n uluslararas\u0131 kurulu\u015flardan sa\u011flad\u0131klar\u0131 yard\u0131mlardan da istifade ediyorlard\u0131. Adam Hanieh \u015f\u00f6yle yorumluyor: \u201cBat\u0131 \u015eeria pek \u00e7ok \u0130srail mal\u0131n\u0131n tutsak ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir pazar ve Filistin t\u00fcketimi temelde yabanc\u0131 fonlarla finanse edildi\u011finden son derece karl\u0131 bir pazar. Ba\u015fka bir ifadeyle FUY\u2019a yap\u0131lan yabanc\u0131 yard\u0131mlar Filistinliler kadar \u0130srail\u2019e de yap\u0131l\u0131yor\u201d.[37]<\/a> Yard\u0131mlar ayr\u0131ca d\u0131\u015f yard\u0131mlar\u0131 onaylanan yerlere kanalize eden \u0130srailli yetkililerin de i\u015fine yar\u0131yor; b\u00f6ylece \u00e7o\u011funlukla FUY\u2019la yak\u0131n ba\u011flar\u0131 olan ve \u0130srailliler\u2019in yeni su\u00e7 ortaklar\u0131 olan belli Filistinli al\u0131c\u0131lara iltimas ge\u00e7ebiliyorlar.<\/p>\n El-Fetih liderleri Filistin hareketinin i\u00e7indeki radikal aktivistler taraf\u0131ndan y\u0131llard\u0131r elitizm, otoriterle\u015fme ve K\u00f6rfez rejimleriyle kurdu\u011fu yak\u0131n ili\u015fkiler nedeniyle su\u00e7lan\u0131yor. Buna ra\u011fmen g\u00f6revi k\u00f6t\u00fcye kullan\u0131p hareketin kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6m\u00fcrmekle su\u00e7lanm\u0131yorlar. Her ne kadar varl\u0131kl\u0131 Filistinliler\u2019le ba\u011f kuruyor olsalar da \u00f6nde gelen FK\u00d6 liderleri y\u0131llard\u0131r m\u00fctevazi bir ya\u015fam s\u00fcr\u00fcyor.[38]<\/a> \u00d6zellikle Arafat \u201cBay Filistin\u201d imaj\u0131yla uyumlu, sade ya\u015fam tarz\u0131yla \u00f6v\u00fcl\u00fcrd\u00fc. Oslo Anla\u015fmas\u0131 ve FUY\u2019un kurulmas\u0131 bunu h\u0131zla de\u011fi\u015ftirdi.<\/p>\n Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019n\u0131n 1967\u2019de i\u015fgalinden sonra \u0130srailli stratejistlerin \u00f6nceliklerinden biri, kendilerinin yerel halka ili\u015fkilerinde arac\u0131l\u0131k edecek i\u015fbirlik\u00e7ileri belirlemekti. \u0130srail ordusuyla birlikte \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan bir Filistin b\u00fcrokrasisi (polis te\u015fkilat\u0131n\u0131 da i\u00e7eren sivil bir idare) olu\u015fturdular. Bunun yan\u0131nda FK\u00d6\u2019n\u00fcn etkisine kar\u015f\u0131 koymaya \u00f6zendirilecek yerel milislerin yeti\u015ftirilmesi i\u00e7in \u201cK\u00f6y Birlikleri\u201d in\u015fa edildi. Sonuncular (1987 \u0130ntifadas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n \u00fcr\u00fcn\u00fc olan, kendilerini m\u00fccadelenin y\u00fckseltilmesine adayan, yeni nesil militanlar\u0131n net bir \u015fekilde g\u00f6sterdi\u011fi gibi) ulusal m\u00fccadeleyi zay\u0131flatmakta ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 olamad\u0131. Yine de ayr\u0131cal\u0131kl\u0131 Filistinliler tabakas\u0131, \u0130srail askeri idaresi ve i\u015fgalden do\u011frudan do\u011fruya kar elde eden \u0130srailli i\u015fadamlar\u0131 aras\u0131nda ili\u015fkiler kurulmas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fc a\u00e7an ba\u015fl\u0131ca y\u00f6n haritas\u0131n\u0131n olu\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flad\u0131lar. Oslo anla\u015fmas\u0131yla birlikte bu \u00e7ekirdek grup geni\u015fledi; K\u00f6rfez\u2019deki Filistin burjuvazisinin ve elindekileri korumay\u0131 beceren, geleneksel toprak sahibi s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n \u00fcyeleri dahil \u201cyurda geri d\u00f6nen\u201d sermayeyi kendine \u00e7ekti.[39]<\/a> Oslo anla\u015fmas\u0131ndan sadece be\u015f y\u0131l sonra ekonomik \u00e7evrenin ge\u00e7irdi\u011fi de\u011fi\u015fim hakk\u0131nda Jamil Hilal \u201c \u2018yap\u0131sal uyum\u2019 ortam\u0131 dahilinde \u00f6zel sekt\u00f6r vurgusu” ile “D\u00fcnya Bankas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n artan etkisi\u201dne i\u015faret ediyor ve sosyo-ekonomik e\u015fitsizli\u011fin kesinlikle h\u0131zla artt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6yl\u00fcyor.[40]<\/a> Neo-liberal uygulamalar, \u0130srail\u2019in Bat\u0131 \u015eeria ve Gazze\u2019yi bitirme politikas\u0131yla birle\u015fince FUY\u2019la ba\u011flant\u0131l\u0131 k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck bir grup Filistinli\u2019nin zenginle\u015fmesine, \u00e7o\u011funlu\u011fun ya\u015fam ko\u015fullar\u0131n\u0131nsa \u00e7ok daha k\u00f6t\u00fcle\u015fmesine neden oldu.<\/p>\n 1993\u2019te \u0130srail, Filistinliler\u2019in \u0130srail\u2019de istihdam edilmesi konusunda yeni bir denetim mekanizmas\u0131 olu\u015fturdu. 25 y\u0131ldan fazla bir s\u00fcre Filistin emek g\u00fcc\u00fc \u0130srail ekonomisinin ayr\u0131lmaz bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olmu\u015ftu. Ayn\u0131 zamanda Filistinli istihdam\u0131 \u0130srail\u2019in Bat\u0131 \u015eeria ve Gazze\u2019deki denetimini kolayla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131yordu. Leyla Farsakh g\u00f6\u00e7men i\u015fg\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fcn \u201cFilistinliler\u2019in \u0130srail mallar\u0131na ve ticari ili\u015fkilerine ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve Filistin i\u015fg\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fcn Filistin mal ve hizmetlerine olan \u0130srail talebiyle i\u00e7 i\u00e7e ge\u00e7mesine neden oldu\u011funu\u201d belirtiyor.[41]<\/a> 1992\u2019de \u0130srail y\u00f6neticilerinin verdi\u011fi s\u00fcrekli \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma izni say\u0131s\u0131 115 bindi; 1994 itibariyle (yani Oslo\u2019dan sonra) bu say\u0131 65 bin oldu;[42]<\/a> May\u0131s 1996\u2019da ise sadece 36 bindi.[43]<\/a> Rakamlar, \u0130srailli stratejistlerin yeni ucuz emek kaynaklar\u0131 hedefleri dahilinde s\u00fcrekli bir art\u0131yor, bir azal\u0131yordu. Michael Ellman ve Smain Lacher \u015funlar\u0131 s\u00f6yl\u00fcyor: \u201cFilistinli i\u015f\u00e7ilerin yerine deniz a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 i\u015fg\u00fcc\u00fcne d\u00f6n\u00fck net ve a\u00e7\u0131k bir politika\u201d.[44]<\/a> Kurals\u0131zla\u015ft\u0131rma ve eme\u011fin hareketlili\u011finin d\u00fcnya \u00e7ap\u0131nda h\u00fck\u00fcm s\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc bir d\u00f6nemde \u0130srail, Asya ve Do\u011fu Avrupa\u2019dan g\u00f6\u00e7men i\u015f\u00e7ilerin gelmesini te\u015fvik etti. Ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta [g\u00f6\u00e7men istihdam\u0131] Filistinliler\u2019inkinden daha pahal\u0131ya gelse de, bunlar h\u0131zl\u0131ca \u201cyasa d\u0131\u015f\u0131\u201d ilan edilebilir ve b\u00f6ylelikle son derece s\u00f6m\u00fcr\u00fclebilir hale gelebilirdi; belli baz\u0131 patronlar\u0131n kar\u015f\u0131 koyamayaca\u011f\u0131 bir cazibe.[45]<\/a> Bundan dolay\u0131 Filistin topraklar\u0131nda i\u015fsizlik artt\u0131; i\u015fsizlik oran\u0131 1993\u2019ten 2000\u2019e Gazze\u2019de y\u00fcze 15,1\u2019den y\u00fczde 32,5\u2019e, Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019da y\u00fczde 10,1\u2019den y\u00fczde 23,8\u2019e \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131[46]<\/a> ve yoksulluk ve di\u011fer sosyal mahrumiyet d\u00fczeyi endekslerinde ani bir y\u00fckseli\u015f ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti.<\/p>\n FUY liderli\u011fi ba\u015fka konulara odaklanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131: Her \u015fey bir kenara b\u00f6lgeyi denetim alt\u0131na almak ve kendi g\u00fcvenli\u011fini garantilemek i\u00e7in g\u00fcvenlik ayg\u0131t\u0131 in\u015fa etmek. El-Fetih\u2019in liderli\u011finin otoriter e\u011filimlerine ra\u011fmen, 1960\u2019lardan itibaren FK\u00d6; FHKC ve Filistin Demokratik Kurtulu\u015f Cephesi (FDKC \u2013 \u015feklen demokratik sosyalizm ilkelerine ba\u011fl\u0131, radikal ulusalc\u0131lar) gibi gruplar da dahil, geni\u015f bir politik ak\u0131m yelpazesini b\u00fcnyesinde bar\u0131nd\u0131rd\u0131. 1987 \u0130ntifadas\u0131 taban \u00f6rg\u00fctlenmelerini (kad\u0131n, \u00f6\u011frenci ve \u00e7ift\u00e7i gruplar\u0131, k\u00f6y konseyleri, sendikalar ve ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z k\u00fclt\u00fcrel inisiyatifler gibi) \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131. \u0130srail ve ABD bu hareketi bast\u0131racak Filistin g\u00fcvenlik g\u00fc\u00e7lerini kurmak i\u00e7in Oslo Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131 kulland\u0131. Bu g\u00fc\u00e7ler \u00f6zellikle hareketin radikal unsurlar\u0131n\u0131 bast\u0131r\u0131p hareketin b\u00f6lgeye \u201cbula\u015fma\u201d etkisini azaltacakt\u0131. Filistinliler\u2019in do\u011frudan kontrol\u00fc alt\u0131ndaki yerlerde \u0130srailliler\u2019in bo\u015faltt\u0131\u011f\u0131 k\u0131\u015flalara ve karakollara Filistin g\u00fcvenlik g\u00fc\u00e7leri yerle\u015fti. FUY, \u00fcniformal\u0131 polisleri ve sivil \u201cistihbarat\u201d kesimlerini i\u00e7eren, \u00e7ok birimli bir ayg\u0131t kurdu. Bunlar\u0131n en \u00f6nemlisi \u00d6nleyici G\u00fcvenlik Servisi (\u00d6GS) idi. On binlerce insan silah alt\u0131na al\u0131nd\u0131: 1990\u2019lar\u0131n ortas\u0131nda FUY polis \u015fefi 40 bin ki\u015fiye ihtiya\u00e7 oldu\u011funu belirtti[47]<\/a>; on y\u0131l sonra 50 ila 70 bin ki\u015fi kaydedilmi\u015fti.[48]<\/a> Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019n\u0131n \u00d6GS komutan\u0131 Jibril Rahjoub (Ebu Rami), Gazze\u2019ninki ise Muhammed Dahlan (Ebu Fadi) idi. \u0130kisi de M\u0131s\u0131r ve \u00dcrd\u00fcn\u2019deki CIA kamplar\u0131nda yeti\u015ftirilen ve \u0130srail vas\u0131tas\u0131yla ABD\u2019nin donatt\u0131\u011f\u0131 adamlar\u0131 y\u00f6netiyordu.[49]<\/a> Bunlar keyfi g\u00f6zalt\u0131lara, isnats\u0131z tutuklamalara ve i\u015fkencelere imza att\u0131lar; ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z yay\u0131nlar\u0131 ve \u00f6rg\u00fctleri kapatt\u0131lar. Graham Usher\u2019\u0131n belirtti\u011fi gibi FUY\u2019un yeni infazc\u0131lar\u0131 olarak \u201cBat\u0131 \u015eeria ve Gazze\u2019de var olan veya ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmaya ba\u015flayan d\u00fczeni ele ge\u00e7irmek ve sonra ayartmak i\u00e7in\u201d h\u0131zla harekete ge\u00e7tiler.[50]<\/a><\/p>\n FUY ileri gelenleri h\u0131zla imtiyazlar da\u011f\u0131tan mekanizman\u0131n merkezine oturdu. \u00dcst d\u00fczey FUY memurlar\u0131 \u0130srailliler\u2019le birlikte \u00e7al\u0131\u015farak in\u015faat ihaleleri ve temel mallar\u0131n tedariki i\u00e7in monopol imtiyazlar\u0131, mobil telefon \u015firketlerine ve TV kanallar\u0131na ayr\u0131cal\u0131klar da\u011f\u0131t\u0131r hale geldiler. \u00c7ok de\u011ferli arazi kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131 tahsis etmek i\u00e7in hukuk sistemi \u00fczerindeki kontrollerinden istifade ettiler. \u0130\u015fgal Alt\u0131ndaki Topraklar\u2019da yap\u0131lacak yat\u0131r\u0131mlar FUY\u2019un denetimine tabi idi. B\u00f6ylece baz\u0131 FUY ileri gelenleri bek\u00e7ilik yaparak elde ettikleri gelirle inan\u0131lmaz \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde zenginle\u015fmekle kalmad\u0131, ayn\u0131 zamanda K\u00f6rfez sermayesiyle ve devletleriyle ba\u011f kurdular veya ba\u011flar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lendirdiler. Gazze\u2019nin \u00d6GS\u2019sinin ba\u015f infazc\u0131s\u0131 Muhammed Dahlan, Birle\u015fik Arap Emirlikleri\u2019nin \u00fcst d\u00fczey y\u00f6neticileri ve yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lar\u0131yla yan yana \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131: Oslo Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n imzalanmas\u0131n\u0131 takip eden on sene i\u00e7inde ki\u015fisel servetinin 120 milyon dolara \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6yleniyor.[51]<\/a> 2003\u2019te FUY\u2019un b\u00fct\u00e7esini inceleyen bir IMF heyeti, FUY\u2019un 1995-2000 aras\u0131nda elde etti\u011fi 900 milyon dolarl\u0131k gelirin Arafat ve onun ba\u015f ekonomi-maliye dan\u0131\u015fman\u0131n\u0131n kontrol\u00fcndeki \u201c\u00f6zel hesaplar\u201da aktar\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve bu paran\u0131n Filistin\u2019deki ve yurtd\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki yat\u0131r\u0131mlarda kullan\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 belirtti.[52]<\/a> Arafat m\u00fctevazi ya\u015famaya devam etti fakat di\u011fer liderler, genel sefaletin kol gezdi\u011fi bir ortamda yeni zenginliklerini a\u00e7\u0131k eden g\u00f6steri\u015f\u00e7i t\u00fcketimin i\u00e7ine dald\u0131. \u00d6zellikle Ramallah\u2019ta yeni yerle\u015fim yerleri in\u015fa edildi. Burada \u201cabus\u201d denilen FUY y\u00f6neticileri, t\u00fcm k\u00fcresel g\u00fcneyde \u00f6rnekleri g\u00f6r\u00fclen l\u00fcks, kapal\u0131 sitelerde villalar yapt\u0131rd\u0131lar. Bu, ulusal hareketi a\u015f\u0131nd\u0131r\u0131c\u0131 bir etki yaratt\u0131. Tecr\u00fcbeli bir Filistinli gazeteci olan Lamis Andoni\u2019ye g\u00f6re Birinci \u0130ntifada\u2019n\u0131n sayg\u0131 duyulan gen\u00e7 liderleri bile bu durumdan etkilendi; onlar\u0131n \u201culusalc\u0131 kimlikleri\u201dnin art\u0131k i\u015fe yaramad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve yeni \u201coyun kurallar\u0131\u201dn\u0131n para ve FUY\u2019un polis devleti taraf\u0131ndan belirlendi\u011fi konular\u0131nda \u0131srar eden yozla\u015fm\u0131\u015f memurlar\u0131n k\u00f6t\u00fc etkisi onlar\u0131 da sard\u0131.[53]<\/a><\/p>\n Geni\u015f kitlelerin ya\u015fam standartlar\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6km\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. 1999-2007 aras\u0131 aras\u0131nda Filistin\u2019in ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na GSYH\u2019\u0131 \u00fc\u00e7te iki azald\u0131; Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019da hane halklar\u0131n\u0131n y\u00fczde 56\u2019s\u0131, Gazze\u2019de ise y\u00fczde 75\u2019i yoksulluk s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n alt\u0131nda ya\u015f\u0131yordu; bu, kay\u0131tlardaki en y\u00fcksek seviye idi.[54]<\/a> S\u0131n\u0131r kapatmalar, insafs\u0131z kolonile\u015fme ve s\u00fcrekli tekrarlanan \u0130srail i\u015fgalleri birlikte yayg\u0131n yoksullu\u011fu do\u011furdu. 2000\u2019de \u0130kinci \u0130ntifada y\u00fckseldi. Bu daha kitlesel bir ayaklanmayd\u0131; ancak ilki kadar enerjik de\u011fildi ve h\u0131zla \u0130srail g\u00fc\u00e7leriyle silahl\u0131 \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmaya d\u00f6nd\u00fc; sonunun nas\u0131l olaca\u011f\u0131 belli, e\u015fit olmayan bir m\u00fccadele. \u0130srail ayr\u0131ca 2000\u2019de apartheid duvar\u0131n\u0131 in\u015fa etmeye ba\u015flad\u0131. Bu duvar daha fazla Filistinli\u2019nin tecrit edilmesine, \u00e7ok \u00f6nemli tar\u0131m arazilerine ula\u015f\u0131m\u0131n engellenmesine ve par\u00e7alanm\u0131\u015f FUY b\u00f6lgeleri aras\u0131ndaki ileti\u015fimin kopmas\u0131na neden oldu.<\/p>\n El-Fetih deste\u011fini h\u0131zla \u0130slamc\u0131 Hamas\u2019a kapt\u0131rd\u0131.[55]<\/a> 1987\u2019de Gazze\u2019de M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Karde\u015fler\u2019in bir kolu taraf\u0131ndan kurulan Hamas, ilk \u0130ntifada\u2019da \u00f6nem kazand\u0131. Ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta \u0130srail\u2019in g\u00f6zdesiydi; her \u015feyin \u00f6tesinde FK\u00d6\u2019den \u00e7ekinen \u0130srail, Hamas\u2019\u0131n laik ulusalc\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n deste\u011fini azaltaca\u011f\u0131 umuduyla \u0130slamc\u0131lar\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fcmesi i\u00e7in alan a\u00e7t\u0131.[56]<\/a> 1990\u2019lar boyunca \u00f6rg\u00fct; M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Karde\u015fler\u2019in pop\u00fclist stratejisine has sosyal yard\u0131mla\u015fma projeleri geli\u015ftirerek ve FUY\u2019un \u0130srail\u2019le uzla\u015fmas\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131karak Gazze ve Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019daki taban\u0131n\u0131 durmadan geni\u015fletti. Glen Robinson Oslo s\u00fcrecinin batmas\u0131n\u0131n sonu\u00e7lar\u0131ndan olan Hamas\u2019\u0131n ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n izini s\u00fcr\u00fcyor:<\/p>\n Oslo, Filistinliler\u2019in haklar\u0131n\u0131 vermeyi ba\u015faramad\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan Hamas\u2019\u0131n y\u0131ld\u0131z\u0131 parlad\u0131 ve hareket alan\u0131 geni\u015fledi. \u0130srail\u2019in Bat\u0131 \u015eeria ve Gazze i\u015fgalini tamamen bitirmekteki isteksizli\u011fi Oslo\u2019nun i\u015fe yaramayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 en ba\u015f\u0131ndan tahmin eden Hamas\u2019\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lendirdi ve onu Filistin\u2019in tek \u00f6nemli muhalif hareketi yapt\u0131\u2026 Hamas, Oslo\u2019nun hayal k\u0131r\u0131kl\u0131\u011f\u0131na u\u011fratt\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n politik evi oldu.[57]<\/a><\/p>\n Hamas \u00e7ok ge\u00e7meden \u0130srail\u2019de \u201cislamo-fa\u015fist\u201d diye tan\u0131mlanmaya ba\u015flad\u0131 ve k\u00fcresel \u0130slam tehdidinin bir par\u00e7as\u0131 oldu\u011fu s\u00f6ylendi. Ger\u00e7ekte Hamas hedefleri s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131, eylemde pragmatik bir \u00f6rg\u00fctt\u00fc. El-Fetih\u2019in dar ulusalc\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 payla\u015f\u0131yordu. Kurucusu \u015eeyh Yasin bunun alt\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7iziyor: \u201cHamas\u2019ta biz Filistin \u00fclkesinde sava\u015f\u0131yoruz. Sava\u015f\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 i\u015fgal alt\u0131ndaki topraklardan d\u0131\u015far\u0131ya ta\u015f\u0131maya haz\u0131r de\u011filiz\u201d.[58]<\/a> En \u00f6nemli slogan\u0131 olan \u201c\u0130slam \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmd\u00fcr\u201d Karde\u015flik\u2019ten al\u0131nmayd\u0131 ve her ama\u00e7 i\u00e7in kullan\u0131labilirdi. Birka\u00e7 y\u0131l boyunca Hamas, \u0130srail\u2019e verilecek her t\u00fcrl\u00fc tavize kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131; ancak 2004\u2019e gelindi\u011finde El-Fetih\u2019le birlikte pazarl\u0131k masas\u0131na oturmaya ve silahl\u0131 eylemlerini durdurmaya haz\u0131r hale geldi. Ayr\u0131ca birka\u00e7 y\u0131l boyunca FUY se\u00e7imlerine kat\u0131lmay\u0131 reddetmi\u015fti; politikas\u0131n\u0131 de\u011fi\u015ftirdi ve \u00e7ok ge\u00e7meden ba\u015f d\u00f6nd\u00fcr\u00fcc\u00fc bir se\u00e7im zaferi elde etti.<\/p>\n Arafat 2004\u2019te \u00f6ld\u00fc. Onun g\u00f6revini Mahmud Abbas (Ebu Mazen) devrald\u0131. Abbas, El-Fetih\u2019in kurucu \u00fcyelerindendi. Katar\u2019da \u00fcst d\u00fczey bir b\u00fcrokratt\u0131 ve uzun s\u00fcre kendini \u0130srail\u2019le ili\u015fkilerin normalle\u015ftirilmesine adam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. 2006\u2019da Hamas FUY\u2019un Yasama Konseyi se\u00e7imlerini kazand\u0131; onun De\u011fi\u015fim ve Reform listesi 132 sandalyeden 74\u2019\u00fcn\u00fc elde etti ve Hamas lideri \u0130smail Haniye ba\u015fbakan oldu. \u0130srailliler deh\u015fete kap\u0131ld\u0131 ve ABD Gazze\u2019de Muhammed Dahlan liderli\u011finde bir darbe giri\u015fiminde bulundu.[59]<\/a> Bu geri tepince Hamas, El-Fetih g\u00fc\u00e7lerini b\u00f6lgeden s\u00fcrmeyi ba\u015fard\u0131. Art\u0131k iki tane, ayr\u0131 Filistin h\u00fck\u00fcmeti vard\u0131: Hamas\u2019\u0131nki Gazze\u2019de ve Abbas\u2019\u0131n liderli\u011fini s\u00fcrd\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc FUY\u2019unki Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019da. \u0130srail vakit kaybetmeden Gazze\u2019yi d\u0131\u015f d\u00fcnyaya kapatt\u0131 ve 2008\u2019in Aral\u0131k ay\u0131nda b\u00f6lgede b\u00fcy\u00fck bir i\u015fgal ba\u015flatt\u0131. Bu geli\u015fmelerin hi\u00e7biri neo-liberal program\u0131 ve FUY\u2019un \u0130srail\u2019le i\u015fbirli\u011fini sona erdirmedi. Abbas 2007\u2019de Selam Fayyad\u2019\u0131 ba\u015fbakanl\u0131\u011fa atad\u0131. Fayyad[\u2021]<\/a> 1990\u2019lar boyunca FUY\u2019un \u0130MF temsilcili\u011fini yapan bir iktisat\u00e7\u0131yd\u0131. Kendisi \u0130srail ve ABD\u2019nin g\u00f6zdesiydi. Ayn\u0131 zamanda D\u00fcnya Bankas\u0131 ile birlikte yeni Filistin Reform ve Kalk\u0131nma Plan\u0131\u2019n\u0131n(FRKP) da mimar\u0131yd\u0131. Bu plan piyasala\u015fmay\u0131 h\u0131zland\u0131rmaya d\u00f6n\u00fckt\u00fc:<\/p>\n Filistin\u2019in ekonomik vizyonu de\u011fi\u015fmelidir. Arap d\u00fcnyas\u0131yla uyum i\u00e7inde olacak, \u00f6zel sekt\u00f6r\u00fcn \u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fck etti\u011fi serbest pazar ekonomisi sistemini geli\u015ftirmeliyiz. Ekonominin b\u00f6lgesel ve k\u00fcresel pazarlara a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131 \u00f6zg\u00fcr, demokratik ve adil bir toplumun ekonomik temelini sa\u011flayacakt\u0131r.[60]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n Neo-liberal reform b\u00fcy\u00fck bir hararetle s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc. \u201cFayyadizm\u201d alt\u0131nda Bat\u0131 \u015eeria k\u00fcresel refah\u0131n hayali a\u011f\u0131na dahil edildi. Y\u00fczeysel de\u011fi\u015fimler ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131: AVM in\u015faatlar\u0131, oteller, restoranlar ve l\u00fcks araba galerileri, \u201cFilistin\u2019de \u00f6zel sekt\u00f6r\u00fcn ortaya \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131\u011f\u0131 en b\u00fcy\u00fck proje \u2026 Filistin\u2019in ilk planl\u0131 \u015fehri\u201d [61]<\/a> olarak reklam\u0131 yap\u0131lan Rawabi ba\u015fta olmak \u00fczere d\u00f6rt ba\u015f\u0131 mamur g\u00fcvenlikli siteler. Katarl\u0131 spek\u00fclat\u00f6rler taraf\u0131ndan finanse edilip \u0130srail yerle\u015fim yerlerine \u00f6zenerek yeni zenginler i\u00e7in yap\u0131lan bu tepeba\u015f\u0131 kasaba, \u00e7evredeki k\u00f6ylerden zorla istimlak edilen araziler (istimlak karar\u0131n\u0131n alt\u0131nda Abbas\u2019\u0131n ki\u015fisel imzas\u0131 vard\u0131) \u00fczerine in\u015fa edildi. Sanayi b\u00f6lgesi (ki bunlar\u0131n baz\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n T\u00fcrk \u015firketi TOBB-B\u0130S -Bar\u0131\u015f \u0130\u00e7in Sanayi- gibi yabanc\u0131 i\u015fletmecileri var) in\u015fas\u0131 i\u00e7in de \u00e7ift\u00e7ilerin arazilerine el kondu. Hedef Filistin\u2019in hemen yan\u0131 ba\u015f\u0131ndaki \u00dcrd\u00fcn\u2019de oldu\u011fu gibi NSBleri ekonomiye kazand\u0131rmakt\u0131. NSBler asgari \u00fccretin alt\u0131nda \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lan g\u00f6\u00e7men i\u015f\u00e7ilerin istihdam edildi\u011fi, sendikalar\u0131n giri\u015finin yasak oldu\u011fu ve ulusal sosyal g\u00fcvenlik sistemine dahil olmayan yerlerdir. Charlotte Silver Bat\u0131 \u015eeria end\u00fcstri b\u00f6lgelerini \u201cFilistin\u2019in ta\u015feronla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131\u201d olarak tan\u0131ml\u0131yor.[62]<\/a> NSBler ayr\u0131ca \u0130srailli \u015firketlerle ortak giri\u015fimler kurma f\u0131rsat\u0131 sa\u011fl\u0131yordu. Bunlar, Filistinli i\u015fadamlar\u0131n\u0131n da halihaz\u0131rda yat\u0131r\u0131m yapt\u0131klar\u0131, \u0130srailli yerle\u015fimcilerin tar\u0131ma dayal\u0131 sanayi tesislerinin FUY versiyonu halindeydi.[63]<\/a> Tar\u0131k Dana\u2019ya g\u00f6re Filistinli \u015firketler, boykot kampanyalar\u0131ndan ve baz\u0131 Avrupa \u00fclkelerinin kurallar\u0131ndan ka\u00e7\u0131nma amac\u0131yla \u0130srail yerle\u015fimlerinden \u00e7\u0131kan mallar\u0131n \u00fczerine hileyle \u201cFilistin mal\u0131\u201d damgas\u0131 vurup Avrupa\u2019ya ihra\u00e7 edilmesi i\u015fine kar\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f durumdalar.[64]<\/a><\/p>\n Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019daki in\u015faat furyas\u0131 ve t\u00fcketici harcamalar\u0131nda keskin art\u0131\u015f vas\u0131tas\u0131yla ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan kalk\u0131nma \u201cbalonu\u201d mortgage bor\u00e7lar\u0131nda ve ki\u015fisel kredilerde b\u00fcy\u00fck art\u0131\u015flarla finanse edildi. Geleneksel olarak Filistinliler bor\u00e7lanmaktan pek haz etmeseler de 2008-2011 aras\u0131nda Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019da t\u00fcketici kredileri 6 kat art\u0131p 415 milyon dolara ula\u015ft\u0131; 2012 itibariyle arsa al\u0131mlar\u0131 ve in\u015faat i\u00e7in al\u0131nan kredi toplam\u0131 da 500 milyon dolar\u0131 a\u015ft\u0131 ki bunlar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011fu Amerikan ve K\u00f6rfez bankalar\u0131ndan kullan\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131.[65]<\/a> 2013\u2019te Bat\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019daki kamu sekt\u00f6r\u00fc \u00e7al\u0131\u015fanlar\u0131n\u0131n y\u00fczde 75\u2019i bor\u00e7 i\u00e7inde oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yl\u00fcyordu.[66]<\/a> Bu arada FUY kendi bor\u00e7 geri \u00f6demelerini ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftiremiyor ve \u00e7al\u0131\u015fanlara maa\u015flar\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6deyemiyordu. 2012\u2019de \u0130\u015fgal Alt\u0131ndaki Topraklar\u2019da i\u015fsizlik oran\u0131 y\u00fczde 27\u2019ye y\u00fckseldi, reel \u00fccretler de 2006\u2019daki seviyesinin y\u00fczde 10 alt\u0131ndayd\u0131.[67]<\/a> FUY y\u0131lmad\u0131; bile isteye Amerikan stratejistklerinin, uluslararas\u0131 finansal organizasyonlar\u0131n\u0131n ve \u0130srailli politikac\u0131lar ve i\u015fadamlar\u0131n\u0131n bir yarat\u0131\u011f\u0131 haline geldi.<\/p>\n FUY; egemen devletlerin, uluslararas\u0131 \u015firketlerin ve bankalar\u0131n g\u00fcndemini belirledi\u011fi b\u00f6lgesel de\u011fi\u015fim planlar\u0131yla tam olarak b\u00fct\u00fcnle\u015fti. Kom\u015fu \u00fclke M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da oldu\u011fu gibi her \u015fey sat\u0131l\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131ld\u0131. H\u00fcsn\u00fc M\u00fcbarek y\u00f6netimi alt\u0131nda M\u0131s\u0131r, kamu varl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n hileli yollarla yerel i\u015fadamlar\u0131na ve yabanc\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lara sat\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131, ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 bir piyasala\u015fma ve kurals\u0131zla\u015ft\u0131rma dalgas\u0131n\u0131n i\u00e7ine dalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. \u00d6nceden ulusal servet olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclen her \u015fey eninde sonunda sat\u0131\u015fa m\u00fcsaitti: Arazi, su kaynaklar\u0131, enerji tesisleri, fabrikalar, tar\u0131msal hizmetler, bankalar; \u201cpiyasaya a\u00e7\u0131labilecek\u201d ve M\u00fcbarek ve onun g\u00f6zde destek\u00e7ilerinin \u00f6zel ellerine terk edilebilecek her \u015fey.[68]<\/a> Daha az yo\u011fun ama ayn\u0131 sonu\u00e7lar do\u011furan benzer bir program Suriye\u2019de izlendi.[69]<\/a> Filistinli neo-liberalizm taraftarlar\u0131n\u0131n elinde benzersiz bir f\u0131rsat vard\u0131.<\/p>\n Bat\u0131 \u015eeria ve Gazze\u2019nin \u0130srail taraf\u0131ndan i\u015fgaline, \u00f6nceden Avrupal\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lerin \u201cs\u00f6m\u00fcrgeler d\u00fcnyas\u0131\u201dnda yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131na benzer \u015fekilde yakla\u015f\u0131labilirdi. Askeri ayg\u0131t yerel direni\u015fi k\u0131rabilir ve b\u00f6ylece gittik\u00e7e uysalla\u015fan ulusalc\u0131 liderlik ihanet etmekte ayart\u0131labilirdi. K\u00f6rfez devletleri g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcndeki b\u00f6lgesel sermaye, zenginli\u011fini art\u0131rma ve ba\u015f belas\u0131 Filistin direni\u015fini k\u0131rma iste\u011fiyle i\u015fin i\u00e7ine girmeye can at\u0131yordu. Oslo Anla\u015fmas\u0131 \u0130\u015fgal Alt\u0131ndaki Topraklar\u2019\u0131n resmi kontrol\u00fc \u00fczerinden bu projede \u00fcstlendikleri rol\u00fc oynamaya can atan bir liderlik ortaya \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131.<\/p>\n El-Fetih, Arap d\u00fcnyas\u0131ndaki di\u011fer devletlerin bir benzerini in\u015fa etme arzusuyla 1950\u2019lerde kuruldu. Kolektif m\u00fccadele i\u00e7in Filistinli kitlelerle (ki bunlar\u0131n hayallerini ba\u015fka bir g\u00fcndem \u015fekillendiriyordu) temas kurdu. Bu g\u00fcndem, Ortado\u011fu \u00e7ap\u0131nda m\u00fccadeleleri tetikleyen de\u011fi\u015fim umudunun etkisi alt\u0131ndayd\u0131. Yukar\u0131da belirtildi\u011fi gibi M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da \u00d6zg\u00fcr Subaylar hareketinin radikal milliyet\u00e7ili\u011finin, Irak\u2019ta devrimci kalk\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n ve Cezayir ve Yemen\u2019de s\u00f6m\u00fcrgecilik kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 hareketlerin h\u00fck\u00fcm s\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc 1950\u2019ler ve 60\u2019lar; politik ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k ve topra\u011f\u0131n, end\u00fcstrinin, finansal sistemin ve ticaretin kamula\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 da dahil ekonomik ve sosyal reform isteklerini oda\u011f\u0131na alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Ra\u015fid Khalidi durumu \u015f\u00f6yle yorumluyor: \u201cL\u00fcbnan m\u00fclteci kamplar\u0131ndaki s\u00fcrg\u00fcn d\u00f6neminde bile \u2018ulusal\u2019 devlet kurma taleplerine kar\u015f\u0131 koymak FK\u00d6 i\u00e7in zordu\u201d.[70]<\/a> Bu hareketin y\u00fckseli\u015fi El-Fetih\u2019i sola \u00e7ekti. B\u00f6ylece \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fcn liderleri ulusal kaynaklar\u0131n kitlelerin ihtiya\u00e7lar\u0131 i\u00e7in kullan\u0131laca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 taahh\u00fct ettiler. Ba\u015fta \u00dcrd\u00fcn ve L\u00fcbnan\u2019da olmak \u00fczere okullar\u0131, sa\u011fl\u0131k ocaklar\u0131 ve hastaneleriyle birlikte bir sosyal dayan\u0131\u015fma a\u011f\u0131 ve ulusal hareketin i\u00e7inde yer alan Filistinli i\u015f\u00e7ileri temsil eden sendikalar in\u015fa edildi. Arafat; Samed isimli bir organizasyon taraf\u0131ndan y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclen \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fcn m\u00fctevazi sanayi giri\u015fimlerinin \u201cba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Filistin\u2019in ve b\u00fcrokrasiden ar\u0131nd\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f Filistin kamu sekt\u00f6r\u00fc ekonomisinin \u00e7ekirde\u011fini\u201d te\u015fkil etti\u011fini ve [bunlar\u0131n] \u201cdevrimin ruhunu ve kararl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 a\u015f\u0131lad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131\u201d s\u00f6yl\u00fcyordu.[71]<\/a> FK\u00d6, hi\u00e7bir zaman y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe sokulmayan bir umudu a\u015f\u0131lamaya devam etti: Filistin\u2019e d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fle birlikte \u00fclkenin kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n (toprak, su ve madenler) kapsaml\u0131 bir ulusal kalk\u0131nma projesi i\u00e7in kullan\u0131lmas\u0131. Oslo\u2019dan sonra FUY bu ama\u00e7lar\u0131 terk etti. Nas\u0131r sonras\u0131 M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n ve b\u00f6lgenin di\u011fer egemen s\u0131n\u0131flar\u0131n\u0131n neo-liberalizmine dahil oldu ve soyut d\u00fczlemde halk\u0131n yarar\u0131 i\u00e7in devletin elinde tuttu\u011fu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclen kaynaklar, piyasan\u0131n ve onun \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n emrine sunuldu. B\u00f6yle yaparak Filistin davas\u0131nda sosyal s\u0131n\u0131f meselesinin \u00f6nemini yeni bir a\u015famaya y\u00fckseltmi\u015f oldu.<\/p>\n FK\u00d6 hi\u00e7bir zaman Ortado\u011fu\u2019daki kitlesel m\u00fccadelelere bula\u015fmad\u0131; tam tersine \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fcn liderleri \u0130srail\u2019e, emperyalizme ve b\u00f6lgenin egemen s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 ortak m\u00fccadelenin yarataca\u011f\u0131 f\u0131rsatlardan Filistinliler\u2019i uzak tutmak i\u00e7in gayretke\u015flik g\u00f6sterdi. El-Fetih on y\u0131llarca Filistin hareketinin kitlesel anlamda b\u00fcy\u00fck bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olmadan hareketin i\u00e7inde yer ald\u0131. Ba\u015fta \u00dcrd\u00fcn 1970 ve Birinci \u0130ntifada 1987 gibi d\u00f6n\u00fcm noktalar\u0131nda Filistin hareketinin, radikal de\u011fi\u015fimler i\u00e7in y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclen m\u00fccadelelerin yarataca\u011f\u0131 f\u0131rsatlar\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olmas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcne set \u00e7ekti. El-Fetih liderleri ulusal birli\u011fin \u00f6nemini vurguluyorlard\u0131: \u0130srail\u2019in s\u00f6m\u00fcrgecili\u011fine kar\u015f\u0131 olma ba\u011flam\u0131nda me\u015fru bir proje; ancak bu projenin esas belirleyici taraf\u0131 Filistinliler\u2019in birle\u015fik m\u00fccadelelerine kat\u0131lma kapasitesini ve b\u00f6ylelikle \u0130srail dahil b\u00f6lgenin egemen s\u0131n\u0131flar\u0131na kafa tutma potansiyelini yok etmesiydi. FUY; \u0130srail, ABD ve neo-liberal projeyle ittifak kurmaya do\u011fru ilerledi\u011finde Filistinli radikallerin hi\u00e7e sayd\u0131\u011f\u0131 ne olursa olsun birlik fikri geriye d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fs\u00fcz bir \u015fekilde \u00e7\u00f6pe gitti. Art\u0131k topraklara el koyan, k\u00f6yl\u00fcleri evinden atan, bask\u0131 uygulayan ve muhalifleri susturan FUY olmu\u015ftu. Tar\u0131k Dana, pek \u00e7ok Filistinli\u2019nin FUY\u2019un g\u00fcvenlik ayg\u0131t\u0131n\u0131 \u201ci\u015fgalin bir uzant\u0131s\u0131\u201d olarak g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc tart\u0131\u015f\u0131yor: \u201cFUY\u2019un uygulamalar\u0131n bir sonucu olarak ele\u015ftirmek art\u0131k vatana ihanet su\u00e7u say\u0131l\u0131yor\u201d.[72]<\/a><\/p>\n Ana ak\u0131m milliyet\u00e7ili\u011fin krizi kendisini bir\u00e7ok y\u00f6nden g\u00f6steriyor. Bunlar aras\u0131nda en \u00f6nemlisi Filistin\u2019in tecridini sonland\u0131rmak ve geleneksel liderli\u011fi elde tutmak i\u00e7in olu\u015fturulmu\u015f bir giri\u015fim olan Boykot, Tecrit ve Yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar (BTY) hareketi. \u00a02005\u2019te ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan bu hareket, FK\u00d6\u2019y\u00fc baypas etti. Kampanyay\u0131 y\u00fcr\u00fctenlerden \u00d6mer Barghouti FK\u00d6\u2019y\u00fc, Filistin meselesini \u201c\u0130srail\u2019in adaletsizlikleriyle birlikte var olan bir oyma s\u00fcreci\u201dne d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcren \u201cy\u0131llard\u0131r s\u00fcren, tam bir ke\u015fmeke\u015f\u201d olarak tan\u0131ml\u0131yor.[73]<\/a> BTY h\u0131zla yay\u0131ld\u0131; k\u00fcresel sosyal adalet hareketiyle (\u00f6zellikle D\u00fcnya Sosyal Forumu a\u011flar\u0131) kurulan yarat\u0131c\u0131 ili\u015fkiler bu harekete destek sa\u011flad\u0131. \u0130\u015fgal Alt\u0131ndaki Topraklar\u2019daki y\u00fczlerce \u00f6rg\u00fct kampanyan\u0131n deklarasyonunu destekledi; pek \u00e7o\u011fu yurt d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki sendikalar, dini kurumlar, \u00f6\u011frenci gruplar\u0131 ve dayan\u0131\u015fma kampanyalar\u0131yla s\u0131k\u0131 ili\u015fkiler kurup Filistin\u2019in tecridinin azalmas\u0131na katk\u0131 sa\u011flad\u0131. El-Fetih Filistinliler\u2019in m\u00fccadelesini kontrol alt\u0131na almaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131rken Filistinliler ilk defa t\u00fcm d\u00fcnyada geni\u015f kitleler taraf\u0131ndan g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcr hale geldiler.<\/p>\n 1950\u2019lerde El-Fetih Ortado\u011fu\u2019nun kapitalist d\u00fczeni i\u00e7inde yer alacak, ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z bir devlet in\u015fa etmeyi umuyordu. 1990\u2019lara gelindi\u011finde tarihteki Filistin\u2019in k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck bir b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc \u00fcst\u00fcnde g\u00f6lge bir iktidar elde etmek i\u00e7in ulusal hareketten feragat etti. Bu noktada; neo-liberal mant\u0131\u011f\u0131n h\u00fck\u00fcm s\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc kapitalizmin yeniden yap\u0131land\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 s\u00fcrecine kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadelenin her ge\u00e7en g\u00fcn daha fazla etkiledi\u011fi kitlelerle kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya geldi. Ulusal sorun b\u00fcy\u00fck sermayeye, uluslararas\u0131 finans sistemine ve Washington ve K\u00f6rfez \u00fclkelerinin y\u00f6netti\u011fi yeni emperyalizme kar\u015f\u0131 b\u00fct\u00fcnsel m\u00fccadelenin bir par\u00e7as\u0131 haline geldi. M\u00fclks\u00fczle\u015ftirilmenin, s\u00fcr\u00fclmenin ve \u0130srail\u2019in y\u0131llard\u0131r s\u00fcren kolonizasyonunun sonucu olarak Filistinliler kendilerini tamamen s\u0131n\u0131fsal uzla\u015fmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131n politik d\u00fcnyas\u0131nda buldular.<\/p>\n 2011\u2019de M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019daki kitlesel m\u00fccadele M\u00fcbarek\u2019i devirdi\u011finde durum buydu. Pek \u00e7ok Filistinli bundan memnun kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131; nefret edilen bir diktat\u00f6r\u00fcn, b\u00fcy\u00fck grevlerin merkezi bir rol oynad\u0131\u011f\u0131, kitlesel bir muhalefet hareketi taraf\u0131ndan devrilmesini kutlad\u0131lar. Electronic Intifada, Gazze\u2019den \u015f\u00f6yle haber ge\u00e7ti:<\/p>\n \u201cMasr, Masr, Masr, Masr\u201d; Arap\u00e7a M\u0131s\u0131r kelimesi Gazze sokaklar\u0131ndaki b\u00fcy\u00fck kalabal\u0131klar taraf\u0131ndan hayk\u0131r\u0131l\u0131yordu\u2026 Gazze\u2019nin en i\u015flek caddelerinden olan Umar el-Mukhtar Caddesi \u00e7ok g\u00fczel bir portre sunuyordu: Alt\u0131n bir kartalla s\u00fcslenmi\u015f, siyah, k\u0131rm\u0131z\u0131, beyaz renkli y\u00fczlerce M\u0131s\u0131r bayra\u011f\u0131 dalgaland\u0131r\u0131l\u0131rken pek \u00e7ok insan \u015fekerleme yiyip patlayan havai fi\u015fekleri izliyordu.[74]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n Gazzeliler Tunus ve Kahire\u2019den uyarlad\u0131klar\u0131 sloganlar\u0131 hayk\u0131r\u0131yordu: \u201cHalk, Abbas\u2019\u0131 devirmek istiyor\u201d.[75]<\/a> Filistin k\u00f6kenli n\u00fcfusun yo\u011fun oldu\u011fu bir \u015fehir olan Amman\u2019da at\u0131lan sloganlar: \u201cYa\u015fas\u0131n M\u0131s\u0131r!\u201d, \u201cS\u0131radaki kim?\u201d, \u201cS\u0131ra Abbas\u2019ta!\u201d [76]<\/a> Filistinli aktivist ve yazar Ali Abunimah \u015funlar\u0131 aktard\u0131:<\/p>\n Devrim, Arap d\u00fcnyas\u0131n\u0131n ortak kaderine has bir \u015fuuru yeniden uyand\u0131rd\u0131. Pek \u00e7o\u011fumuzun \u00f6ld\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc bir \u015fuur; anne-babalar\u0131m\u0131z\u0131n kendi gen\u00e7lik an\u0131lar\u0131nda yer alan, dinledi\u011fimizde bize naif gelen ve Arap liderlerinin kesinlikle \u00f6ld\u00fcrmek istedi\u011fi bir \u015fuur. Arap diktat\u00f6rleri de\u2026 kendi halklar\u0131n\u0131n ruhunun \u00f6ld\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcyordu. Devrimler s\u0131n\u0131rs\u0131z olanaklar\u0131 bar\u0131nd\u0131ran bir bilinci ve \u00fclkeden \u00fclkeye yay\u0131lmas\u0131 gereken de\u011fi\u015fim arzusunu uyand\u0131rd\u0131.[77]<\/a><\/p>\n Filistin m\u00fccadelesi kritik bir d\u00f6nemde. Filistin\u2019in tecridi Ortado\u011fu\u2019nun g\u00fc\u00e7 odaklar\u0131na kafa tutan hareketler taraf\u0131ndan k\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131. \u201cOrtak kader bilinci\u201d Filistiniler\u2019le sokaklardaki ve i\u015fyerlerindeki Tunuslular\u2019\u0131 ve M\u0131s\u0131rl\u0131lar\u2019\u0131 birle\u015ftirdi.<\/p>\n Bar\u0131 \u015eeria\u2019da Filistinliler ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta fazla ihtiyatl\u0131yd\u0131. Mahmud Abbas hem M\u00fcbarek\u2019i hem de Tunus\u2019un diktat\u00f6r\u00fc Ben Ali\u2019yi telefonla arayarak destek \u00f6nerdi ve ayaklanmalar\u0131 destekleyen Ramallah\u2019taki g\u00f6stericilerin \u00fczerine polisi sald\u0131. Bunlar FUY\u2019un diktat\u00f6rl\u00fcklere olan ba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n ve kitlesel hareketleri k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fcmsedi\u011finin a\u00e7\u0131k g\u00f6stergeleridir. Fakat kutlama havas\u0131n\u0131n yay\u0131lmas\u0131yla Abbas panikledi, t\u00fcm kabinesinin istifas\u0131n\u0131 istedi ve ba\u015fkanl\u0131k se\u00e7imi \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131 yapt\u0131. Ayn\u0131 anda FUY\u2019un g\u00fcvenlik g\u00fc\u00e7lerini alarma ge\u00e7irdi. Onun ayakta kalmas\u0131 yerel hareketi bast\u0131rmak i\u00e7in \u0130srail\u2019le ortak hareket etmesine ba\u011fl\u0131yd\u0131. Aylar boyunca Filistin gitti geldi. Haziran 2011\u2019de \u0130srail subaylar\u0131n\u0131n akl\u0131nda bir \u201cfelaket senaryosu\u201d vard\u0131: \u0130srail\u2019in M\u0131s\u0131r, \u00dcrd\u00fcn, Suriye ve L\u00fcbnan s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131n bir \u201cs\u0131n\u0131r \u0130ntifadas\u0131\u201d alan\u0131na d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmesine neden olacak ve Filistinliler\u2019i birle\u015ftirecek bir \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131.[78]<\/a> Fakat Abbas dayand\u0131 ve \u0130srail, binlerce Filistinli Suriye\u2019den s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 a\u015fmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131nda bunu bast\u0131rmay\u0131 becerdi.<\/p>\n SKYK (Silahl\u0131 Kuvvetler Y\u00fcksek Konseyi) h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin M\u00fcbarek\u2019in \u0130srail\u2019le yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 anla\u015fmalar\u0131 iptal etmesinde ve Gazze\u2019yle olan s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131nda \u0131srar eden, Filistin i\u00e7in harekete ge\u00e7ilmesi ad\u0131na say\u0131s\u0131z eylemin yap\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019daki geli\u015fmeler \u00f6zel \u00f6neme sahipti. Eyl\u00fcl 2011\u2019de b\u00fcy\u00fck bir kalabal\u0131k \u0130srail\u2019in Kahire b\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7ili\u011fini bast\u0131 ve \u0130srail diplomatik g\u00f6revlilerini tahliye etti. SKYK yine de isteklere kulaklar\u0131n\u0131 t\u0131kad\u0131. Aral\u0131k 2011\u2019de M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Karde\u015fler parlamento se\u00e7imlerini kazand\u0131lar; onlar da harekete ge\u00e7medi. Karde\u015fler\u2019in Gazze\u2019deki \u201ckarde\u015f\u201d \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fc Hamas M\u00fcbarek\u2019in d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc \u201ct\u00fcm taleplerini destekledi\u011fimiz M\u0131s\u0131r devriminin zaferinin ba\u015flamas\u0131\u201d olarak de\u011ferlendirip kutlad\u0131lar.[79]<\/a> M\u0131s\u0131r devletinin omurgas\u0131 olan orduyla \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 y\u00fcz\u00fcnden fel\u00e7 ge\u00e7iren Karde\u015fler harekete ge\u00e7emedi. \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fcn aday\u0131 Muhammed Mursi Haziran 2012\u2019de devlet ba\u015fkan\u0131 se\u00e7ildikten sonra Karde\u015fler, Filistin\u2019le olan ili\u015fkilerini inkar etme moduna girdi; Filistin meselesiyle \u00e7ok derin bir ge\u00e7mi\u015fi olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen Gazze\u2019yi kaderine terk etti. M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n laik muhalefeti de daha etkin de\u011fildi. Liberaller ve milliyet\u00e7iler her ne kadar Filistin meselesine ba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrekli ifade etseler de Gazze ve (daha geni\u015f perspektiften) \u0130srail i\u015fgali meselelerinde \u0131sl\u0131k \u00e7ald\u0131lar. 2012\u2019de Nas\u0131rc\u0131 ba\u015fkan aday\u0131 Hamdeen Sabbahi e\u011fer se\u00e7ilirse M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019\u0131n \u0130srail\u2019le yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bar\u0131\u015f anla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 y\u0131rt\u0131p ataca\u011f\u0131n\u0131, Filistin direni\u015fini destekleyece\u011fini ve Araplar\u2019dan gasp edilmi\u015f topraklar \u00fczerinde kurulmu\u015f olan siyonist devleti tan\u0131may\u0131 reddedece\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131.[80]<\/a> Milyonlarca M\u0131s\u0131rl\u0131 i\u015f\u00e7inin ve devrimci aktivistin deste\u011fini yakalayan bir kampanyadan sonra o da sessizli\u011fe b\u00fcr\u00fcnd\u00fc. T\u0131pk\u0131 Karde\u015fler ve di\u011fer laik muhalif kesimler (liberaller, sosyal demokratlar ve kom\u00fcnistler) gibi o da M\u0131s\u0131r devletinin omurgas\u0131yla y\u00fczle\u015fti\u011finde fel\u00e7 oldu. Stalinist d\u00f6nemin perspektiflerinden mustarip; ulusal \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n v\u00fccut bulmu\u015f hali ve \u201chalk\u201d\u0131n tarihsel temsilcisi olarak de\u011ferlendirdikleri silahl\u0131 kuvvetlere sayg\u0131 duyan ulusalc\u0131lar ve kom\u00fcnistler, \u00fcst d\u00fczey subaylarla uzla\u015f\u0131 aray\u0131\u015f\u0131na girdi; Filistinli radikal aktivistlere yap\u0131lan ihanetin onlara d\u00fc\u015fen k\u0131sm\u0131 da buydu. Temmuz 2013\u2019te General Abd\u00fcl Fettah El-Sisi iktidara el koydu\u011funda M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da Filistin\u2019e en fazla yak\u0131nl\u0131k duyanlar sokaklardan temizlendi.<\/p>\n Filistinli aktivistler \u201ckaybedilen Arap Bahar\u0131\u201dn\u0131n yas\u0131n\u0131 tutuyor.[81]<\/a> 2014\u2019te \u0130srail Gazze\u2019ye yeniden insafs\u0131zca sald\u0131rd\u0131ktan sonra, \u0130srail bas\u0131n\u0131 bile Gazzeliler\u2019in \u00fcz\u00fcnt\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fc sat\u0131rlar\u0131na ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131. Haaretz Filistinliler i\u00e7in \u201cm\u00fcttefik olarak de\u011ferlendirdikleri bir \u00fclke \u2013 M\u0131s\u0131r – Gazze\u2019yi y\u0131k\u0131ma terk etti\u011fi i\u00e7in \u015fa\u015fk\u0131nl\u0131k ve \u00f6fke [duyuyorlar]\u201d yorumunda bulundu.[82]<\/a> Fakat tarihsel de\u011fi\u015fimler ufukta g\u00f6r\u00fcnd\u00fc. Arap \u00fclkelerindeki kitlesel hareketler sayesinde Filistin\u2019e olan ilgi artt\u0131. Bu, 50 y\u0131ldan fazlad\u0131r s\u00fcren Filistin m\u00fccadelesindeki en \u00f6nemli geli\u015fmedir. Ali Abunimah\u2019\u0131n belirtti\u011fi gibi: \u201cdevrimler s\u0131n\u0131rs\u0131z olanaklar\u0131n ve yay\u0131lmas\u0131 gereken de\u011fi\u015fim arzusunun bilincini geri getirdi\u201d. B\u00f6lgenin egemen s\u0131n\u0131flar\u0131 neo-liberal g\u00fcndem etraf\u0131nda birle\u015fmi\u015f durumdalar. De\u011fi\u015fim isteyen Filistinliler, M\u0131s\u0131rl\u0131lar ve di\u011ferleri i\u00e7in mesele, devrimci d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcme ve Filistin\u2019i \u00f6zg\u00fcrle\u015ftirmeye kendini adam\u0131\u015f politik ak\u0131mlar\u0131n nas\u0131l in\u015fa edilece\u011fidir.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n [*]<\/a> Arap\u00e7a rais \u2013 [\u00e7.n.]<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [\u2020]<\/a> \u0130ngilizcesi \u201cFaustian pact\u201d; ruhunu \u015feytana satma anlam\u0131nda \u2013 [\u00e7.n.]<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [\u2021]<\/a> Orijinal metinde burada Abbas deniyor; ancak muhtemelen bir yanl\u0131\u015fl\u0131k s\u00f6z konusu. \u2013 [\u00e7.n.]<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n [1]<\/a> Bu makalenin taslak a\u015famas\u0131nda yapt\u0131klar\u0131 yorumlar i\u00e7in Anne Alexander\u2019a, Alex Callinicos\u2019a, Elli Marfleet\u2019e, John Rose\u2019a ve Alan Watts\u2019a te\u015fekk\u00fcrler.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [2]<\/a> Ma\u2019an News, 2014<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [3]<\/a> Faheem ve Thomas, 2014.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [4]<\/a> Mozgovaya\/Haaretz, 2011.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [5]<\/a> Benn, 2010.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [6]<\/a> Benn, 2010.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [7]<\/a> Barghouti, 2011, s. 56.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [8]<\/a> Khalidi, 2014.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [9]<\/a> Khalidi, 2014.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [10]<\/a> Nakba, Arap\u00e7a felaket anlam\u0131nda bir kelime. Kelime, Arap d\u00fcnyas\u0131nda 1948 Arap-\u0130srail \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 ve Filistinliler\u2019in yerinden yurdundan edilmesine i\u015faret eder.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [11]<\/a> Ibrahim, 1982, s. 48.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [12]<\/a> \u201cFatah\u201d veya \u201cFath\u201d Arap\u00e7a Filistin Ulusal Kurtulu\u015f Hareketi (Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Falastini) kelimelerinin (tersten) ba\u015f harfleridir. Ayn\u0131 zamanda Kuran\u2019da ge\u00e7en bir kelime olup \u201cba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7\u201d veya \u201czafer\u201d [fetih] anlam\u0131na gelir.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [13]<\/a> El-Fetih\u2019in politik stratejisinin geli\u015fimi ve kar\u0131\u015fmama ilkesi i\u00e7in: Schulz, 1999.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [14]<\/a> Hart, 1989, s. 157.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [15]<\/a> Suriye, Irak ve L\u00fcbnan FK\u00d6 i\u00e7indeki \u00e7e\u015fitli gruplara destek sa\u011fl\u0131yordu. Suriyeliler; El-Saika, Filistin Halk Kurtulu\u015f Cephesi-Genel Komutanl\u0131k ve Filistin Halk M\u00fccadele Cephesi dahil bir dizi gruba arka \u00e7\u0131k\u0131yordu.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [16]<\/a> Hart, 1989, s. 286.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [17]<\/a> Hart, 1989, s. 286.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [18]<\/a> L\u00fcbnan\u2019da ya\u015fanan geli\u015fmelerin hayranl\u0131k uyand\u0131r\u0131c\u0131 hikayesi i\u00e7in: Sayigh, 1979.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [19]<\/a> Filistinli liderler \u00e7o\u011funlukla takma adlarla an\u0131l\u0131r. Bu adlar genellikle en b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00e7ocuklar\u0131n\u0131n ismine g\u00f6ndermede bulunur (b\u00f6ylece Ebu Davud, Davud\u2019un babas\u0131 anlam\u0131ndad\u0131r)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [20]<\/a> Hart, 1989, s. 304.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [21]<\/a> Rabbani ve Hajjar, 1988, s. 26.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [22]<\/a> Johnson ve O\u2019Brien, 1988.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [23]<\/a> Hanieh, 2013, s. 105.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [24]<\/a> Johnson ve O\u2019Brien, 1988.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [25]<\/a> Mideast Mirror, 1988b.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [26]<\/a> Mideast Mirror, 1988a.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [27]<\/a> Marshall, 1989, s. 167-168.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [28]<\/a> Mideast Mirror, 1988c.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [29]<\/a> Bat\u0131 \u015eeria topraklar\u0131n\u0131n sadece y\u00fczde 3\u2019\u00fc ve b\u00f6lgedeki Filistin n\u00fcfusunun y\u00fczde 20\u2019si \u00fczerinde FUY\u2019un do\u011frudan kontrol\u00fc vard\u0131 (A b\u00f6lgesi). B\u00f6lgenin y\u00fczde 24\u2019\u00fc ve n\u00fcfusun 70\u2019inin kontrol\u00fc FUY-\u0130srail ortak y\u00f6netimi alt\u0131ndayd\u0131 (B b\u00f6lgesi); \u0130srail b\u00f6lgenin y\u00fczde 70\u2019inin do\u011frudan kontrol\u00fcn\u00fc ele ge\u00e7irdi (C b\u00f6lgesi). Bu son b\u00f6lgede 227 tane birbirinden ayr\u0131 alan vard\u0131. Bknz. Gorenberg, 2007, s. 370-373; Hanieh, 2013, s. 10-109.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [30]<\/a> Merkezi \u0130statistik Dairesi, \u0130srail\u2019in \u0130statistiki \u00d6zeti 1992-2006 ve Yerler, N\u00fcfus ve Simgeler Listesi 1995-2005. Kud\u00fcs\u2019\u00fcn \u0130statistik Almana\u011f\u0131, Kud\u00fcs \u0130srail Ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131 Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc, 1991-2004, FMEP (Ortado\u011fu Bar\u0131\u015f\u0131 Vakf\u0131) i\u00e7inde, 2007.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [31]<\/a> BBC News, 1998.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [32]<\/a> Yiftachel, 2005, s. 128.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [33]<\/a> Davidi\u2019den al\u0131nt\u0131, 2000.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [34]<\/a> M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da ve \u00dcrd\u00fcn\u2019de h\u0131zl\u0131ca kurulan bu b\u00f6lgeler, ABD\u2019ye s\u0131nai \u00fcr\u00fcnlerin g\u00fcmr\u00fck tarifesi al\u0131nmadan ihrac\u0131n\u0131 m\u00fcmk\u00fcn k\u0131ld\u0131. Bu mallar\u0131n girdileri \u00e7o\u011funlukla \u0130srail\u2019den sa\u011flan\u0131yordu.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [35]<\/a> Hanieh, 2013, s. 104.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [36]<\/a> Hanieh, 2013, s. 110.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [37]<\/a> Hanieh, 2013, s. 110.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [38]<\/a> 1984\u2019te Tunus\u2019ta Halil El-Vezir\u2019le (El-Fetih\u2019in tarihi lideri Ebu Cihad) r\u00f6portaj yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131mda El-Vezir \u015fehir d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda, g\u00f6zlerden \u0131rak k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck ve k\u00f6t\u00fc d\u00f6\u015fenmi\u015f bir evde ya\u015f\u0131yordu. 1988\u2019de bir \u0130srail komando timi taraf\u0131ndan orada katledildi. Salah Khalaf (Ebu Iyad) da Tunus\u2019ta ayn\u0131 kaderle 1991\u2019de kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\u201cKar\u0131\u015fmama\u201d<\/h3>\n
Yenilgi<\/h3>\n
Neo-liberal Filistin<\/h3>\n
\u201cFayyadla\u015fma\u201d<\/h3>\n
Hamas<\/h3>\n
Sat\u0131l\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lan Filistin<\/h3>\n
Devrim<\/h3>\n
Notlar<\/h3>\n
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