{"id":287,"date":"2014-03-31T02:03:29","date_gmt":"2014-03-30T23:03:29","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/marx-21.net\/?page_id=287"},"modified":"2014-03-31T02:32:25","modified_gmt":"2014-03-30T23:32:25","slug":"suriyede-cetin-sinav","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/marx-21.net\/?page_id=287","title":{"rendered":"Suriye’de \u00c7etin S\u0131nav"},"content":{"rendered":"
Jonathan Maunder<\/strong><\/em><\/pre>\n
Arap devrimleri, t\u00fcm d\u00fcnyada kapitalizme ve emperyalizme kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccade\u00adleye b\u00fcy\u00fck esin kayna\u011f\u0131 oldu. Grev, i\u015fgal ve protestolarla d\u0131\u015favurulan sisteme kar\u015f\u0131 k\u00fcresel yabanc\u0131la\u015fma ve \u00f6fkeyi esinlendirip besledi.1<\/sup><\/p>\n
Ne var ki, devrimci s\u00fcre\u00e7 b\u00f6lgede e\u015fitsiz bir \u015fekilde geli\u015fmi\u015ftir. Tunus ve M\u0131s\u0131r’da Ben Ali ve M\u00fcbarek’in birka\u00e7 hafta i\u00e7inde devrilmesiyle h\u0131zl\u0131 ilerleme\u00adler ya\u015fand\u0131. Libya’da Kaddafi sonu\u00e7ta NATO’nun askeri m\u00fcdahalesine dayanan uzun bir m\u00fccadeleden sonra iktidardan devrildi. Yemen’de, Salih kendi rejimini oldu\u011fu gibi b\u0131rakan bir anla\u015fmayla iktidardan indirildi. Bu yaz\u0131 yaz\u0131l\u0131rken, Suri\u00adye’de Be\u015far Esad rejimi ve halk ayaklanmas\u0131 aras\u0131nda bir yeni\u015fememe durumu\u00adnun ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131yla birlikte, farkl\u0131 bir yola girildi\u011fi g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcyor.<\/p>\n
Baz\u0131 solcular, ayaklanmay\u0131 temelde jeopolitik a\u00e7\u0131dan, kendi \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 i\u00e7in a\u00adyaklanmay\u0131 y\u00f6nlendiren Bat\u0131 ve b\u00f6lgesel m\u00fcttefikleri ile b\u00f6lgede Bat\u0131’n\u0131n ege\u00admenli\u011fine kar\u015f\u0131 duru\u015fu temsil eden Esad rejimi aras\u0131ndaki bir \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma olarak de\u011ferlendirmi\u015flerdir.2<\/sup> Ben ise jeopolitik boyut \u00f6nemli olmakla birlikte, bunun 2000’den beri Baas Partisi’nin y\u00f6netiminin temelindeki tarihsel “toplumsal pakt”\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesi s\u0131n\u0131fsal e\u015fitsizlik ve devlet otoriterizminde yo\u011funla\u015fmaya yol a\u00e7an Suriye’deki i\u00e7 geli\u015fmelerin kavran\u0131\u015f\u0131yla b\u00fct\u00fcnle\u015fmesi gerekti\u011fini \u00f6ne s\u00fcr\u00fc\u00adyorum. Bu anlamda, Suriye ayaklanmas\u0131n\u0131 motive eden di\u011fer Arap devrimlerindeki ayn\u0131 sorun ve kayg\u0131lard\u0131. Bu ba\u011flam Suriye ayaklanmas\u0131n\u0131 b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc i\u00e7inde kavramak i\u00e7in ya\u015famsald\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Ben Ali ve M\u00fcbarek rejimleri gibi Esad rejiminin de Suriye i\u015f\u00e7ileri ve yok\u00adsullar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na temelden ters d\u00fc\u015fen bir egemen s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131 temsil etti\u011fini \u00f6ne s\u00fc\u00adr\u00fcyorum. Ayr\u0131ca, bu rejimin hem emperyalizme hem de Filistin ve L\u00fcbnan direni\u015f hareketlerine y\u00f6nelik konumu, bir egemen s\u0131n\u0131f olarak jeostratejik \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 yan\u00ads\u0131tan derin bir \u00e7eli\u015fkiye sahiptir.<\/p>\n
Suriye’de i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131, hen\u00fcz kolektif g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc grevler yoluyla kitlesel grevlerin devrimlerin erken ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131nda ya\u015famsal rol oynad\u0131\u011f\u0131 Tunus ve M\u0131s\u0131r’dakiyle ay\u00adn\u0131 d\u00fczeyde ortaya koymam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ciddi meydan okumalara kar\u015f\u0131n, Suriye i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131\u00adf\u0131n\u0131n b\u00f6yle bir rol oynama potansiyeline sahip oldu\u011funu ve ger\u00e7ek \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck, e\u00ad\u015fitlik ve demokrasi u\u011fruna ayaklanman\u0131n hedeflerine tam anlam\u0131yla ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftir\u00admenin tek yolunun bunun oldu\u011funu \u00f6ne s\u00fcr\u00fcyorum. Ayr\u0131ca, kendisine g\u00fcvenen, \u00f6z-\u00f6rg\u00fctl\u00fc bir hareketin geli\u015fmesi emperyalist m\u00fcdahale ve y\u00f6nlendirmeye kar\u015f\u0131 en iyi savunmad\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Burada 2011 \u015eubat\u0131ndan bu yana ayaklanman\u0131n nas\u0131l ba\u015flay\u0131p geli\u015fti\u011finin ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 bir de\u011ferlendirmesini sunmayaca\u011f\u0131m.3<\/sup> Bu makalenin amac\u0131, Suriye’de E- sad rejiminin do\u011fas\u0131n\u0131, ayaklanman\u0131n toplumsal ve ekonomik k\u00f6klerini kavray\u0131p rejime ve emperyalist m\u00fcdahaleye bir alternatif olu\u015fturabilecek bir i\u015f\u00e7i hareketi\u00adnin ortaya \u00e7\u0131kabilece\u011fine dair beklentileri de\u011ferlendirmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Suriye Rejiminin Ekonomi Politi\u011fi<\/h5>\n
Rejimin do\u011fas\u0131n\u0131n kavramak i\u00e7in do\u011fdu\u011fu tarihsel ba\u011flamla ba\u015flamal\u0131y\u0131z. 1946’da Suriye’nin Fransa’dan ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kazanmas\u0131n\u0131 izleyen d\u00f6nem ulusal kurtulu\u015f m\u00fccadelesine kat\u0131lanlar\u0131n farkl\u0131 s\u0131n\u0131fsal \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n plana \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir toplumsal karga\u015fa d\u00f6nemiydi. K\u0131rsal b\u00f6lgelerde toprak sahipleri feodal sistemi s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmek i\u00e7in sava\u015fan bir muhafazak\u00e2r g\u00fc\u00e7ken, k\u00f6yl\u00fcler ve i\u015f\u00e7iler toprak ve ser\u00advetin daha e\u015fit bir da\u011f\u0131l\u0131m\u0131 anlaml\u0131 bir demokrasi i\u00e7in sava\u015f\u0131yorlard\u0131.4<\/sup> A\u015fa\u011f\u0131dan gelen hareketlerden a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 korkan k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck sanayici kapitalist s\u0131n\u0131f, toprak sahiple\u00adriyle i\u015fbirli\u011fi ve \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma aras\u0131nda s\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131p kalm\u0131\u015f ve sanayile\u015fmenin yolunu a\u00e7\u00admakta ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131.5<\/sup><\/p>\n
Bu d\u00f6nem o zaman Suriye’nin “Arap d\u00fcnyas\u0131n\u0131n politik ve k\u00fclt\u00fcrel Mek\u00adke’si” olmas\u0131na yard\u0131m eden a\u015fa\u011f\u0131dan \u00f6nemli m\u00fccadelelere tan\u0131k oldu.6<\/sup> 1946’da grevlerin grev hakk\u0131n\u0131n kabul edilmesi d\u00e2hil ileri \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma yasalar\u0131n\u0131n ge\u00e7mesini sa\u011flamas\u0131yla sendika \u00fcyeleri say\u0131s\u0131 \u00fc\u00e7 kat artt\u0131. 1950’deki ulusal k\u00f6yl\u00fc ayaklan\u00admas\u0131n\u0131 1951’de Halep’te Arap d\u00fcnyas\u0131n\u0131n ilk k\u00f6yl\u00fc kongresi izledi.7<\/sup> Bu hareket\u00adler Baas Partisi, Arap Sosyalist Partisi ve Kom\u00fcnist Partisi gibi milliyet\u00e7i ve sosyalist ak\u0131mlar\u0131n etraf\u0131nda bir araya geldiler.<\/p>\n
Ne var ki, bu politik g\u00fc\u00e7ler halk\u0131n m\u00fccadelelerini farkl\u0131 derecelerde da\u011f\u0131t\u0131p sonra da bast\u0131rd\u0131lar. Dar bir orta s\u0131n\u0131f temeline sahip Baas Partisi, emperyalizm ve toprak sahibi s\u0131n\u0131fa muhalefetle a\u015fa\u011f\u0131dan s\u0131n\u0131f m\u00fccadelesine d\u00fc\u015fmanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 birle\u015fti\u00adren milliyet\u00e7i bir ideolojiye sahipti. Arap Sosyalist Partisi ise k\u00f6yl\u00fcler i\u00e7inde da\u00adha geni\u015f bir tabana sahipti ama Baas’la birle\u015ferek politik ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kaybetmi\u015fti. Zaman\u0131n Stalinist stratejisini izleyen Kom\u00fcnist Partisi, i\u015f\u00e7i ve k\u00f6y\u00adl\u00fclerin m\u00fccadeleleriyle Baas’\u0131n “ilerici milliyet\u00e7ileri” aras\u0131nda yalpal\u0131yordu. 1955’te \u00fc\u00e7 parti Ulusal Cephe ad\u0131 alt\u0131nda bir se\u00e7im ittifak\u0131 kurdu.8<\/sup><\/p>\n
1958’de a\u015fa\u011f\u0131dan hareket kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda deh\u015fete kap\u0131lan bir grup subay\u0131n, Suri\u00adye’yi Nas\u0131r M\u0131s\u0131r’\u0131yla birli\u011fe g\u00f6t\u00fcrmesiyle Birle\u015fik Arap Cumhuriyeti (BAC) ku\u00adruldu. Baas bunu desteklerken, Kom\u00fcnist Parti’den muhalefet gelmedi. BAC d\u00f6neminin reformlar\u0131, sonraki on y\u0131llarda Baas Partisi’nin iktidar\u0131na taban olu\u015f\u00adturan “toplumsal pakt”\u0131n temelini att\u0131. Bu, halk hareketleri \u00fczerinde tam devlet kontrol\u00fc kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131nda toprak da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m\u0131, i\u015f\u00e7i ve yoksullara sosyal yard\u0131mlar\u0131n \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00adlenmesini ve sanayile\u015fmeyi i\u00e7ine al\u0131yordu. 1959’da grev hakk\u0131 kald\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131, t\u00fcm ba\u00ad\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z sendikalar ve k\u00f6yl\u00fc \u00f6rg\u00fctlenmeleri yasakland\u0131.9<\/sup><\/p>\n
BAC 1961’de \u00e7\u00f6kt\u00fcyse de onu “toplumsal pakt” modelini koruyan 1963 Ba\u00adas askeri darbesi izledi. Baas, devlet g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc i\u015f\u00e7i ve k\u00f6yl\u00fclerin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z \u00f6rg\u00fctlen\u00admesinin \u00f6n\u00fcne ge\u00e7mek kadar toprak da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m\u0131 ve ulusalla\u015ft\u0131rmalar yoluyla egemen s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n do\u011frudan \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na meydan okuma anlam\u0131na gelen sanayile\u015fmeyi te\u015fvik etmek i\u00e7in kulland\u0131.10<\/sup><\/p>\n
Suriye’nin BAC’a kat\u0131lmas\u0131 ve 1963 darbesi, Tony ClifPin “yoldan sapm\u0131\u015f s\u00fcrekli devrim” dedi\u011fi, Rus devrimci Leon Tro\u00e7ki’nin ana hatlar\u0131yla ortaya koy\u00addu\u011fu s\u00fcrekli devrim s\u00fcrecinden bir sapman\u0131n \u00f6rnekleri gibi g\u00f6r\u00fclebilir. Tro\u00e7ki, s\u00f6\u00adm\u00fcrgecilikten kurtularak ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan \u00fclkelerde i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n eski feodal y\u00f6netici s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n egemenli\u011fini y\u0131k\u0131p b\u00f6ylece m\u00fccadeleyi sosyalizme y\u00f6nlendirme g\u00f6revini nas\u0131l \u00fcstlenece\u011fini ortaya koymu\u015ftu. Ne var ki, \u00f6nderlik eden politik g\u00fc\u00e7lere ve k\u00f6yl\u00fc kitlesi kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda nispeten az say\u0131da olmas\u0131na ba\u011fl\u0131 olarak, Suriye i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131\u00adf\u0131 kendisini toplumda \u00f6nder g\u00fc\u00e7 olarak yerle\u015ftirmeyi ba\u015faramad\u0131. Ayn\u0131 zamanda, sanayi ve tar\u0131mda egemen s\u0131n\u0131f ekonomik ve politik kalk\u0131nma g\u00f6revini \u00fcstlene\u00admeyecek kadar p\u0131s\u0131r\u0131k ve da\u011f\u0131n\u0131kt\u0131. Cliffin teorisi, bu durumda devletle ili\u015fkide\u00adki orta s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n radikalle\u015fmi\u015f kesimlerinin nas\u0131l ulusal kalk\u0131nma yoluyla s\u00fcr\u00fckleyici bir rol oynad\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 ortaya koymu\u015ftur. Bu “yoldan sapm\u0131\u015f s\u00fcrekli devrim”in so\u00adnu\u00e7lar\u0131 sosyalizm de\u011fil, devlet kapitalizmi bi\u00e7imleriydi.11<\/sup> Cliff bu toplumsal ta\u00adbakan\u0131n bak\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 anlat\u0131r:<\/p>\n
Yukar\u0131dan reform umarlar ve \u00f6zbilince sahip, \u00f6zg\u00fcrce bir araya gelmi\u015f bir halk\u0131n kurtulu\u015f m\u00fccadelesinin onlar\u0131n kendileri i\u00e7in yeni bir d\u00fcnyayla sonu\u00e7lana\u00adca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6rmek yerine, minnettar bir halka yeni d\u00fcnyay\u0131 vermek a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a ho\u015flar\u0131na gider. Uluslar\u0131n\u0131 durgunluktan \u00e7ekip \u00e7\u0131karacak \u00f6nlemleri \u00e7ok fazla \u00f6nemserken, demokrasiyi \u00e7ok az \u00f6nemserler. Sanayile\u015fme, sermaye birikimi, ulusal dirili\u015f ham\u00adlesini somutla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131rlar. G\u00fc\u00e7leri di\u011fer s\u0131n\u0131flar\u0131n mecalsizli\u011fi ve politik hi\u00e7li\u011fiyle do\u011fru orant\u0131l\u0131d\u0131r.12<\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Haf\u0131z’\u0131n “d\u00fczeltici hareketi”, “yoldan sapm\u0131\u015f s\u00fcrekli devrim” s\u00fcrecinde dev\u00adlet kapitalizminin t\u00fcm\u00fcyle kuruldu\u011fu ve devlet ayg\u0131t\u0131n\u0131n ge\u00e7mi\u015fin devrimci m\u00fccadeleleriyle her t\u00fcrl\u00fc ba\u011f\u0131n\u0131n koptu\u011fu nokta olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclebilir. M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Ale\u00advi az\u0131nl\u0131ktan gelen Haf\u0131z, yeni yat\u0131r\u0131m ve ticaret f\u0131rsatlar\u0131 sundu\u011fu S\u00fcnni burju\u00advaziyle ittifak\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamla\u015ft\u0131rmadan \u00f6nce Alevi subaylardan sad\u0131k bir \u00e7ekirdek olu\u015fturup S\u00fcnni M\u00fcsl\u00fcman subaylar\u0131 temizlemek i\u00e7in mezhep\u00e7ili\u011fi kulland\u0131.13<\/sup> Bu nedenle, mezhep\u00e7ilik istikrarl\u0131 bir egemen s\u0131n\u0131f kurma \u00e7abas\u0131n\u0131n par\u00e7as\u0131 olarak “e\u00adlit ya da s\u0131n\u0131fsal bir koalisyonun \u00f6nc\u00fc g\u00fcc\u00fc”n\u00fc kurmak i\u00e7in kullan\u0131ld\u0131.14<\/sup> Haf\u0131z’\u0131n y\u00f6netimi ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131ktan sonra defalarca tekrarlanan askeri darbelere k\u0131yasla ger\u00ad\u00e7ekten de istikrar getirdi. Ama bu a\u015fa\u011f\u0131dan halk m\u00fccadelesini bast\u0131rma temelin\u00adde olu\u015fturulan bir istikrard\u0131. Suriye Kom\u00fcnist Partisi, i\u015f\u00e7i ve k\u00f6yl\u00fclerin kitlesel m\u00fccadelelerine net bir y\u00f6nelim g\u00f6stermek yerine, 1950’lerden beri Baas’la “bi\u00adlimsel sosyalizm”i benimsemi\u015f “temel devrimci kuvvet” olarak betimledikleri it\u00adtifaklar\u0131 arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te i\u015fbirlik\u00e7ilik yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131.15<\/sup> Bu, bug\u00fcn de Esad rejimi konusunda yan\u0131lsamalara kap\u0131lan baz\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n yanl\u0131\u015f\u0131 gibi, solun a\u015fa\u011f\u0131dan kitle m\u00fc\u00adcadelelerinden \u00e7ok s\u00f6zde “ilerici” ve “anti-emperyalist” milliyet\u00e7i liderlere inan\u00e7 duyma tehlikesine dikkat \u00e7eker.16<\/sup><\/p>\n
1970 ve 1982 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda Suriye i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131 say\u0131ca hat\u0131r\u0131 say\u0131l\u0131r bir b\u00fcy\u00fck\u00adl\u00fc\u011fe ula\u015ft\u0131. Toprak da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m\u0131ndan sonra, bir\u00e7ok k\u00f6yl\u00fcn\u00fcn elinde ailelerini ge\u00e7indi- remeyecek kadar k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck araziler kald\u0131 ve reformlar ne makine kullan\u0131m\u0131na ne de toprak sulama sistemlerine eri\u015filmesini sa\u011flayabildi. Sonu\u00e7 k\u0131rsal b\u00f6lgelerin pro- leterle\u015fmesiydi.17<\/sup> 1970 ve 1981 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda ge\u00e7imlerini tamamen kendileri kar\u015f\u0131layan k\u00f6yl\u00fclerin say\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n 440.000’den 290.000’e inmesi, kendi toprak pay\u00adlar\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131rm\u0131\u015f olan b\u00fcy\u00fck toprak sahiplerinin \u00e7ekti\u011fi bir \u00fccretli emek havuzu o- lu\u015fturdu.18<\/sup> Ayn\u0131 zamanda bu k\u00f6yl\u00fcler yeni fabrika ve madenlerde de \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaya gittiler. Sanayide i\u015fg\u00fcc\u00fc 1972 ve 1982 aras\u0131nda 276.515’ten 433.609’a y\u00fcksel\u00addi.19<\/sup><\/p>\n
1980’lerin ba\u015f\u0131na kadar, ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k sonras\u0131 \u00e7a\u011f\u0131n en k\u00f6t\u00fc e\u015fitsizliklerine kar\u015f\u0131 reformlar\u0131n, devlet ayg\u0131t\u0131nda nispeten y\u00fcksek maa\u015fl\u0131 i\u015flerin \u00e7o\u011falmas\u0131 ve 1970’lerin petrole dayal\u0131 canlanmas\u0131n\u0131n arkas\u0131ndan K\u00f6rfez \u00fclkelerindeki Suriye\u00adli i\u015f\u00e7ilerin g\u00f6nderdi\u011fi d\u00f6viz nedeniyle n\u00fcfusun nispi yoksul kesiminde bir azalma g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc. Ne var ki, bir\u00e7ok i\u015f\u00e7inin ya\u015fam\u0131 gene de zordu. 1981 hane anketi, Suri\u00adye’nin en b\u00fcy\u00fck \u015fehri Halep’te n\u00fcfusun y\u00fczde 62’sinin a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 kalabal\u0131k ve dar mek\u00e2nlarda ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, bu dilime giren y\u00fczde 20’lik kesimde oda ba\u015f\u0131na d\u00f6rt ki\u00ad\u015fi d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc g\u00f6stermi\u015fti.20<\/sup> 1980’de \u015eam fabrikalar\u0131ndaki i\u015f\u00e7ilerle ilgili anketler de ayn\u0131 a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 kalabal\u0131kl\u0131\u011f\u0131, \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma yasalar\u0131n\u0131n patronlar taraf\u0131ndan s\u00fcrekli ihlal e\u00addildi\u011fini ve i\u015f\u00e7ilerin s\u0131rf devlet \u015firketlerinden ayr\u0131lmalar\u0131 nedeniyle para cezalar\u0131 ya da hapisle tehdit edildiklerini ortaya koymu\u015ftu.21<\/sup><\/p>\n
1980’lerin ortalar\u0131nda, rejim d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck ekonomik b\u00fcy\u00fcme ve azalan yabanc\u0131 ya\u00adt\u0131r\u0131mlara \u00fccretler, sosyal yard\u0131mlar ve g\u00fcnl\u00fck t\u00fcketim mallar\u0131 s\u00fcbvansiyonlar\u0131n\u00adda kesintilerle kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k verdi. Sonu\u00e7, \u00f6nceki d\u00f6nemde elde edilmi\u015f olan kazan\u0131mlar\u0131n geri al\u0131nmas\u0131yd\u0131; b\u00f6ylece 1990’lar\u0131n ortas\u0131na gelindi\u011finde n\u00fcfusun y\u00fczde 70’i nispi yoksulluk s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131nda ya\u015f\u0131yordu.22<\/sup> 1991’de 10 Say\u0131l\u0131 Yat\u0131r\u0131m Yasa- s\u0131’n\u0131n \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131, ekonominin yeni alanlar\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6zel sermayeye a\u00e7t\u0131.23<\/sup> 1990’lar\u0131n or\u00adtas\u0131na geldi\u011fimizde, Volker Perthes “Baas\u00e7\u0131l\u0131ktan \u00f6nceki burjuvazisinden hem daha kalabal\u0131k hem daha varl\u0131kl\u0131 bir \u00fcst s\u0131n\u0131f ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r” diye yazabiliyordu.24<\/sup><\/p>\n
2000’de Be\u015far Esad babas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnden sonra iktidara geldi\u011fi zaman du\u00adrum b\u00f6yleydi. Be\u015far ekonomiyi \u00f6zel sermayeye a\u00e7makta, devletin sosyal i\u015flevle\u00adrini budamakta ve giderek daha \u00e7ok bask\u0131c\u0131 i\u015flevlerine bel ba\u011flamakta daha da ileri gitmi\u015fti. 1960’lardan beri Baas\u00e7\u0131 devletin temelindeki tarihsel “toplumsal pakt” \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde zay\u0131flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. 2011 ayaklanmas\u0131n\u0131n k\u00f6klerini ve bu kadar h\u0131z\u00adla yay\u0131larak ezilmesinin bu kadar zorla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131n nedenini anlamak i\u00e7in bu ba\u011flam ya\u015famsal \u00f6nemdedir.<\/p>\n
2011 Ayaklanmas\u0131n\u0131n Toplumsal K\u00f6kleri<\/h5>\n
Be\u015far’\u0131n neoliberal reformlar\u0131 Suriye toplumunu etkileyen bir dizi \u00f6nemli o\u00adlayla ayn\u0131 zamanda oldu. Belki de bunlar\u0131n en \u00f6nemlisi on binlerce k\u00f6yl\u00fcn\u00fcn kentlere ka\u00e7mas\u0131na neden olan 2008-10 kurakl\u0131\u011f\u0131yd\u0131.25<\/sup> Hemen hemen ayn\u0131 za\u00admanda yurtd\u0131\u015f\u0131nda \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131p ailelerine d\u00f6viz g\u00f6nderen binlerce Suriyeli, 2005’te Su\u00adriye’nin L\u00fcbnan’dan \u00e7ekilmesi ve 2008 Dubai finans krizinden sonra geri d\u00f6nd\u00fc. Bu da yetmezmi\u015f gibi 2003 ‘te ABD ve \u0130ngiltere’nin Irak i\u015fgalinden sonra 1,5 mil\u00adyon Irakl\u0131 m\u00fclteci \u00fclkeye s\u0131\u011f\u0131nd\u0131. Bu gruplar daha \u00e7ok \u015fehirlerin yoksul d\u0131\u015f ma\u00adhallelerinde \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131p yerle\u015fmeyi denediler.26<\/sup> 2011 ayaklanmas\u0131 s\u0131ras\u0131nda kentsel muhalefetin ba\u015fl\u0131ca merkezleri bu y\u00f6reler oldu.<\/p>\n
Bu olaylar\u0131n etkisi neoliberal reformlarla artt\u0131. Kurakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n etkisi, k\u00f6yl\u00fclerin topraklar\u0131ndan ayr\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131r\u0131p yeralt\u0131 su seviyesini azaltan yo\u011fun ticari \u00e7ift\u00e7i\u00adli\u011fe yol a\u00e7an 2000’deki devlet topraklar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6zelle\u015ftirilmesiyle daha da k\u00f6t\u00fcle\u015f\u00adti. 27<\/sup> Devlet kontrol\u00fcndeki Tar\u0131m \u0130\u015f\u00e7ileri Sendikas\u0131, k\u0131rsal b\u00f6lgelerdeki s\u0131k\u0131nt\u0131lar\u0131n di\u011fer nedenleri olarak yak\u0131t s\u00fcbvansiyonlar\u0131n\u0131n kesilmesine, pestisit ve hayvan yemleri \u00fczerindeki fiyat kontrollerinin kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131na i\u015faret etti.28<\/sup> \u015eehirlerde kira kontrollerinin ortadan kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 ve k\u00f6rfez \u00fclkelerinden gayrimenkule yat\u0131r\u0131m ak\u0131\u015f\u0131 uygun konut sa\u011flamay\u0131 giderek zorla\u015ft\u0131rd\u0131.29<\/sup> \u0130hracat tarifelerinin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fcl\u00admesi bir\u00e7ok k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck imalat\u00e7\u0131y\u0131 iflasa s\u00fcr\u00fckleyerek \u00f6zellikle de gen\u00e7ler aras\u0131nda za\u00adten g\u00f6r\u00fclen y\u00fcksek issizlik oranlar\u0131n\u0131 daha da k\u00f6r\u00fckledi. S\u00fcbvansiyonlar\u0131n kesil\u00admesi ve enflasyonun pe\u015finden, \u00fccretlerdeki nispi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015fle birlikte 2010’da i\u015f\u00e7ile\u00adrin y\u00fczde 61 ‘i ayda 190 dolardan az kazan\u0131yordu.30<\/sup> Kurumlar vergisinin azalt\u0131lmas\u0131 gibi di\u011fer reformlar zenginlerin servetinin servet katt\u0131.31<\/sup> Ekonomi sek\u00adt\u00f6rlerinin toptan \u00f6zelle\u015ftirildi\u011fi ve k\u00fcresel sermayeye a\u00e7\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olan M\u0131s\u0131r’\u0131n tersi\u00adne, Suriye’deki neoliberal reform genellikle \u00f6zel sermaye ve devlet aras\u0131nda ittifaklar\u0131, devlet sekt\u00f6r\u00fc i\u00e7inde sosyal yard\u0131mlar\u0131n kesilmesini i\u015f\u00e7ilerin ko\u015fulla\u00adr\u0131n k\u00f6t\u00fcle\u015fmesini ve b\u00f6lgesel sermayeyle ba\u011flar\u0131n g\u00fc\u00e7lendirilmesini i\u00e7ine al\u0131yor\u00addu. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla D\u00fcnya Bankas\u0131’n\u0131n ekonomilerinin yabanc\u0131 sermayeye ne \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde a\u00e7\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6steren verilerine g\u00f6re, Suriye M\u0131s\u0131r’a k\u0131yasla \u00e7ok geride kal\u0131yor. A\u00adma “emek esnekli\u011fi”-patronlar\u0131n i\u015f\u00e7iler \u00fczerindeki kontrol\u00fc- s\u00f6z konusu oldu\u00ad\u011funda iki \u00fclke birbirine \u00e7ok yak\u0131n. 32<\/sup> B\u00fct\u00fcn toplumda i\u015f\u00e7ilerin beklentisi olan sosyal harcama kalemlerinde ciddi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Sa\u011fl\u0131k ve e\u011fitimde her ye\u00adri saran \u00f6zelle\u015ftirme ve paral\u0131 sisteme ge\u00e7i\u015f, zenginler i\u00e7in \u00f6zel \u00fcniversite ve has\u00adtanelerle birlikte iki tabakal\u0131 bir sistem yaratm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.33<\/sup><\/p>\n
Bu reformlar\u0131n Suriye toplumu \u00fczerinde \u00e7ok derin etkisi oldu. 2000’lerin or\u00adtas\u0131nda D\u00fcnya Bankas\u0131’n\u0131n e\u015fitsizlik endeksinde Suriye M\u0131s\u0131r’\u0131n gerisinde yer al\u00add\u0131.34<\/sup> Suriyeli iktisat\u00e7\u0131 Samar Seifan’\u0131n s\u00f6yledi\u011fi gibi, “\u00d6nceden Suriye’yi karakterize eden, \u00e7ok geni\u015f tabanl\u0131, b\u00fcy\u00fck orta tabakal\u0131 ve al\u00e7ak tepeli bir top\u00adlumsal piramide sahip olu\u015fuydu. Ekonomik reformla, orta tabaka k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fcl\u00fcrken zen\u00adgin tabakan\u0131n zirvede boy g\u00f6stermesinin sonucu, geni\u015f tabanl\u0131, daralan orta tabakal\u0131 ve y\u00fcksek tepeli bir toplumsal piramit olmu\u015ftur”.35<\/sup><\/p>\n
Ayn\u0131 \u015fekilde, Raymond Hinnebusch ve Soren Schmidt ayaklanmadan \u00f6nce\u00adki y\u0131llar\u0131n “otoriter iktidar\u0131n kapitalist ahbap \u00e7avu\u015flar\u0131n yeni tabakas\u0131n\u0131n hizme\u00adtine ko\u015fuldu\u011fu… Belirleyici bir d\u00f6nemeci” temsil etti\u011fini” s\u00f6ylemi\u015ftir.36<\/sup> Bu ger\u00e7ek rejim i\u00e7inde de hissedilmi\u015f olmal\u0131 ki 2009’da dan\u0131\u015fmanlar komitesi Esad’a bir i\u00e7 memorandumda halkta devletin “zenginler i\u00e7in yoksullar\u0131 terk etti\u011fi” alg\u0131\u00ads\u0131n\u0131n yerle\u015fti\u011fi uyar\u0131s\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131.37<\/sup> 2011 ayaklanmas\u0131ndan bir hafta \u00f6nce, g\u00fcney\u00addeki Deraa \u015fehri \u00e7evresindeki bir tar\u0131m b\u00f6lgesinde bir k\u00f6yl\u00fc bir gazeteciye, “Halk\u0131 bu \u015fekilde bask\u0131 alt\u0131nda tutamazs\u0131n\u0131z. Olmaz b\u00f6yle \u015fey. Her \u015fey tek bir k\u0131v\u0131lc\u0131ma bakar ” demi\u015fti.38<\/sup><\/p>\n
Suriye toplumundaki artan s\u0131n\u0131fsal kutupla\u015fma, devlet ve halk aras\u0131ndaki i\u00adli\u015fkinin giderek bezginlik ve yolsuzlu\u011fa dayal\u0131 oldu\u011fu anlam\u0131na da gelir. Trans- parency International [Uluslararas\u0131 Saydaml\u0131k Kurulu\u015fu] uluslararas\u0131 yolsuzluk endeksinde 2003’te 69. s\u0131rada olan Suriye’yi 2006’da 93. s\u0131raya yerle\u015ftirmi\u015fti.39 <\/sup>Otoritelere yayg\u0131n k\u0131zg\u0131nl\u0131k, yiyici memurlar\u0131 hicveden TV dramalar\u0131, romanlar\u00a0ve karikat\u00fcrlerle pop\u00fcler k\u00fclt\u00fcr e\u011filimlerini besliyordu.40<\/sup><\/p>\n
Bu nedenle, Baas Partisi’nin 1960’lar ve 1970’lerde olu\u015fturdu\u011fu tarihsel “toplumsal pakt”\u0131n 2000’den beri da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131, 2011 ayaklanmas\u0131n\u0131n tarihsel k\u00f6k\u00adlerinin anla\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131nda anahtar rol oynar. As Bassam Haddad’\u0131n s\u00f6yledi\u011fi gibi:<\/p>\n
Ekonomideki derin k\u00f6t\u00fcle\u015fme, kamusal politikan\u0131n [public policy] elitlerce ele ge\u00e7irilmesi ve otoriter y\u00f6netim. uzun y\u0131llar boyunca i\u00e7in i\u00e7in birikerek n\u00fc\u00adfusun geni\u015f kesimlerinde umutsuzluk duygusuna neden olmu\u015ftur. Suriye’de bi\u00adrey ve gruplar\u0131n soka\u011fa d\u00f6k\u00fclmesinde \u00f6n planda rol oynayan, Tunus ve M\u0131s\u0131r’dan sonra bu konuda ger\u00e7ekten de bir \u015feyler yapabilecekleri hissiyat\u0131d\u0131r.41<\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Toplumsal pakt\u0131n bu da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131, Suriye i\u00e7inde yolsuzlu\u011fa batm\u0131\u015f ve otoriter egemen s\u0131n\u0131f ile i\u015f\u00e7i ve yoksul kitle aras\u0131ndaki temel b\u00f6l\u00fcnmeyi ortaya \u00e7\u0131karm\u0131\u015f\u00adt\u0131r. Bu, neden solun Esad’\u0131n M\u00fcbarek ya da Ben Ali’den bir bi\u00e7imde daha fazla deste\u011fi hak etti\u011fi yan\u0131lsamalar\u0131na kap\u0131lmamas\u0131 gerekti\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a ortaya koyu\u00adyor. Ayn\u0131 zamanda da hem rejimin hem yabanc\u0131 h\u00fck\u00fcmetlerin ayaklanmay\u0131 kont\u00adrol edip kendi \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na g\u00f6re bi\u00e7imlendirmesini zorla\u015ft\u0131ran ayaklanman\u0131n do\u011fdu\u011fu derin toplumsal k\u00f6kleri de a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131yor.<\/p>\n
Suriye Rejiminin D\u0131\u015f Politikas\u0131<\/h5>\n
Haf\u0131z iktidara geldi\u011finden beri, \u0130srail’le bir bar\u0131\u015f antla\u015fmas\u0131 imzalamay\u0131 red\u00addetmesiyle birlikte Be\u015far’\u0131n Filistin ve L\u00fcbnan’daki Hamas ve Hizbullah direni\u015f \u00f6rg\u00fctlerine deste\u011fi ve \u0130ran’la ittifak\u0131 nedenleriyle, Suriye Ortado\u011fu’daki kilit “ret- \u00e7i” devlet olarak g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc.<\/p>\n
Ama 1970’den beri ilkeli bir anti-emperyalizmi temsil etmekten uzak olan Suriye d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131, Suriye devlet kapitalist egemen s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n jeopolitik ve i\u00e7 e\u00adkonomik \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n motive etti\u011fi bir dizi manevra yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu manevralar, en ba\u015fta ABD ve Sovyetler Birli\u011fi olmak \u00fczere uluslararas\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7ler, K\u00f6rfez Devlet\u00adleri gibi b\u00f6lgesel g\u00fc\u00e7ler ve Filistin ve L\u00fcbnan direni\u015f hareketleriyle ili\u015fkilerinde defalarca de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fe neden olmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n
1967 sava\u015f\u0131nda Arap ordular\u0131n\u0131n \u0130srail kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 utan\u00e7 verici yenilgi, iktidara geli\u015finde Hafiz’\u0131n d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131n\u0131 bi\u00e7imlendiren kilit olayd\u0131. Sava\u015f \u0130sra\u00adil’in Suriye’nin \u015eam’\u0131n sadece 80 kilometre g\u00fcneyine d\u00fc\u015fen Golan Tepeleri’ni i\u015f\u00adgal etmesine neden oldu. Bu i\u015fgal h\u00e2l\u00e2 s\u00fcr\u00fcyor. Daha sonra Haf\u0131z g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir konumda m\u00fczakere edebilmek i\u00e7in \u0130srail ile konvansiyonel askeri denge kurma\u00adya kararl\u0131yd\u0131. Bu, Filistin’in kurtulu\u015fu i\u00e7in halka dayal\u0131 direni\u015f sava\u015f\u0131 fikrinden ko\u00adpup \u0130srail ve ABD ile m\u00fczakerelerde pazarl\u0131k kozu olarak kullanmak amac\u0131yla, Filistin hareketini kontrol etme \u00e7abas\u0131n\u0131 i\u00e7ine al\u0131yordu. Bir ara\u015ft\u0131rmada s\u00f6ylendi\u00ad\u011fi gibi, “Haf\u0131z’\u0131n iktidar\u0131 ele ge\u00e7irmesinde temel mesele, \u0130srail’e kar\u015f\u0131 bir gerilla sava\u015f\u0131na muhalefeti”ydi.42<\/sup> Daha \u00f6nce Haf\u0131z Suriye’de \u00fcslenmi\u015f Filistin gerilla hareketine sald\u0131r\u0131p liderlerini tutuklam\u0131\u015f ve b\u00fcrolar\u0131n\u0131 kapatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. \u00dcrd\u00fcn Kral\u0131 H\u00fcseyin, 1970’de \u00dcrd\u00fcn’de \u00fcslenmi\u015f Filistin gerillalar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 ilk sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 ba\u015flatt\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, Suriye Filistinlilerin saf\u0131nda duruma m\u00fcdahale etmi\u015fti. Ama bir y\u0131l sonra Esad asilere Cezayir’den g\u00f6nderilen silahlara el koymu\u015f ve H\u00fcseyin Filis\u00adtinlilere nihai sald\u0131r\u0131ya ge\u00e7ti\u011finde sadece diplomatik protestolarla yetinmi\u015fti.43<\/sup><\/p>\n
Konvansiyonel askeri g\u00fc\u00e7 olu\u015fturmas\u0131, Suriye’nin 1973’te \u0130srail’e s\u00fcrpriz bir sald\u0131r\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirip bu \u00fclkeye \u00f6nemli askeri kay\u0131plar verdiren M\u0131s\u0131r’a kat\u0131lma\u00ads\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Haf\u0131z bu zaferin verdi\u011fi otoriteden politik ve ekonomik olarak ABD a\u00e7\u0131l\u0131m\u0131 yaparken, di\u011fer yandan \u0130srail’le “bar\u0131\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeleri'”yapan M\u0131s\u0131r ve \u00dcrd\u00fcn’e kat\u0131lmayarak yararland\u0131.44<\/sup> ABD’nin b\u00f6lgede Suriye’nin \u00f6nemini kabul etmesi, o zaman Henry Kissinger taraf\u0131ndan \u015f\u00f6yle \u00f6zetlenmi\u015fti: “Ortado\u011fu’da M\u0131s\u0131r’s\u0131z bir sava\u015f, Suriye’siz bir bar\u0131\u015f olamaz”.45<\/sup><\/p>\n
\u0130srail’e yenilgiyi tatt\u0131rd\u0131ktan sonra, Haf\u0131z \u015fimdi de L\u00fcbnan i\u00e7 sava\u015f\u0131na m\u00fcda\u00adhale ederek Filistin direni\u015f hareketi \u00fczerindeki kontrol\u00fcn\u00fc daha da sa\u011flamla\u015ft\u0131r\u00admak istemi\u015fti. 1970’lerin ortas\u0131nda, Filistin Kurtulu\u015f \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc (FK\u00d6) i\u00e7indeki Filistinli gerillalar\u0131n L\u00fcbnanl\u0131 solcu gruplarla ittifak\u0131, L\u00fcbnan’da egemen s\u0131n\u0131fa kar\u015f\u0131 tarihsel bir meydan okumaya d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. \u0130srail ve ABD, h\u00fck\u00fcmet ve a\u015f\u0131\u00adr\u0131 sa\u011fc\u0131 Hristiyan Falanjist milislerden yana m\u00fcdahale etmi\u015fti.46<\/sup> 1976’da h\u00fck\u00fcme\u00adti desteklemek i\u00e7in Suriye askerleri L\u00fcbnan’a girdi. 1976’da Hristiyanlar\u0131n ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 mahallelere sa\u011flad\u0131klar\u0131 koruma, Falanjist milislerin sald\u0131r\u0131ya ge\u00e7ip Fi\u00adlistinlilerin Tel al-Za’atar m\u00fclteci kamp\u0131nda katliam yapmalar\u0131na yol a\u00e7t\u0131.47<\/sup> \u00c7ok ge\u00e7meden, Esad bir Filistin hizbinin isyan\u0131n\u0131 destekleyerek FK\u00d6’y\u00fc L\u00fcbnan’dan \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131ktan sonra, L\u00fcbnan’\u0131n Trablus [Tripoli] \u015fehrinin \u00e7evresinde kalan FK\u00d6 sa\u00adva\u015f\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n ku\u015fat\u0131lmas\u0131na da yard\u0131m etti. Robert Fisk kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 manzaray\u0131 \u015f\u00f6y\u00adle anlatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131:<\/p>\n
\u0130ki Filistin kamp\u0131, Badawi ve Nahr Al-Bared isyanc\u0131lar taraf\u0131ndan ku\u015fatma alt\u0131na al\u0131nd\u0131. Onlara yard\u0131m eden L\u00fcbnanl\u0131 Baas\u00e7\u0131lar ve Suriye top\u00e7u bataryalar\u0131 sadece Arafat’\u0131n adamlar\u0131n\u0131 de\u011fil, ama Trablus’un sivil n\u00fcfusunu da bombard\u0131man alt\u0131nda tutuyordu…. Yerle bir olmu\u015f \u015fehirde araba s\u00fcrerken top\u00e7u bombard\u0131ma\u00adn\u0131na hedef olan bir hastaneyle kar\u015f\u0131la\u015f\u0131p zayiat\u0131 sordum. Binan\u0131n d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda so\u011fut\u00adma tesisat\u0131 olan ve i\u00e7i sivillerin \u00f6l\u00fcleriyle dolu bir et kamyonu duruyordu.48<\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Filistinlilere yap\u0131lan ihanet Yakla\u015f\u0131k 2.500 Filistinlinin \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc Sabra ve \u015eatilla m\u00fclteci kamplar\u0131ndaki korkun\u00e7 katliam\u0131n lideri olan Elie Hobeika’n\u0131n Hris\u00adtiyan milislerin yeni lideri olarak Suriye’nin deste\u011fini ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 1983’te doruk nok\u00adtas\u0131na vard\u0131. Suriye’nin L\u00fcbnan’da “b\u00fcy\u00fck rol” sahibi olmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fini \u00f6ne s\u00fc\u00adr\u00fcp sonra da \u015eam’a ka\u00e7an Hobeika, rejimin deste\u011fiyle kendi milislerini olu\u015ftur\u00admaya giri\u015fti.49<\/sup> Suriye’nin L\u00fcbnan’a m\u00fcdahalesi Esad’\u0131n b\u00f6lgede ve gelecekte \u0130srail ve ABD ile muhtemel m\u00fczakerelerde kendi konumunu g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmek i\u00e7in Filistin hareketini kendi amac\u0131na uygun \u015fekilde kullan\u0131p kontrol alt\u0131na alma arzu\u00adsunu yans\u0131t\u0131yordu. FK\u00d6’y\u00fc L\u00fcbnan’da ezmek gibi bu strateji de Hafiz’\u0131n strate\u00adjik \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00fcderken kullanabilece\u011fi Suriye-yanl\u0131s\u0131 Filistinli gerilla gruplar\u0131na destek olmas\u0131n\u0131 i\u00e7eriyordu.50<\/sup> Suriye’nin jeopolitik konumunu g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmek i\u00e7in direni\u015f hareketlerine verilen ayn\u0131 ikiy\u00fczl\u00fc destek, Be\u015far’in bug\u00fcn de bu hareket\u00adlere y\u00f6nelik stratejisini ele verir.<\/p>\n
1990’lar\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131nda Sovyetler Birli\u011fi’nin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fc ve Suriye’nin i\u00e7ine d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fc ekonomik kriz, Hafiz’\u0131 ABD’yle yak\u0131nla\u015fmaya y\u00f6neltti. 1991’de ABD’nin Irak’a kar\u015f\u0131 ba\u015f\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7ekti\u011fi ilk sava\u015f\u0131 desteklemesi, 1990’lar boyunca Suudi Arabistan ve K\u00f6rfez Devletleri’nden b\u00fcy\u00fck yat\u0131r\u0131mlar \u00e7ekmesine neden oldu. Bu y\u00f6n de\u011fi\u015fik\u00adli\u011finin par\u00e7as\u0131 olarak, Haf\u0131z \u0130srail’le yeniden m\u00fczakereleri ba\u015flatmak i\u00e7in de ze\u00admin yoklad\u0131. 1996 ve 2000’de Suriye’nin \u0130srail’in Golan Tepeleri’nden geri \u00e7ekilmesi kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131nda diplomatik normalle\u015fme, ekonomik i\u015fbirli\u011fi ve g\u00fcvenlik \u00f6nlemlerini kabul edece\u011fi “so\u011fuk bar\u0131\u015f” anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzalanmak \u00fczereydi \u2014 Fi\u00adlistinliler i\u00e7in adalet g\u00fcndemden d\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc.51 Sonradan bir \u0130srailli h\u00fck\u00fcmet da\u00adn\u0131\u015fman\u0131 \u015f\u00f6yle diyecekti: “\u0130srail heyetinin \u00fcst d\u00fczey \u00fcyelerinden iki ya da \u00fc\u00e7 ay i\u00e7inde bir anla\u015fman\u0131n m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oldu\u011funu i\u015fittim. T\u00fcm konularda -normalle\u015fme, g\u00fcvenlik ve su- eskisinden ald\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131zdan \u00e7ok daha fazlas\u0131n\u0131 ald\u0131k”.52<\/sup><\/p>\n
2000’de Hafiz’\u0131n \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnden sonra Be\u015far iktidara geldi\u011finde, \u0130srail’in Golan Tepeleri’nde 1.500 yeni yerle\u015fim yeri planlar\u0131yla \u00f6rt\u00fc\u015fen ikinci Filistin intifada- s\u0131, \u0130srail’le bir bar\u0131\u015f anla\u015fmas\u0131na var\u0131lma olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ortadan kald\u0131rd\u0131.<\/p>\n
Bu d\u00f6nemde Be\u015far’in stratejisi Irak Sava\u015f\u0131 \u00f6zelinde genelde \u0130srail ve ABD’ye do\u011frudan muhalefet stratejisi olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Ger\u00e7ekteyse, bu yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n i\u00ad\u00e7erdi\u011fi \u00e7ok fazla say\u0131daki n\u00fcans rejimin stratejik ikilem ve hesaplar\u0131n\u0131 yans\u0131t\u0131r. Bir tarafta, Filistin ve L\u00fcbnan direni\u015f hareketlerine deste\u011fi, Be\u015far’a Golan Tepele- ri’ndeki i\u015fgalle do\u011frudan kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya gelmeden \u0130srail \u00fczerinde bask\u0131 kurma im\u00adk\u00e2n\u0131 vermi\u015ftir.53<\/sup> \u0130ran ve Saddam H\u00fcseyin d\u00f6nemindeki Irak’la ittifaklar\u0131ndan da \u00f6nemli ekonomik ve politik yararlar sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Ayn\u0131 zamanda da Be\u015far 11 Eyl\u00fcl’den sonra rejimini ABD y\u00f6netiminin sald\u0131rganl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan korumak i\u00e7in Suri\u00adye’nin M\u0131s\u0131r ve Suudi Arabistan gibi Bat\u0131 yanl\u0131s\u0131 devletlerle ili\u015fkisini g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmeyi denedi. Raymond Hinnebusch’un s\u00f6yledi\u011fi gibi:<\/p>\n
Suriye, kendisini Kahire ve Riyad’a ba\u011flayan geleneksel Bat\u0131 yanl\u0131s\u0131 ve [Saddam H\u00fcseyin d\u00f6nemindeki] Irak ve \u0130ran’la birlikte zaman zaman yeni bir potan\u00adsiyel Bat\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcnen iki b\u00f6lgesel ittifak a\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kullanmak i\u00e7in kendisine pozisyon se\u00e7meye \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131yor.54<\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Ekonomik d\u00fczeyde, bunu Be\u015far d\u00f6neminde \u0130ran ve K\u00f6rfez Devletleri’nin d\u00fc\u015fman egemen s\u0131n\u0131flar\u0131n\u0131n Suriye i\u015f\u00e7ileri ve kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131 nas\u0131l s\u00f6m\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnde g\u00f6rebiliriz. \u0130ran bir petrol boru hatt\u0131 ve 2007’de Suriye’nin ilk otomobil fabrika\u00ads\u0131n\u0131 in\u015fa ederken, (Bin Ladin ailesi d\u00e2hil) Suudi Arabistan, Kuveyt, Katar ve BA- E’den milyarlarca dolarl\u0131k gayrimenkul yat\u0131r\u0131m\u0131 akm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.55<\/sup> Jeopolitik d\u00fczeyde, bunu \u0130srail’e kar\u015f\u0131 direni\u015fi destekleyip Irak sava\u015f\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131karken Be\u015far’\u0131n, ABD\/\u0130ngiltere i\u015fgaline kar\u015f\u0131 sava\u015fan isyanc\u0131lar\u0131 durdurmak i\u00e7in Irak’a s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n\u0131 ka\u00adpatmas\u0131, CIA’in “ola\u011fan\u00fcst\u00fc eylem” program\u0131 yoluyla “ter\u00f6r \u015f\u00fcphelileri”ne i\u015f\u00adkenceye kat\u0131lmas\u0131nda g\u00f6rebiliriz.56<\/sup><\/p>\n
Be\u015far’\u0131n b\u00f6lgedeki \u00e7eli\u015fkili rol\u00fc, Suudi Arabistan ve \u0130srail’in 2011 ayaklan\u00admas\u0131na tepkisinde g\u00f6r\u00fclebilir. 2011 May\u0131s\u0131nda New York Times Suudilerin tep\u00adkisiyle ilgili bir yorumunda \u015f\u00f6yle yaz\u0131yordu:<\/p>\n
Kral Abdullah’\u0131n ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Be\u015far Esad’a destek a\u00e7\u0131kla\u00admas\u0131n\u0131, Cuma namazlar\u0131nda protestocular\u0131 desteklemek i\u00e7in Allah’a dua edilme\u00adsiyle birlikte bir sessizlik izledi. Analistler bu sessizli\u011fin derin bir belirsizli\u011fi yans\u0131tt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6ylediler. [Suudi] hanedan\u0131 mensuplar\u0131 \u015fahsen Esad’\u0131 sevmezler \u2014 \u0130ran’la s\u0131k\u0131 ili\u015fkilerine bozulur, Suudilerin m\u00fcttefiki eski L\u00fcbnan ba\u015fbakan\u0131 Rafik Hariri’nin kan\u0131na Suriye’nin elinin de bula\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131na inan\u0131rlar. Ama iktidardan gitmesinin \u0130ran etkisinin azalmas\u0131 garantisi olmadan mezhep sava\u015f\u0131n\u0131 k\u00f6r\u00fckleye\u00adce\u011finden de korkarlar.57<\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Ayn\u0131 \u015fekilde baz\u0131 \u0130srailli yetkililer de Esad’\u0131n d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcn “Filistinli \u00f6rg\u00fctle\u00adrin her t\u00fcrl\u00fc s\u0131n\u0131rlamadan kurtulabilece\u011fi”ne y\u00f6nelik kayg\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 ve Suriye rejimi\u00adnin davran\u0131\u015flar\u0131 d\u00fczene koyarak olaylar\u0131n kontrolden \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131n\u0131 engelleyen merkezi otoriteyi temsil etti\u011fi [inan\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131] ifade etmi\u015flerdi”.58<\/sup> Bu “d\u00fczenleyici” pozisyon, Suriye istihbarat\u0131n\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131ndaki ismin 2003’teki yorumlar\u0131na yans\u0131m\u0131\u015f\u00adt\u0131: Buna g\u00f6re, Suriye’ye ABD’den gelen rejim de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fi tehditlerinin “o zama\u00adna kadar Suriye istihbarat a\u011f\u0131n\u0131n denetiminde olan gruplar\u0131, yani Hizbullah, Hamas ve \u0130slami Cihad’\u0131 kontrol d\u0131\u015f\u0131na \u00e7\u0131karabilirdi”.59<\/sup><\/p>\n
E\u011fer Be\u015far’\u0131n resmi d\u00fc\u015fmanlar\u0131n\u0131n pozisyonu d\u00fcz bir \u00e7izgi izlemiyorsa, s\u00f6z\u00adde m\u00fcttefiklerininki de \u00f6yledir. Hamas, ayaklanma s\u0131ras\u0131nda rejimi desteklemeyi reddedip siyasal b\u00fcrosunu \u015eam’dan ta\u015f\u0131rken, Hizbullah’\u0131n lideri Hassan Nasrallah sad\u0131k kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ger\u00e7i bu tavr\u0131 Hizbullah’\u0131n Suriye’de ve genelde Arap d\u00fcn\u00adyas\u0131ndaki sayg\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131na g\u00f6lge d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.60<\/sup><\/p>\n
Haf\u0131z ve Be\u015far Esad’\u0131n \u0130srail’e muhalefeti ve direni\u015f hareketlerine deste\u011fi, en ba\u015fta di\u011fer devletlerle ili\u015fkilerinde etki ve g\u00fc\u00e7lerini korumakla ilgilenen bir dev\u00adlet kapitalist egemen s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n temsilcilerinin jeopolitik \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131yla bi\u00e7imlenmi\u015f\u00adtir. Belirtilen destek bu hareketlerin desteklenmesi, frenlenmesi ve bast\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 aras\u0131nda hi\u00e7 durmadan manevra yapmay\u0131 gerektirir. Bu gibi ikiy\u00fczl\u00fc manevrala\u00adr\u0131n tersine, sosyalistler b\u00f6lgede emperyalizme meydan okuyup Filistin’in kurtu\u00adlu\u015funda en b\u00fcy\u00fck umutlar\u0131n\u0131 Arap devrimlerinin kitlesel m\u00fccadelelerine ba\u011flamal\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Yeni\u015fememenin \u00d6tesi?<\/h5>\n
Ben bu yaz\u0131y\u0131 yazd\u0131\u011f\u0131m s\u0131rada Esad rejimi h\u00e2l\u00e2 iktidardayd\u0131. Rejimin d\u00fc\u015fme\u00adsi halinde olacaklar hakk\u0131nda belli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fclerde belirsizlik ya\u015fan\u0131yor. Baz\u0131lar\u0131, bu\u00adnun ABD ve \u0130srail’e ivme kazand\u0131rarak \u0130ran’la sava\u015f yolunda bir ad\u0131m daha at\u0131lmas\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelece\u011fini \u00f6ne s\u00fcr\u00fcyor. Bir ba\u015fka kayg\u0131 da mezhep sava\u015f\u0131na ve i\u00e7 sava\u015fa yol a\u00e7aca\u011f\u0131 y\u00f6n\u00fcnde. B\u00fct\u00fcn bu sonu\u00e7lar m\u00fcmk\u00fcn ve hafife al\u0131nmama\u00adl\u0131.<\/p>\n
Kilit soru, i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n rejime kar\u015f\u0131 dengeyi bozup d\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7lerin ayaklanma\u00ady\u0131 kendi \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 i\u00e7in kullanmalar\u0131n\u0131 zorla\u015ft\u0131racak kitle grevleri yoluyla \u00fcretim\u00adden gelen kolektif toplumsal g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc kullan\u0131p kullanmayaca\u011f\u0131d\u0131r. Rejimin ayaklanmay\u0131 bast\u0131rmas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6tesinde, b\u00f6yle bir \u015feyin olup olmayaca\u011f\u0131, muhalefet i\u00e7inde \u00f6zg\u00fcr Suriye Ordusu (FSA\/\/\u00d6SO) ve Suriye Ulusal Konseyi (SNC\/\/SUK) gibi di\u011fer g\u00fc\u00e7lerin rol\u00fcne ve mezhep\u00e7ili\u011fin etkisine ba\u011fl\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n
FSA, b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde firar eden asker ve subaylarla birlikte, rejimin sald\u0131r\u0131la\u00adr\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 silahlanan sivillerden olu\u015fuyor. 1970’lerin ve 1980’lerin ba\u015f\u0131nda Hama \u015fehrini yerle bir eden ve yakla\u015f\u0131k 20.000 \u015fehir sakininin \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Karde\u015fler’e kar\u015f\u0131 rejimin zalimce sava\u015f\u0131n\u0131n miras\u0131 ve ayaklanman\u0131n ac\u0131mas\u0131zca bast\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcl\u00fcrse, silahl\u0131 direni\u015fin geli\u015fmi\u015f oldu\u011fu hi\u00e7 s\u00fcrpriz say\u0131lmamal\u0131.61<\/sup><\/p>\n
FSA “\u015femsiyesi” alt\u0131nda, T\u00fcrkiye’de \u00fcslenen liderlikle gev\u015fek ba\u011flar\u0131n\u0131 ko\u00adruyan \u00e7ok say\u0131da farkl\u0131 grup yer al\u0131yor. FSA’ya Katar, Suudi Arabistan ve NATO gibi d\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7lerin sa\u011flamakta oldu\u011fu yard\u0131m\u0131n boyutlar\u0131 hakk\u0131nda \u00e7ok fazla tart\u0131\u015f\u00adma g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcyor. Belli bi\u00e7imlerde yard\u0131m sa\u011fland\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve bu yard\u0131m\u0131n gelecekte arta\u00adca\u011f\u0131 m\u00fcmk\u00fcn de olsa bu gibi iddialar\u0131 abartmamak \u00f6nem ta\u015f\u0131yor. 2012 ba\u015f\u0131nda g\u00fcvenilir raporlar, FSA’n\u0131n yeterince silahl\u0131 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve silahlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6nemli bir b\u00f6\u00adl\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fcn asker ka\u00e7aklar\u0131, devletin cephaneliklerine bask\u0131nlar ve karaborsadan pa\u00adrayla temin edildi\u011fini g\u00f6steriyor.62<\/sup><\/p>\n
2012 Nisan\u0131nda Halep’te \u00e7ekilen foto\u011fraflarda \u00f6n planda g\u00f6r\u00fclen, tanklar\u0131 durdurmak i\u00e7in ellerindeki k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck ve bozuk silahlar, boru tipi bombalar, derme \u00e7atma z\u0131rhlar ve Molotof kokteylleriyle sava\u015fan gen\u00e7 FSA sava\u015f\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131yd\u0131.63<\/sup> A\u00adyaklanma i\u00e7inde ger\u00e7ek bir halk taban\u0131na sahip olan FSA’n\u0131n kolayca d\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7le\u00adrin \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 i\u00e7in vek\u00e2leten sava\u015fan birle\u015fik bir g\u00fcce d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015febilmesi ihtimali a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a \u00e7ok uzak.<\/p>\n
Ne var ki, d\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7lerin sad\u0131k gruplar yarat\u0131p silahl\u0131 direni\u015f i\u00e7indeki liderlerle i\u015fbirli\u011fi aray\u0131\u015f\u0131na girmeleri muhtemeldir. Rejimle uzun bir askeri \u00e7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n, FSA’y\u0131 giderek daha \u00e7ok d\u0131\u015f deste\u011fe ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 k\u0131lma tehlikesi de vard\u0131r. B\u00f6yle bir durumda, FSA halk\u0131n kat\u0131l\u0131m\u0131n ve bir i\u015f\u00e7i hareketinin do\u011fu\u015funun \u00f6n\u00fcnde engel te\u015fkil edecektir. Lee Sustar ve Yusuf Khalili’nin \u00f6ne s\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc gibi:<\/p>\n
\u015eiddete dayanmayan kitlesel g\u00f6steriler sorunu -ve bir silahl\u0131 m\u00fccadelenin y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fcl\u00fcp y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclmeyece\u011fi, y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclecekse de nas\u0131l y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclece\u011fi- Suriye Devrimi’nin temelidir. Silahl\u0131 kuvvetlerin sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131na u\u011frayan bir mahalle ya da \u015fehir\u00adde, \u00f6zsavunmay\u0131 \u00f6rg\u00fctlemek ile – \u00f6zellikle e\u011fer d\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7ler FSA’ya h\u00e2kim olmay\u0131 denerlerse- FSA’y\u0131 silahl\u0131 bir kuvvet olarak in\u015fa etmek birbirinden farkl\u0131d\u0131r. Bu arada, sivil hedefler Irak tarz\u0131 cihat\u00e7\u0131 sald\u0131r\u0131lar, devrimin sadece yabanc\u0131 ajanla\u00adr\u0131n i\u015fi oldu\u011fu inanc\u0131n\u0131 besleyerek Esad’\u0131n elini g\u00fc\u00e7lendirecektir.64<\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Bu nedenle, sosyalistlerin rejime kar\u015f\u0131 silahl\u0131 direni\u015f hakk\u0131n\u0131 savunarak, ca\u00adni Esad rejimi iktidarda kald\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00fcrece direni\u015fin silah b\u0131rakmas\u0131 i\u00e7in soyut \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131\u00adlar\u0131 reddetmesi gerekirken, FSA’n\u0131n kitlesel halk eyleminin yerine ikame edilece\u011fi bir durumun tehlikelerinin de fark\u0131na var\u0131lmal\u0131d\u0131r. B\u00f6yle bir geli\u015fme, bir i\u015f\u00e7i ha\u00adreketinin ortaya \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131 zorla\u015ft\u0131racakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n
SNC, Suriye M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Karde\u015fleri’nin h\u00e2kim oldu\u011fu ve s\u00fcrg\u00fcndeki liderle\u00adrin Bat\u0131’y\u0131 Libya’dakine benzeyen bir askeri m\u00fcdahaleye ikna etme \u00e7abas\u0131yla ku\u00adrulan bir \u00f6rg\u00fctlenmedir. Bu y\u00fczden, SNC liderleri, dikkatlerini ayaklanmaya uluslararas\u0131 destek sa\u011flamaktan \u00e7ok askeri m\u00fcdahale i\u00e7in lobi yapmakta yo\u011fun\u00adla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Muhalefet i\u00e7indeki en bat\u0131 yanl\u0131s\u0131 grup onlarken, yeni egemen elit ha\u00adline gelmek i\u00e7in pozisyon belirlemi\u015flerdir. Ne var ki, Suriye i\u00e7indeki muhalefet onlar\u0131n bu rol\u00fcne kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131k\u0131yor. Esad sonras\u0131 bir devlette, K\u00fcrtlerin \u00f6zerkli\u011fini ya da ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 desteklemeyi reddederek Suriye K\u00fcrtlerini ve askeri m\u00fcdaha\u00adleye b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kan Yerel Koordinasyon Komiteleri \u00e7evresinde \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00adlenen bir\u00e7ok aktivisti de kendisinden uzakla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.65<\/sup> SNC’nin “Libya modeli”ne deste\u011fini g\u00f6zden d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcren olgular hem Bat\u0131’n\u0131n Esad’a ayn\u0131 bi\u00e7imde m\u00fcdahale edece\u011finin o kadar kesin olmamas\u0131, hem de Libya’ya m\u00fcdahalenin giz\u00adli kapakl\u0131 i\u015fler \u00e7eviren yiyici bir Ge\u00e7ici Ulusal Konsey’in kurulmas\u0131 ve on binler\u00adce sivilin \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcyle sonu\u00e7lanmas\u0131d\u0131r.66 <\/sup><\/p>\n
Mezhep\u00e7ili\u011fin Rol\u00fc<\/h5>\n
Suriye Ortado\u011fu’nun en farkl\u0131 \u00fclkelerinden biridir. Suriye n\u00fcfusunun yakla\u00ad\u015f\u0131k y\u00fczde 65’i S\u00fcnni M\u00fcsl\u00fcman, geri kalan\u0131 M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Alevi (y\u00fczde 14), Hristiyan (y\u00fczde 12) ve daha k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fclerde \u015eii M\u00fcsl\u00fcman ve D\u00fcrzi az\u0131nl\u0131klardan olu\u015fur.67<\/sup> Tarihsel olarak, S\u00fcnni burjuvaziyle ittifak halindeki Alevi subaylar\u0131n \u00e7e\u00adkirde\u011finden olu\u015fan rejim, istikrar\u0131n koruyucusu pozu tak\u0131nmak i\u00e7in L\u00fcbnan tarz\u0131 bir i\u00e7 sava\u015f korkusuna oynam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n
Ayaklanma s\u0131ras\u0131nda, rejim az\u0131nl\u0131k gruplar\u0131n\u0131 kendisine ba\u011fl\u0131 tutmak i\u00e7in S\u00fcnnilerin intikam eylemleri d\u00fczenleyece\u011fi korkusunu kullanmak i\u00e7in elinden geleni yapt\u0131. Zaman zaman bu gruplar\u0131n deste\u011fini alarak \u00f6nemli Esad yanl\u0131s\u0131 g\u00f6s\u00adteriler d\u00fczenlemeyi de ba\u015fard\u0131. May\u0131s 2012’de \u015eam’da a\u011f\u0131r can kayb\u0131na neden olan otomobillere yerle\u015ftirilen bombalar\u0131n sorumlulu\u011funu \u00fcstlenen bir \u0130slamc\u0131 grubun a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131 \u015f\u00f6yleydi: “Rejime diyoruz ki. Ya S\u00fcnni halka yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131z kat\u00adliamlar\u0131 durdurun ya da Alevilerin g\u00fcnahlar\u0131n\u0131n bedelini \u00f6deyin”.68<\/sup><\/p>\n
Ama mezhep\u00e7ili\u011fe kar\u015f\u0131 olu\u015fan ayaklanman\u0131n slogan ve \u015fiarlar\u0131 aras\u0131nda ge\u00adni\u015f yer tuttu\u011funu vurgulamal\u0131y\u0131z.69<\/sup> Ayn\u0131 zamanda, az\u0131nl\u0131klar\u0131n bir b\u00fct\u00fcn olarak re\u00adjimi destekledikleri de ger\u00e7e\u011fi yans\u0131tm\u0131yor. Bir analizin s\u00f6yledi\u011fi gibi:<\/p>\n
\u00d6zellikle entelekt\u00fceller ve basit k\u00f6yl\u00fcler aras\u0131nda bir\u00e7ok Alevi, cemaatinin nas\u0131l rejim taraf\u0131ndan rehin al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131na i\u00e7erliyor. D\u00fcrziler neredeyse tam ortadan b\u00f6l\u00fcnm\u00fc\u015f durumda. Co\u011frafi olarak da\u011f\u0131n\u0131k Hristiyanlar, pratikte g\u00fcvenlik g\u00fc\u00e7le\u00adrinin hak ihlallerinin ne kadar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6rd\u00fcklerine g\u00f6re farkl\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015flere sahipler… .Sa- lamiyya \u015fehrinde yo\u011funla\u015fan \u0130smailiye mezhebindekiler muhalefet saflar\u0131na ilk kat\u0131lanlar olmu\u015ftu.70<\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Bu rejimin mezhep\u00e7ilik s\u00f6ylemlerinin Suriye’de s\u0131n\u0131fsal b\u00f6l\u00fcnme ger\u00e7e\u011finin \u00fcst\u00fcn\u00fc nas\u0131l \u00f6rtt\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc de a\u00e7\u0131\u011fa \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131yor. Ayn\u0131 \u00e7o\u011funluk S\u00fcnni M\u00fcsl\u00fcman n\u00fcfus gibi, az\u0131nl\u0131k cemaatler de s\u0131n\u0131f temelinde b\u00f6l\u00fcnm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Ayaklanma i\u00e7inde bir i\u015f\u00ad\u00e7i hareketinin geli\u015fmesinin ne kadar \u00f6nem ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6steren bir ba\u015fka neden de budur. B\u00f6yle bir hareket, S\u00fcnniler, Aleviler, Hristiyanlar, D\u00fcrz\u00fcler ve di\u011ferlerini ortak s\u0131n\u0131fsal talepler temelinde bir araya getirmenin g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir kald\u0131rac\u0131 olacakt\u0131r. B\u00f6yle bir hareketin yoklu\u011fu ise hem rejimin hem de K\u00f6rfez devletlerinin mezhep- \u00e7i gerilimleri k\u00f6r\u00fckleme f\u0131rsatlar\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7o\u011faltacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n
\u0130\u015f\u00e7i S\u0131n\u0131f\u0131<\/h5>\n
Ayaklanma i\u00e7inde bir i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131 hareketinin do\u011fma ihtimali nedir? Nesnel a\u00ad\u00e7\u0131dan bakarsak, bug\u00fcn Suriye’de i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131 potansiyel olarak b\u00fcy\u00fck bir g\u00fc\u00e7t\u00fcr. 22,5 milyonluk n\u00fcfusun yakla\u015f\u0131k 2,7 milyonu \u00fccretli i\u015f\u00e7idir.71<\/sup> Aileler ve i\u015fsizler\u00a0hesaba kat\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, bu n\u00fcfusun y\u00fczde 70’e yak\u0131n\u0131n\u0131n \u00fccretli eme\u011fe do\u011frudan ya da dolayl\u0131 olarak ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 olmas\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelir. N\u00fcfusun yakla\u015f\u0131k y\u00fczde 75’i en b\u00fcy\u00fck alt\u0131 \u015fehirde ya\u015far: \u015eam, Halep, Homs, Hama, Latakia and Tartous.72<\/sup> Bu \u015fe\u00adhirlerin her birinde g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc i\u015f\u00e7i topluluklar\u0131 vard\u0131r. B\u00fcy\u00fck bir madencilik ve imalat sekt\u00f6r\u00fcne sahip olan Suriye’de 20 y\u0131ld\u0131r havalimanlar\u0131, demiryollar\u0131, limanlar ve enerji santrallerindeki i\u015f\u00e7iler ekonomi i\u00e7in giderek daha \u00e7ok \u00f6nem ta\u015f\u0131r hale gel\u00admi\u015ftir.73<\/sup> Bunlar\u0131n yan\u0131nda, i\u015fg\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fcn yakla\u015f\u0131k y\u00fczde 25’ini olu\u015fturan ve 1980’ler- den beri \u00fccretlerin nispi a\u00e7\u0131dan d\u00fc\u015fmesiyle y\u00fczde 40’\u0131n\u0131n ikinci i\u015fler yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 memurlar, \u00f6\u011fretmenler ve doktorlar gibi kamu sekt\u00f6r\u00fc i\u015f\u00e7ileri bulunur.74<\/sup><\/p>\n
Ne var ki, Suriye i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131 nesnel bak\u0131mdan b\u00fcy\u00fck bir toplumsal g\u00fc\u00e7 olarak varl\u0131k g\u00f6sterirken, bunu \u00f6znel eyleme d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrmesi diye bir ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmazl\u0131k s\u00f6z konusu de\u011fildir. Bu, i\u015f\u00e7ilerin m\u00fccadele edecek \u00f6zg\u00fcvenine ve ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z \u00f6rg\u00fctler a\u011f\u0131n\u0131n geli\u015fmesine ba\u011f\u0131d\u0131r. Tunus ve M\u0131s\u0131r i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131flar\u0131n\u0131n aksine, Suriye i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131\u00adn\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n bu t\u00fcr \u00f6rg\u00fctlenme gelene\u011fi daha zay\u0131ft\u0131r. M\u0131s\u0131rl\u0131 devrimci sosyalist Mos- tafa Bassoumy’nin \u00f6ne s\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc gibi:<\/p>\n
Tunus ve M\u0131s\u0131r devrimleri ile Suriye ayaklanmas\u0131 aras\u0131ndaki ba\u015fl\u0131ca fark, i\u015f\u00ad\u00e7i hareketlerinin s\u00f6z konusu \u00fclkelerde oynad\u0131\u011f\u0131 rold\u00fcr.\u00a0Suriye’de i\u015f\u00e7i hareketinin olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u015fik\u00e2r. Bu Suriye’de sendikalar\u0131n devlet denetime tabi olmas\u0131yla birlikte M\u0131s\u0131r ve Tunus’a k\u0131yasla daha gev\u015fek olmalar\u0131n\u00addan kaynaklanabilir. Birka\u00e7 y\u0131ld\u0131r yar\u0131-ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Tunus sendikalar\u0131 ve giderek ak\u00adtifle\u015fen M\u0131s\u0131r i\u015f\u00e7i hareketinin varl\u0131\u011f\u0131, \u00f6rg\u00fctl\u00fc i\u015f\u00e7ileri devrimin kalbine yerle\u015ftiren bir kald\u0131ra\u00e7 g\u00f6revi g\u00f6rm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Her iki durumda da bu ayaklanman\u0131n halk lehine \u00e7abuk sonu\u00e7 almas\u0131na neden olmu\u015ftur.75<\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Tersine Suriye’de y\u00fczlerce sendika aktivistinin hapsedilmesine neden olan son b\u00fcy\u00fck grev dalgas\u0131 1980-1’de g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z i\u015f\u00e7i \u00f6rg\u00fctlerinin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck d\u00fczeyde kalmas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6tesinde, ekonomide “kay\u0131t d\u0131\u015f\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma”n\u0131n art\u0131\u015f\u0131 ve k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck i\u015fyerlerinin inatla varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmesi de g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131 hareketinin olu\u015fu\u00admunun kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131na ciddi engeller \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131yor.76<\/sup> Suriye’de \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan n\u00fcfusun i\u015fsiz kate\u00adgorisinde say\u0131lan yakla\u015f\u0131k y\u00fczde 20’si (oran gen\u00e7ler aras\u0131nda \u00e7ok daha y\u00fcksek), i\u015fportac\u0131l\u0131k yapan ya da “resmi olmayan” ge\u00e7ici i\u015flerde ama yerle\u015fik \u015firketlere ba\u011fl\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan “kay\u0131t d\u0131\u015f\u0131” ekonomidekilerle i\u00e7 i\u00e7e ge\u00e7mi\u015ftir. K\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck i\u015fyerleri a\u00e7\u0131\u00ads\u0131ndan bak\u0131l\u0131rsa, 2004’de yap\u0131lan bir ara\u015ft\u0131rmada, Suriye’deki 600.000 \u015firketten 500.000’inin be\u015ften az i\u015f\u00e7i \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 tahmin ediliyor.77<\/sup><\/p>\n
Ne var ki, K\u00fcresel G\u00fcney’in ba\u015fka \u00fclkeleriyle ilgili bir analizin g\u00f6sterdi\u011fi gibi, bu i\u015f\u00e7i gruplar\u0131 aras\u0131nda hi\u00e7bir net b\u00f6l\u00fcnme olmamas\u0131 da m\u00fcmk\u00fcn.78<\/sup> Ayn\u0131 i\u015f\u00adyerleri hem “kay\u0131tl\u0131” hem “kay\u0131t d\u0131\u015f\u0131” i\u015f\u00e7i \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131rabilir; ayr\u0131ca tek tek i\u015f\u00e7iler g\u00fcn\u00add\u00fcz “kay\u0131tl\u0131” gece “kay\u0131td\u0131\u015f\u0131” \u00e7al\u0131\u015fabilirler.79<\/sup> K\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck i\u015fyerlerinin egemenli\u011fi de de\u011fi\u015fiklik g\u00f6sterir. \u015eam ve Halep’te 14 i\u015f\u00e7iden az i\u015f\u00e7i \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131ran i\u015fyerleri \u015firketle\u00adrin yakla\u015f\u0131k y\u00fczde 60’\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015ftururken, Homs ve Hama gibi sanayinin daha geli\u015f\u00admi\u015f oldu\u011fu yerlerde \u015firketlerin y\u00fczde 20’sini olu\u015ftururlar.80<\/sup> Bu nedenle, Suriye’deki i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fckl\u00fc bir tablosunda g\u00f6r\u00fclen, stratejik a\u00e7\u0131dan daha g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc i\u015f\u00e7i gruplar\u0131n\u0131n, K\u00fcresel G\u00fcney’de yayg\u0131n g\u00f6r\u00fclen bir durum olan ya i\u015fsiz, kay\u0131t d\u0131\u015f\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lan ya da k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck i\u015fyerlerinde \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan daha geni\u015f i\u015f\u00e7i ve yoksul kit\u00adlesinin par\u00e7as\u0131 olmas\u0131d\u0131r.81<\/sup><\/p>\n
Latin Amerika, Afrika, Asya ve Ortado\u011fu’da g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc i\u015f\u00e7i gruplar\u0131n\u0131n grevle\u00adrinin daha geni\u015f yoksul ve i\u015fsiz kitlenin direni\u015fiyle birle\u015fti\u011fi m\u00fccadelelere ili\u015fkin son zamanlarda bir\u00e7ok \u00f6rnek g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcyor. Haftalar s\u00fcren sokak g\u00f6sterilerinden son\u00adra, grevlerinin yay\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n M\u00fcbarek ve Ben Ali’nin devrilmesinde kar\u015f\u0131 konul\u00admaz bir bask\u0131 yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 M\u0131s\u0131r ve Tunus devrimlerinde bu s\u00fcrecin geli\u015fti\u011fine tan\u0131k olduk.83<\/sup> Suriye’de \u00f6rg\u00fctlenme bi\u00e7imleri Yerel Koordinasyon Komitelerinin olu\u00ad\u015fumu, i\u015fportac\u0131lar\u0131n ve k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck d\u00fckk\u00e2n sahiplerinin grevlerini, yollar\u0131n kapat\u0131l\u0131p kontrol noktalar\u0131 kurulmas\u0131n\u0131 i\u00e7ine al\u0131yor. Fabrikalar, b\u00fcrolar ve hastaneler de ba\u00adz\u0131 s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 grevler g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Ama \u015fimdiye kadar eksik halka, ekonomiyi durdu\u00adrup rejimi \u00e7\u00f6kertecek potansiyel g\u00fcce sahip -petrol rafinerileri, limanlar, fabrikalar, b\u00fcrolar, madenler, demiryollar\u0131, hava limanlar\u0131, okullar ve hastanelerde- g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc i\u015f\u00ad\u00e7i gruplar\u0131n\u0131n kal\u0131c\u0131 ve koordine edilmi\u015f grev eylemidir.<\/p>\n
\u0130\u015f\u00e7ilerin i\u015fyerlerinde sahip oldu\u011fu \u00fcretimden gelen g\u00fc\u00e7leri e\u015fsizdir \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc e\u00adkonomin b\u00fct\u00fcn kesimleri ve devleti do\u011frudan felce u\u011fratarak rejimi vurabilir. Ay\u00adn\u0131 zamanda, bu mezhep ayr\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n \u00fcstesinden gelinmesinin de en g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc yoludur. \u015eimdiye kadar rejimin dayanmas\u0131n\u0131n bir nedeninin de bu oldu\u011funu unut\u00admayal\u0131m. B\u00f6yle bir i\u015fi hareketinin do\u011fu\u015fu hi\u00e7 de ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmaz de\u011fildir. Bunu zor\u00adla\u015ft\u0131ran rejimin zalimli\u011fi ve \u00e7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n askerile\u015fmesidir. Ama bu hareket do\u011fmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00fcrece, devrim s\u0131radan halk\u0131n arzulad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ger\u00e7ek ve k\u00f6kl\u00fc de\u011fi\u015fimleri tam anlam\u0131yla ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftiremez.<\/p>\n
Sonu\u00e7<\/h5>\n
Sosyalistler Esad rejimiyle d\u00f6v\u00fc\u015fen tabandaki kuvvetlere a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a sempati bes\u00adlemelidir. Bununla emperyalist bir m\u00fcdahaleye kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kmak aras\u0131nda \u00e7eli\u015fki yok\u00adtur. Tersine, “tabandan” toplumsal de\u011fi\u015fim ve sosyalizme inan\u00e7, emperyalizme kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kman\u0131n en tutarl\u0131 ve sa\u011flam temelidir. Arap devrimlerinin \u00f6nemi, b\u00f6lge\u00addeki s\u0131radan halk kitlesinin hem b\u00f6lgesel egemen s\u0131n\u0131flar\u0131 hem de emperyalist g\u00fc\u00e7leri kontrol etmek i\u00e7in meydan okuma ihtimalini art\u0131rmas\u0131na yatar.<\/p>\n
\u00d6nemli meydan okumalara ve Tunus ve M\u0131s\u0131r’daki m\u00fccadelelerle baz\u0131 \u00f6\u00adnemli z\u0131tl\u0131klar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131n, Suriye ayaklanmas\u0131 b\u00f6lgede yoksulluk, e\u015fitsizlik ve dev\u00adlet bask\u0131s\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 ayn\u0131 m\u00fccadelenin par\u00e7as\u0131d\u0131r. Rejimin i\u00e7te bask\u0131 ara\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lendirirken, egemen s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6zeterek ekonomide reform hamle\u00adsinden do\u011fmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n
Ayaklanma Suriye tarihinde \u00f6nemli halk m\u00fccadelesi gelene\u011finin yeni bir ev\u00adresi olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclebilir. Hanna Batatu’nun 1981’de Suriye ile ilgili yazd\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi:<\/p>\n
Bu m\u00fccadelelerle ba\u011fl\u0131 olan ve kendisini tekrarlayan bir g\u00f6r\u00fcng\u00fc var: Eko\u00adnomik s\u0131k\u0131nt\u0131lar ya da g\u00fcvenlikten yoksun olman\u0131n s\u00fcr\u00fckledi\u011fi k\u0131rsal b\u00f6lge hal\u00adk\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fck \u015fehirlere g\u00f6\u00e7 eder, kenar mahallelere yerle\u015fir. Kendileri de genelde k\u0131rsal b\u00f6lgelerden daha \u00f6nce gelen g\u00f6\u00e7menler olan kent yoksullar\u0131 i\u00e7indeki unsurlarla ortak ba\u011flar geli\u015ftirip birlikte eskiden beri yerle\u015fmi\u015f s\u0131n\u0131flara meydan okur.84<\/sup><\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Bu sefer ya\u015famsal bir fark, Suriye i\u015f\u00e7i s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n\u0131n hem mutlak hem nispi a\u00e7\u0131dan b\u00fcy\u00fckl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne ba\u011fl\u0131 olarak m\u00fccadeleye \u00f6nderlik etme potansiyeli ve art\u0131k Suriye\u00adlilerin \u00e7o\u011funlu\u011funun kentsel b\u00f6lgelerde ya\u015famas\u0131d\u0131r. Bu s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131n i\u015fyerlerinde \u00fcre\u00adtimden gelen g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc kullanarak geli\u015fen g\u00fcc\u00fc, Suriye Devrimi’nin kurtar\u0131c\u0131 potansiyelini tam anlam\u0131yla ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirebilmesinin -sadece rejimi devirmekle yetinmeyip i\u015f\u00e7iler, gen\u00e7ler ve yoksullar\u0131n kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya olduklar\u0131 derin toplumsal ve ekonomik sorunlar\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6zmeye ba\u015flamas\u0131n\u0131n da- tek yoludur.<\/p>\n
Devrimin daha da geli\u015fmesinin kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda \u00f6nemli engeller dikiliyor. Houla \u015fehrinde May\u0131s 2012’deki katliam, rejimin ve milislerinin muhalefetin y\u00fcre\u011fine korku salmak i\u00e7in ne kadar ileri gidebileceklerini g\u00f6steriyor. Ayn\u0131 zamanda, dev\u00adrimin halk\u0131n daha geni\u015f kesimlerini kucaklamakta oldu\u011fu, silahl\u0131 isyanc\u0131lar\u0131n sa\u00ady\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n artt\u0131\u011f\u0131, protesto ve grevlerin hem b\u00fcy\u00fcd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc hem s\u0131kla\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131na dair raporlar da geliyor. Kesin olansa, hem rejimin hem de d\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7lerin a\u015fa\u011f\u0131dan gelen hareke\u00adti sonu\u00e7ta ezme kararl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131d\u0131r. Suriye ayaklanmas\u0131n\u0131n ba\u015far\u0131 ya da ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131, b\u00fct\u00fcn b\u00f6lge ve d\u00fcnyan\u0131n di\u011fer k\u0131sm\u0131nda devrimci hareketlerin \u00f6zg\u00fcvenine etki\u00adde bulanacakt\u0131r. Bu nedenle, sosyalistler emperyalist g\u00fc\u00e7lerin ve m\u00fcttefiklerinin Suriye’ye m\u00fcdahale etme \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131n t\u00fcm\u00fcne kar\u015f\u0131 koyarken, Esad rejimine kar\u00ad\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadelelerinde i\u015f\u00e7iler, k\u00f6yl\u00fcler, askerle ve \u00f6\u011frencilerle sa\u011flam bir dayan\u0131\u015fma i\u00e7inde kalmal\u0131d\u0131r. Onlar\u0131n zaferi bizim zaferimiz, yenilgileriyse yenilgimiz olacak\u00adt\u0131r!<\/p>\n
\u00c7eviren: Ali \u00c7ak\u0131ro\u011flu<\/strong><\/em><\/pre>\n
Notlar<\/span><\/h4>\n
    \n
  1. Bu makalenin ilk taslaklar\u0131ndan biri \u00fczerindeki son derece yararl\u0131 yorum ve tart\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131ndan do\u00adlay\u0131 Anne Alexander, Simon Assaf, Alex Callinicos, Joseph Choonara ve Sam Southgate’e te\u015fek\u00adk\u00fcrler.<\/li>\n
  2. Bkz., Amin, 2012; Galloway, 2011; Ibrahim 2012; Ramadani, 2012.<\/li>\n
  3. Ayaklanman\u0131n \u00f6zl\u00fc ve eri\u015filebilir bir genel \u00f6zeti i\u00e7in, bkz.,Assaf, 2012. Daha ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 bir de\u011fer\u00adlendirme i\u00e7in, bkz. International Crisis Group [Uluslararas\u0131 kriz Grubu] (ICG), 2011.<\/li>\n
  4. Petran, 1972, s. 80-106.<\/li>\n
  5. Heydemann, 1999.<\/li>\n
  6. Petran, 1972, s. 111.<\/li>\n
  7. 7: Bu d\u00f6nemdeki m\u00fccadeleler i\u00e7in, bkz., Petran 1972, s. 86-88 ve s. 101.<\/li>\n
  8. Petran, 1972, s. 114.<\/li>\n
  9. Petran, 1972.<\/li>\n
  10. Heydemann, 1999.<\/li>\n
  11. Devlet kapitalizmi teorisine giri\u015f i\u00e7in, bkz. Haynes, 2009. Yoldan sapm\u0131\u015f s\u00fcrekli devrim teori\u00adsine ili\u015fkin yeni bir tart\u0131\u015fma i\u00e7in, bkz., Choonara, 2011.<\/li>\n
  12. Cliff, 1963.<\/li>\n
  13. Bkz., Batatu, 1981 ve Haddad, 2012a.<\/li>\n
  14. Van Dam, 1996, s. 141.<\/li>\n
  15. Marshall, 1995.<\/li>\n
  16. \u00d6rne\u011fin, bkz., West, 2012.<\/li>\n
  17. Perthes, 1997, s. 86; Ababsa, 2010.<\/li>\n
  18. Perthes, 1997, s. 85.<\/li>\n
  19. Longuenesse, 1985, s. 22.<\/li>\n
  20. Perthes, 1997, s. 131.<\/li>\n
  21. Longuenesse, 1985, s. 20, 23.<\/li>\n
  22. Perthes, 1997, s. 117.<\/li>\n
  23. Polling, 1994.<\/li>\n
  24. Perthes, 1997, p109.<\/li>\n
  25. Ababsa, 2010, s. 83.<\/li>\n
  26. ICG, 2011.<\/li>\n
  27. Ababsa, 2010, s. 84; ICG, 2011.<\/li>\n
  28. Syria Report [Suriye Raporu] ,2011.<\/li>\n
  29. Hinnebusch, 2012, s. 102.<\/li>\n
  30. Seifan, 2010, s. 127.<\/li>\n
  31. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), [Economist \u0130stihbarat Birimi] 2008, s. 3.<\/li>\n
  32. Zorob, 2008, s. 6; Aita, 2009, s. 31.<\/li>\n
  33. Aita, 2009, s. 50; Seifan, 2010, s. 19.<\/li>\n
  34. World Bank, 2005.<\/li>\n
  35. Seifan, 2010, s. 24.<\/li>\n
  36. Hinnebusch ve Schmidt, 2009, s. 4.<\/li>\n
  37. Hinnebusch, 2012, s. 102.<\/li>\n
  38. Syria Report [Suriye Raporu], 2011.<\/li>\n
  39. Seifan, 2010, s. 28.<\/li>\n
  40. 40: Lesch, 2005, s. 223.<\/li>\n
  41. Haddad, 2012a, s. 121.<\/li>\n
  42. Slater, 2002, s. 93.<\/li>\n
  43. Petran, 1972, p253.<\/li>\n
  44. Rogan, 2011, s. 467.<\/li>\n
  45. Traboulsi, 2007, s. 195.<\/li>\n
  46. Traboulsi, 2007, s. 187-204.<\/li>\n
  47. Fisk, 2001, s. 85.<\/li>\n
  48. Fisk, 2001, s. 529-530.<\/li>\n
  49. Fisk, 2001, s. 601.<\/li>\n
  50. Fisk, 2001, s. 569.<\/li>\n
  51. Slater, 2002, s. 94-100.<\/li>\n
  52. Slater, 2002, s. 100.<\/li>\n
  53. 2011 ayaklanmas\u0131n\u0131n sloganlar\u0131ndan biri: “\u015eam kasab\u0131, Golan korka\u011f\u0131 Be\u015far.” Bu at\u0131f i\u00e7in Simon Assafa te\u015fekk\u00fcrler.<\/li>\n
  54. Hinnebusch, 2003, s. 200.<\/li>\n
  55. Khosrokhavar, 2012, s. 286; Seifan, 2010, s. 22.<\/li>\n
  56. Salloukh (2009); LaHood (2005). Arar (2003) Suriye’nin ola\u011fan\u00fcst\u00fc hal eylemlerinin kurban\u00adlar\u0131ndan birinin t\u00fcyler \u00fcrperten a\u00e7\u0131klamalar\u0131n\u0131 aktar\u0131r.<\/li>\n
  57. Khosrokhavar, 2012, s. 289.<\/li>\n
  58. Policy Analysis Unit [Politika Analiz Birimi] ,2012.<\/li>\n
  59. Salloukh, 2009, s. 164-165.<\/li>\n
  60. Sadiki, 2011.<\/li>\n
  61. Rogan, 2011, s. 515.<\/li>\n
  62. Holliday, 2012; Abouzeid, 2012.<\/li>\n
  63. Cantlie, 2012.<\/li>\n
  64. Sustar ve Khalili, 2012.<\/li>\n
  65. Sustar ve Khalili, 2012.<\/li>\n
  66. Milne, 2011.<\/li>\n
  67. EIU, 2008, s. 2.<\/li>\n
  68. Pearse, 2012.<\/li>\n
  69. Bkz., Zenobie, 2011.,<\/li>\n
  70. Harling ve Birke, 2012.<\/li>\n
  71. Seifan, 2010, s. 42.<\/li>\n
  72. EIU, 2008, s. 3.<\/li>\n
  73. EIU, 2008, s. 9, 17.<\/li>\n
  74. EIU, 2008, s. 18.<\/li>\n
  75. Bassyouni, 2011.<\/li>\n
  76. Haddad (2012b) “kay\u0131t d\u0131\u015f\u0131 sekt\u00f6rde” bunlar\u0131 “i\u015flevsiz ve neredeyse tamamen Pazar d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda ya\u00ad\u015fayanlar” olarak g\u00f6sterir, s. 119.<\/li>\n
  77. Seifan, 2010, s. 54. Bu t\u00fcr rakamlar\u0131n abart\u0131l\u0131 olmas\u0131 m\u00fcmk\u00fcn. Bolivya’da patronlar\u0131n\u0131n vergi\u00adden ka\u00e7mak i\u00e7in yapay olarak b\u00f6ld\u00fckleri \u015firketler, k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck i\u015fyerlerinin say\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n y\u00fcksek \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131na ne\u00adden oluyor. Ne var ki, bu gibi uygulamalar\u0131n Suriye’de g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc konusunda elimde bir kan\u0131t yok. Bu konuda Joseph Choonara’ya te\u015fekk\u00fcrler.<\/li>\n
  78. Bkz., Harman, 2009, s. 337-352.<\/li>\n
  79. Fourtuny ve al-Husseini (2010) ve Longuenesse’nin (1985) bulgular\u0131 bunu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fcr\u00fcyor.<\/li>\n
  80. Seifan, 2010.<\/li>\n
  81. Callinicos, 2007.<\/li>\n
  82. Harman, 2009, s. 343-344.,<\/li>\n
  83. Bkz., Naguib, 2011 ve Alexander, 2011<\/li>\n
  84. Batatu, 1981, s. 337.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
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      Geri d\u00f6n<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
      Jonathan Maunder Arap devrimleri, t\u00fcm d\u00fcnyada kapitalizme ve emperyalizme kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccade\u00adleye b\u00fcy\u00fck esin kayna\u011f\u0131 oldu. Grev, i\u015fgal ve protestolarla d\u0131\u015favurulan sisteme kar\u015f\u0131 k\u00fcresel yabanc\u0131la\u015fma ve \u00f6fkeyi esinlendirip besledi.1 Ne var […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-287","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/marx-21.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/287","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/marx-21.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/marx-21.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marx-21.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/marx-21.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=287"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/marx-21.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/287\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":295,"href":"https:\/\/marx-21.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/287\/revisions\/295"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/marx-21.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=287"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}